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NOTE FROM THE FOUNDERS
³:HFDQKDYHGHPRFUDF\LQWKLVFRXQWU\RUZHFDQKDYHJUHDWZHDOWK
FRQFHQWUDWHGLQWKHKDQGVRIDIHZEXWZHFDQ WKDYHERWK´
Justice Louis Brandeis1
³$W WKH WXUQ RI WKH FHQWXU\ ZRPHQ HDUQHG DSSUR[LPDWHO\ WHQ FHQWV DQ
hour, and men were fortunate to receive twenty cents an hour. The
average work week was sixty to seventy hours. During the thirties,
wages were a secondary issue; to have a job at all was the difference
between the agony of starvation and a flicker of life. The nation, now so
vigorous, reeled and tottered almost to total collapse. The labor
movement was the principal force that transformed misery and despair
into hope and progress. Out of its bold struggles, economic and social
reform gave birth to unemployment insurance, old age pensions,
government relief for the destitute, and above all new wage levels that
meant not mere survival, but a tolerable life. The captains of industry
did not lead this transformation; they resisted it until they were
overcome. When in the thirties the wave of union organization crested
over our nation, it carried to secure shores not only itself but the whole
VRFLHW\´
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.2

Labor and employment law is an area of law that impacts every single
individual in this country, if not all around the world. It addresses some of
the most important and fundamental issues of law²as exemplified by its
coverage in most, if not all of foundational law school courses. Labor and
employment law remains the second-most litigated topic in the Federal
Courts.
Washington, D.C. is the home of the United States Supreme Court, the
United States Court of Appeals for both the D.C. and Federal Circuits, the
Department of Labor, the National Labor Relations Board, the Equal
1.
JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE MORROW BOOK OF QUOTATIONS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 48 (1984).
2.
Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at the Illinois AFL-CIO Convention
(Oct. 1965).
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Employment Opportunity Commission, the Merit Systems Protection
Board, numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations,
most²if not all²of the unions in this country, and the Chamber of
Commerce.
Yet, as of April, 2010, there were only five student-run legal
publications that specifically focused on labor and employment law
nationwide and none in Washington, D.C.
The Washington College of Law ³:&/´ was founded in 1896 by two
women, Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett, for the sole purpose of
providing opportunities for those historically outside the mainstream of the
legal profession. WCL has a long-standing tradition of educating students
about the values of dignity, diversity, and equal rights for all. In addition, it
has a reputation for being one of the preeminent institutions in the country
for its programs on international law, human rights, business law, and law
and government. Because of :&/¶V focus on these areas of law, it is no
surprise that the school boasts over fifteen professors teaching
approximately two dozen courses focused on aspects of labor and
employment law. Furthermore, :&/¶V FOLQLFDO SURJUDPV HDFK LQWHUVHFW
with prominent issues in labor and employment law. :&/¶VFRPPLWPHQW
to the importance of labor and employment law is further exemplified by
the Labor and Employment Law & Policy specialization within the
Program on Law & Government¶V Master of Laws (LL.M.) curriculum²
RQHRIWKHIHZ//0¶VQDWLRQZLGHWKDWRIIHUVWKLVVSHFLDOL]DWLRQ
In April, 2010, we sought to help supplement and focus this related
academic elements already present at WCL by founding the sixth studentrun legal publication in this area²The Labor and Employment Law Forum.
The Forum is a novel publication at WCL and serves as an experiment
looking toward the future of legal publications. Early on, the decision was
made to publish in the Digital Commons to provide a forum for thoughtcompelling, legal scholarship with an emphasis on shorter, timely works,
with an emphasis on fast-turn around²articles that might otherwise lose
their relevance, or simply be overlooked by, traditional law reviews. The
Digital Commons gives us, and we hope our readers, the ability to access
polished articles in the native format that all legal scholarship is currently
being read²electURQLFDOO\ %HVLGHV WKH GHVLUH WR EH ³JUHHQ´ DQG FRVWeffective, this format allows us to provide material that often disappears
into obscurity; transcripts and annotations from events that occur both here
at WCL and around the Washington, D.C. area that are vital to the

FOUNDERS NOTE 2/11/11

2011]

2/21/2011 5:58 PM

NOTE FROM THE FOUNDERS

3

academic discussion of labor and employment law. Finding the balance
between the quality of editing that authors expect from traditional,
scholarly legal publications and the necessary rapidity with which the edits
must be completed, has constantly lingered in the background behind this
first issue.
Our sincere hope is that we have struck this balance and that it is
GHPRQVWUDWHGLQWKHIRUHJRLQJSDJHVRIRXULQDXJXUDOLVVXH,IRXUDXWKRUV¶
correspondence to us during this process is any indication, we have.
A special thank you needs to be extended to those who we integral in the
founding of this publication, including Chris Kyle for his support in getting
this publication recognized by the Student Bar Association and The
International Law Review, The Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
and The National Security Law Brief, Joseph Boddicker, and Ian Spear for
their words of wisdom regarding organizational structure and governing
policies. Additional gratitude is owed to those individuals who made the
publication of this first volume possible, including our Editorial Board and
our entire staff and our faculty advisors.
Lastly, we would like to thank the following individuals for their
support: Sean Shank for his expertise and wisdom; Justin Shore for his
enthusiasm, encouragement and assistance; Richael Faithful for her
knowledge and experience; Susanna Birdsong, Amanda Jane Cooney,
Mary Francis Charlton, Jessica Clarke, Clifford Clapp, Renee Danega,
Kyle deCant, Matt Gómez, Ernest Johnson, Pedro de Lencastre, José
0DUUHUR &DLWOLQ 2¶/HDU\ DQG (PLO\ 2¶1HLll for their loyalty and hard
work; Mary Rich for her guidance; Professor Robert Vaughn for his insight
and support; Dean Kaufman, Susan Lewis, Adeen Postar, and Mary Rich
for their expertise and advice.
We would like to thank Professor Susan Carle for serving as our mentor
and source of invaluable insight throughout this sometimes exhausting
process.
Lastly, we would like to thank each of the authors for publishing in our
inaugural issue. Providing our readers with their scholarship is precisely
why we undertook this endeavor. Labor and employment law is far from
static. Whether stemming from common law, statutory, or constitutional
strictures, it is an area of law that is constantly shifting and evolving to
meet the changing realities of the global workplace. Though the economy
has stabilized in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, unemployment
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UHPDLQVKLJKGRPHVWLFDOO\DQGJOREDOO\$V'U.LQJ¶VZRUGVHYRNHLWLVLQ
these uncertain times that the protections provided to workers by law may
be the only economic security they can depend on as industries engage in
reactionary and precautionary downsizing.
The articles and the annotated transcript presented here, in our inaugural
issue, touch upon some of the more dramatic concerns, questions, and
WUDQVLWLRQV WKDW DURVH IURP ERWK WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V ODVW
term, the appointment of new members to the National Labor Relations
Board, DQGWKHSUHOXGHWR&RQJUHVV¶VKLVWRULFUHSHDORI³'RQ¶W$VN'RQ¶W
7HOO´

JENNIFER ERIN BROWN & JAMISON F. GRELLA
THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY 2011
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Unlike the ringing endorsement of labor arbitration in the Steelworkers
Trilogy,1 WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Granite Rock Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters2 will neither revolutionize
arbitration nor change the way courts view Section 301(a) of the LaborManagement Relations Act ³/05$´ 3²at least not in the immediate
future. However, Granite Rock may become best known for what it did not
do²definitively announce whether tort claims may be brought within the
gamut of Section 301(a). The rich history of Section 301(a) has afforded

1.
The Steelworkers Trilogy is comprised of the following three cases: United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The Steelworkers Trilogy was
an historic sea change²from the antipathy courts previously manifested toward
arbitration, to a presumption enthusiastically in favor of arbitration over external
litigation²as the preferred means of dispute resolution in the labor management
context. Significant law review articles and keynote addresses regarding the Trilogy
include: Judge Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The
Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 3 (1988); David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973); Peter Feuille et al., Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards: Some Evidence, 41 LAB. L.J. 477 (1990); William B. Gould IV,
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards²Thirty Years of the Steelworkers
Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464 (1984);
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel Turns: New Evidence on
the Finality of Labor Arbitration Awards, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 193-94
(2007); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993); Michael Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits
on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547 (2005); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review
of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977); W. Daniel Boone, Keynote Address at the National
Academy of ArELWUDWRUV$QQXDO0HHWLQJ%DFNWRWKH%DVLFV$UELWUDWLRQDV³3DUWRID
System of Industrial Self-*RYHUQPHQW´ 0D\    :LOOLDP % *RXOG ,9
Keynote Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting:
Steelworkers Trilogy After a Half Century (May 27, 2010); Andrew M. Kramer,
Keynote Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting: Fifty Years
After the Steelworkers Trilogy: Some New Questions and Old Answers (May 27,
2010).
2.
130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
3.
See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (2006) (providing independent federal jurisdiction for contractual disputes
between employers and labor organizations representing employees).
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the Supreme Court ample opportunity to interpret its purpose and reach.4
Section 301(a) confers jurisdiction on federal courts in suits between
employers and unions.5 6RRQ DIWHU LWV SDVVDJH KRZHYHU WKH &RXUW¶V
interpretation of Section 301(a) emphasized an additional policy goal
flowing from the statute: stability in the collective bargaining process. In
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, the Court found that Section
 D  QRW RQO\ ³FRQIHU>HG@ MXULVGLFWLRQ LQ WKH federal courts over labor
RUJDQL]DWLRQV´ EXW DOVR ³H[SUHVVH>G@ D IHGHUDO SROLF\ WKDW IHGHUDO FRXUWV
should enforce [arbitration] agreements . . . [in order to achieve] industrial
SHDFH´ 6 By interpreting Section 301(a) DVD³FRQJUHVVLRQDOPDQGDWHWRWKH
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law to . . . address disputes
DULVLQJRXWRIODERUFRQWUDFWV>@´7 the Court took it upon itself to stabilize
relationships between employers and unions.
Fifteen years after Section 301(a)¶V SDVVDJH8 contractual stability
between unions and employers continued to be an underlying concern. In
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., the Court explained the necessity
of federal uniformity in collective bargaining disputes to avoid ³[t]he
possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings
under state and federal law [which] would inevitably exert a disruptive
influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective
DJUHHPHQWV´9 Different state and federal interpretations could prolong
disputes, thereby dissuading contracting parties from including arbitration
agreements in the first place.10 TKH &RXUW¶V FRUH FRPPLWPHQW WR VWDELOLW\
within the collective bargaining process guided its Section 301(a)
jurisprudence.
4.
See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)
(recognizing Section 301(a) as an independent grant of federal court jurisdiction
regardless of amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship in order to fashion a
federal common law to govern disputes of collective bargaining agreements); see also
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213±14 (1985) (holding state-law based
claims solely created by a collective bargaining agreement are subject to Section 301(a)
and preempted by federal law); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
104±05 (1962) (mandating federal common ODZ¶VVXSUHPDF\RYHUORFDODQGVWDWHODZV
in interpreting collective bargaining agreements subject to federal jurisdiction under
Section 301(a)).
5.
See § 301(a), § 185(a); see also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455 (observing the
congressional intent of Section 301(a) was more than merely a jurisdictional grant, but
also to provide legal remedies to the parties of collective bargaining agreements).
6.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
7.
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 209.
8.
See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006)) (creating jurisdiction
to allow for private suits to enforce the substance of collective bargaining agreements
between employers and unions).
9.
Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103.
10. Id. at 104.
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Although the &RXUW¶V Rpinion in Granite Rock focused more on
addressing the availability of options Granite Rock might still pursue²as
opposed to explaining why the Court did not endorse the claim for tortious
interference of contract²the Court madH FOHDU WKDW ³>W@KH EDODQFH IHderal
statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collectivebargaining arena is carefully calibrated.´11 Consequently, the Court held
that ³FUHDWLQJ D IHGHUDO FRPPRQ-law tort cause of action [under Section
301(a)] would require a host of policy choices that could easily upset this
EDODQFH>@´12 The majority went no further, finding no need to determine
whether Section 301(a) represented a Congressional mandate to create a
body of federal tort law regarding the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements.13
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND/PROCEDURE
Granite Rock Co. and Teamsters Local 287 ³/RFDO´ were parties to
a collective bargaining agreement ³&%$´  IRU ILYH \HDUV WKDW H[SLUHG RQ
April 30, 2004.14 Preliminary negotiations for a new agreement began in
March 2004, yet the parties were unable to reach a resolution by May
2004.15 After reaching impasse, Local 287 began its strike of Granite Rock
on June 9, 2004.16 On July 2, 2004 at 4 a.m., a new four-year agreement
was allegedly reached containing a broad arbitration clause for the
VHWWOHPHQWRI³DQ\GLVSXWHV´DULVLQJXQGHUWKHDJUHHPHQWDVZHOODVD³QRVWULNHFODXVH´FRYHULQJWKHSHULRGIURP0D\±April 30, 2008.17 The
parties were not, however, able to reach a separate back-to-work agreement
that would indemnify Local union members from liability for any strikerelated damages Granite Rock incurred.18 Later that morning, Local 287
11. See Granite Rock &RY,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2864 (2010);
see also NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639 (Local 639), 362
U.S. 274, 289±290 (1960) (acknowledging that the Taft-+DUWOH\$FWZDV³WKHUHVXOWRI
FRQIOLFW DQG FRPSURPLVH´ WR VWULNH D EDODQFH EHWZHHQ WKH SRZHU RI PDQDJHPHQW DQG
labor).
12. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2864.
13. See id. at 2864±65 FRXFKLQJWKH&RXUW¶VGHQLDOWRUHFRJQL]HDIHGHUDOFRPPRQ
law tort under Section 301(a) as premature, given the other remedies available to
Granite Rock).
14. *UDQLWH 5RFN &R Y ,QW¶O %KG RI 7HDPVWHUV /RFDO  (Local 287 IV), 546
F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008), DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶GLQSDUWVXEQRPGranite Rock Co.
Y,QW¶O%KG2I7HDPVWHUV6&W  
15. *UDQLWH5RFN&RY ,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV /RFDO (Local 287 I), 402 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
16. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2853.
17. Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1171.
18. See Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1122± REVHUYLQJ/RFDO¶VFODLPWKDW
the acceptance of the new collective bargaining agreement was subject to reaching an
DJUHHPHQWRQWKH³%DFNWR:RUN$JUHHPHQW´ 
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allegedly ratified the new CBA.19 Granite Rock then claimed that George
1HWWR/RFDO¶VEXVLQHVVUHSUHVHQWDWive, called Granite Rock to confirm
that the Union had ratified the new agreement.20 However, Local 287
denied that union members ratified the agreement, contending that this
UDWLILFDWLRQ ZDV D FRQGLWLRQ WR WKH DJUHHPHQW RI D ³EDFN WR ZRUN
DJUHHPHQW´21 Granite Rock countered that there was an agreement to
discuss the back to work agreement at a later date, and that the back to
work agreement was subject to the grievance procedure outlined in the new
agreement.22
On July 5, 2004/RFDO¶VPHPEHUVUHFHLYHGLnstructions from Rome
Aloise, the administrative assistant to the General President of the
,QWHUQDWLRQDO %URWKHUKRRG RI 7HDPVWHUV ³,%7´  DQG other members of
Local 287 to refrain from returning to work.23 Granite Rock alleged that on
July 6th, 2004, Mr. Netto demanded a back-to-work agreement that would
protect Local 287 and IBT from liability arising from the strike prior to
returning to work.24 When Granite Rock refused, the strike continued²
which Granite Rock alleged violated the new collective bargaining
DJUHHPHQW¶VQR-strike provision.25 The strike continued until September 13,
2004, and the parties executed their new collective bargaining agreement in
'HFHPEHU ³'HFHPEHU&%$´ 26
The parties agreed that the December CBA was a valid contract and that
it was retroactive to May,27 but they disagreed as to the scope of the
retroactivity. The oral arguments to the Supreme Court are illustrative:
MR. MATHIASON [counsel for Granite Rock]: Your Honor,
ZKDW¶VUHDOO\FHQWUDOLVWKHIDFWWKDWZKHQZHVLJQHGin December,
we signed the agreement of July 2nd. That is critical. If there had
been no ratification on July 2nd, there would be no contract. And
when the union signed, they take the position that they signed a
contract ratified on August 22nd. Those are radically different
events . . . .28
19. Id. The basis of the disagreement between Local 287 and Granite Rock
concerns whether the Local 287 did, in fact, ratify the agreement on July 2, 2004. Local
287 asserted that acceptance of the agreement was conditioned on GraQLWH 5RFN¶V
DFFHSWDQFHRID³%DFNWR:RUN$JUHHPHQW´
20. Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1171±72.
21. Id. at 1172.
22. Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1122±23.
23. Id. at 1171±72.
24. Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1172.
25. Id.
26. Granite Rock &RY,QW¶l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2861 (2010).
27. Id. at 2867.
28. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17±18*UDQLWH5RFNY,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV
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JUSTICE ALITO: Am I correct that neither you, neither Granite
Rock nor the Local, thinks that the December collective
bargaining DJUHHPHQW UHDOO\ ZDV IXOO\ UHWURDFWLYH" 7KH\ GRQ¶W
think it was-MR. MATHIASON: 7KDW¶VFRUUHFW29
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So ± VR \RX GRQ¶W WKLQN >WKH
December
CBA]
included
the
no-strike
clause--30
MR. BONSALL [counsel for Local 287]: We contend that it
would not . . . .31
The subject of the disagreement was whether the December CBA
executed the CBA retroactively to the July 2nd ratification vote or the
August 22nd ratification vote by Local 287. This dispute left open the
question of whether both parties agreed to arbitrate the July strike²a
dispute requiring judicial resolution.32
III. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
A. The District Court
On July 9, 2004, Granite Rock filed a complaint in United States District
Court for the Northern District of California against Local 287, alleging
that Local 287 had participated in an unlawful strike and invoking federal
jurisdiction under Section 301(a) of the LMRA.33 Granite Rock amended
its complaint to include a request for injunctive relief through a temporary
restraining order.34 The court denied injunctive relief and found that the
new agreement had not been ratified.35 Granite Rock filed another motion
for a new trial based on new evidence.36 Local 287 responded with a
130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010) (No. 08-1214), 2010 WL 171664.
29. Id. at 18 (alteration in original).
30. Id. at 25 (alteration in original).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)
(³>:@KHWKHUSDUWLHVKDYHVXEPLWWHGDSDUWLFXODUGLVSXWHWRDUELWUDWLRQLVDQLVVXHIRU
MXGLFLDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQ>@´ (citing AT&T TeFKV ,QFY&RPPF¶QV:RUNHUV86
643, 649 (1986))).
33. Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See generally Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Motion to
Vacate Dismissal of the FLUVW $PHQGHG&RPSODLQW*UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGRI
Teamsters, Local 287 (Local 287 I), 402 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 04CV-02767), 2004 WL 5571934 (arguing that Granite Rock is entitled to a new trial
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request for judgment on the pleadings.37 The court denied the Local 287¶V
motion.38
In the first of a series of orders, the DiVWULFW&RXUWJUDQWHG/RFDO¶V
PRWLRQ WROLPLW WKH WULDOFRXUW¶VUHYLHZWR ZKHWKHU DFROOHFWLYH EDUJDLQLQJ
DJUHHPHQWZDVLQHIIHFWZKHQGHIHQGDQW¶VDOOHJHGYLRODWLRQWRRNSODFHDQG
if so, reserved questions of whether an actual violation of the agreement
occurred and the amount of damages for arbitration.39 The court denied
GHIHQGDQW¶V PRWLRQ WR VWULNH *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V MXU\ GHPDQG and found
*UDQLWH5RFN¶Vrequest to be timely.40
,Q LWV VHFRQG RUGHU WKH 'LVWULFW &RXUW GHQLHG /RFDO ¶V PRWLRQ IRU
summary judgment on issue preclusion.41 Local 287 moved for summary
judgment after the National Labor Relations Board¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWWKH
July 2nd collective bargaining agreement did not exist at the time of Local
¶V VWULNH42 However, the court found that Granite Rock had expressly
³UHVHUYHGWKHUDWLILFDWLRQLVVXHIRUOLWLJDWLRQLQ[District Court]´43
On February 14, in its third order, the District Court granted Granite
5RFN¶V PRWLRQ WR DGG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO %URWKHUKRRG RI 7HDPVWHUV DV D
defendant.44 The court pointed to documents indicating that Rome Aloise,
the Administrative Assistant to the General President of IBT, had, among

because of newly discovered evidencH DQG WKH FRXUW¶VMXGJPHQW PXVW EH DPHQGHG RU
altered to vacate the dismissal of the complaint).
37. Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
38. See id. (observing denial of a motion for judgment under FED. R. CIV. PRO.
12(c) was appropriate because of the underlying factual dispute concerning the
ratification date of the December CBA by Local 287).
39. See id. at 1126±27 (holding that Local 287 was neither estopped from, nor had
waived its ability of, invoking the arbitration provision of the December CBA since
/RFDO¶VDOWHUQDWLYHDUJXPHQWWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKH&%$DWWKHtime of the dispute
had always been that if such an agreement was found, the matter should be referred to
arbitration).
40. See idDW REVHUYLQJWKDW*UDQLWH5RFN¶VUHTXHVt for a jury trial was made
ZLWKLQWHQGD\VRI/RFDO¶VODVWILOLQJZKLFKFRPSRUWVZLWKFED. R. CIV. P. 38(b)).
41. *UDQLWH 5RFN &R Y ,QW¶O %KG RI 7HDPVWHUV /RFDO  (Local 287 II), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36048, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2006).
42. See id. at *2, *5± REVHUYLQJWKDW/RFDO¶VDUJXPHQWZDVEDVHGRQWKHIDFW
WKDW WKH 1/5%¶V DGMXGLFDWLRQ RI *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V XQIDLU ODERU SUDFWLFH FKDUJH ZDV
binding on Granite Rock).
43. See id. at *15. Cf. 7HDPVWHUV/RFDO,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUs (Granite Rock
&R   1/5%   Q   DIILUPLQJ WKH $GPLQLVWUDWLYH /DZ -XGJH¶V
decision not to reach the issue of whether Local 287 held a ratification vote on July 2,
2004, DV GRLQJ VR ZDV DOOHJHG LQ WKH FRPSODLQW DQG WKH 1/5%¶V *HQHUDO &RXQVHO¶V
WKHRU\RIWKHFDVHFRQWUROVWKHLVVXHVDWWULDOQRWWKH&KDUJLQJ3DUW\¶V 
44. See *UDQLWH 5RFN &R Y ,QW¶O %KG RI 7HDPVWHUV /RFDO  (Local 287 III),
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25606, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2006) (applying DCD
Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) to allow Granite Rock to
OLEHUDOO\DPHQGLWVFRPSODLQW³ZKHQMXVWLFHVRUHTXLUHV´ FLWLQJFED. R. CIV. P. 15(a))).
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other things, encouraged Local 287 to continue to strike.45
Ultimately, the District Court found that the ratification date issue was
one for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide.46 After a federal jury found
that Local 287 ratified the December CBA on July 2, 2004, the District
Court referred the issues of breach of contract and damages to arbitration
DQG GLVPLVVHG *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V tortious interference of contract claim
against IBT.47
B. The Ninth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded in part.48 Judge Gould found that the District Court properly
GLVPLVVHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VWRUWLRXV interference of contract claim for failing
to state a claim.49 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court
HUUHG LQ GHQ\LQJ /RFDO ¶V PRWLRQ WR FRPSHO DUELWUDWLRQ DQG UHPDQGHG
³WKH HQWLUH GLVSXWH´ IRU DUELWUDWLRQ ILQGLQJ LW XQQHFHVVDU\ WR DGdress the
contract formation issue.50
1. 'HQLDORI*UDQLWH5RFN¶V7RUWLRXV,QWHUIHUHQFH&ODLP8QGHU6HFWLRQ
301(a)
Judge Gould, writing for a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel, based the
FRXUW¶Vopinion on Painting & Decorating Contractors Ass¶n v. Painters &
Decorators Joint Committee, Inc.,51 a Ninth Circuit decision from 1983
outlining the requirements for jurisdiction under Section 301(a).52 First, a
FODLP PXVW EH ³EDVHG RQ DQ DOOHJHG EUHDFK RI FRQWUDFW EHWZHHQ DQ
employer and a labor organization.´53 Second, ³the resolution of the lawsuit
[must] EHIRFXVHGXSRQDQGJRYHUQHGE\WKHWHUPVRIWKHFRQWUDFW´54 The
1LQWK &LUFXLW IRXQG WKDW WKH 'LVWULFW &RXUW¶V GLVPLVVDO RI *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V
claim against IBT for tortious interference was correct because the claim
did nRW ³DULVH XQGHU´ WKH QHZ FROOHFWLYH EDUJDLQLQJ DJUHHPHQW EHWZHHQ
45. See id. at *3±4 (couching its decision to allow IBT to be added as a defendant
on the great amount of assistance that IBT allegedly provided to Local 287 through
Aloise during and prior to the strike).
46. *UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGRI7HDPVWHUV 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2855 (2010).
47. Id.
48. Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008), DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶GLQSDUW
sub nom. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
49. See id XSKROGLQJ WKH 'LVWULFW &RXUW¶V UXOLQJ that FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
SUHFOXGHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VFODLPRIWRUWXRXVLQWHUIHUHQFH 
50. Id.
51. 707 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1983).
52. Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1172.
53. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
54. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Granite Rock and Local 287 reached on July 2, 2004.55 The court further
noted that other circuit courts also declined to extend a Section 301(a)
FDXVHRIDFWLRQWR³SDUWLHVQRWJRYHUQHGE\WKH UHOHYDQWDJUHHPHQW´56
7KH1LQWK&LUFXLWDOVRGLVPLVVHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWDIHGHUDO
tort claim was cognizable under Section 301(a).57 The Court of Appeals
stated that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent interpreting Section
 D  DV ³D PDQdate to create a federal common law of labor contract
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQQRWDQLQGHSHQGHQWERG\RIWRUWODZ´58 As to satisfying the
VHFRQG HOHPHQW RI 6HFWLRQ  D  *UDQLWH 5RFN DUJXHG WKDW ³EHFDXVH
breach of the underlying contract is a necessary element of the tortious
LQWHUIHUHQFH FODLP WKH UHVROXWLRQ RI WKH WRUW FODLP LV µIRFXVHG XSRQ¶ DQG
µJRYHUQHG E\¶ WKH FRQWUDFW´59 In addition, Granite Rock pointed to the
³FORVH UHODWLRQVKLS´ EHWZHHQ /RFDO  DQG ,%7 WR KLJKOLJKW WKH EHQHILW
that IBT gained by the /RFDO¶V EUHDFK60 7KH FRXUW QRWHG WKH DUJXPHQW¶V
³HPRWLYHIRUFH´EXWheld WKDW*UDQLWH5RFN¶VDUJXPHQWODFNHGSUHFHGHQWLDO
support.61
Unable to persuade the Ninth Circuit on plain language grounds, Granite
Rock turned to legislative intent, arguing that Congress intended Section
 D  WRH[WHQGWR SDUWLHV VXFK DV ,%7 RXW RI FRQFHUQV IRU ³IXQGDPHQWDO
IDLUQHVV´62 %XW*UDQLWH5RFN¶VUHOLDQFHRQOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\WRHVWDEOLVKD
tortious interference claim under Section 301(a) also proved unpersuasive.
The couUW IHOW ERXQG E\ WKH VWDWXWH¶V ODQJXDJH DQG WKDW ³>D@Q\ µJDS¶ WKDW
PLJKWH[LVWLQ&RQJUHVV¶VODERUODZGHVLJQLVIRU&RQJUHVVDQGQRWIRU>WKH
FRXUWV@WRILOO´63

55. Id. at 1173.
56. Id. at 1174 (citing Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561,
572 (2d Cir. 1995); ,QW¶O8QLRQ8QLWHG0LQH:RUNHUVRI$PY&RYHQDQW&RDO&RUS
977 F.2d 895, 897 (4th Cir. 1992); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
No. 1564 v. Quality Plus Stores, Inc., 961 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1992); Serv., Hosp.,
Nursing Home & Pub. Emps. Union, Local No. 47 v. Commercial Prop. Servs., Inc.,
755 F.2d 499, 509 (6th Cir. 1985); Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 948 (7th Cir.
1982); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 501
(5th Cir. 1982)). But see id. at 1174± GLVFXVVLQJ WKH 7KLUG &LUFXLW¶V DGRSWLRQ RI
tortious interference claims under Section 301(a) (citing Wilkes-%DUUH 3XEO¶J &R Y
Newspaper Guild, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1981))).
57. See Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d DW ³*UDQLWH5RFN¶Vassertion that we should
create a federal common law to reach IBT misinterprets our instructions from Congress
DQGWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW´ 
58. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985)).
59. Id. at 1173.
60. Id. at 1173±74.
61. Id. at 1174.
62. Id. at 1175.
63. Id.
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2. The Effect of the Arbitration Clause
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the effect of the arbitration clause
found in the December CBA.64 The court began by pointing out the
distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between challenges to arbitration
clauses and those directed at the validity of the entire contract.65 It noted
that the arbitrator should consider all challenges to the validity of the
contract, while only courts may consider challenges to the arbitration
clause.66 Following this precedent, the Ninth Circuit found that, because
Granite Rock failed to make an independent challenge to the arbitration
clause, it FRXOGQRWFKDOOHQJHWKHFODXVH¶VYDOLGLW\WKURXJKDJHQHUDOEUHDFK
of contract action.67 Granite Rock again argued that Local 287 should be
estopped from asserting the arbitration clause in the first place because
Local 287 disputed that a contract between the parties had ever been
formed.68 However, the court found that it had already rejected similar
arguments in Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp.,69 where the Ninth Circuit
GLVPLVVHG WKH SODLQWLII¶V FODLP LQ RUGHU WR DYRLG WKH ³DEVXUG UHVXOW´ Rf
finding for the validity of a contract while ignoring its arbitration
provision.70 Ultimately, the court found that both parties consented to
arbitration²*UDQLWH5RFNGRLQJVR³LPSOLFLWO\E\VXLQJXQGHUWKHFRQWUDFW
containing the arbitration clause, and Local 287 explicitly by asserting the
DUELWUDWLRQFODXVH´ as an affirmative defense.71

64. Id. at 1176.
65. Id.
66. See id. ³>8@QOHVVWKHFKDOOHQJHLVWRWKHDUELWUDWLRQFODXVHLWVHOIWKHLVVXHRIWKH
FRQWUDFW¶V YDOLGLW\ LV FRQVLGHUHG E\ WKH DUELWUDWRU LQ WKH ILUVW LQVWDQFH´ (alteration in
original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445±46 (2006))).
67. See id. DW  DVVHUWLQJ WKH 'HFHPEHU &%$¶V DUELWUDWLRQ FODXVH ZDV EURDG
enough to cover a dispute of contract formation because the clausH FRYHUHG ³>D@OO
GLVSXWHV DULVLQJ XQGHU WKLV DJUHHPHQW´ DOWHUDWLRQ LQ RULJLQDO  LQWHUQDO TXRWDWLRQV
omitted) (citing Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136,
1142 (9th Cir. 1991))).
68. See id. at 1177±78.
69. 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989).
70. Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1178 (citing Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d
1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1989)).
71. See id. (conceding that either Granite Rock or Local 287 might have retained
their right to have a court resolve the date on which the contract was formed had they
QRWLPSOLFLWO\DVVHUWHGWKHFRQWUDFW¶VYDOLGLW\E\UHO\LQJRQWKHDUELWUDWLRQFODXVH 
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. The Majority
In a seven to two decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Court
UHYHUVHG LQ SDUW DQG DIILUPHG LQ SDUW WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW¶s decision.72 The
Court addressed two issues: 1) whether an arbitrator or the District Court
VKRXOGGHFLGHWKHSDUWLHV¶GLVSXWHRYHUWKH&%$¶VUDWLILFDWLRQGDWHDQG 
ZKHWKHUWKH 1LQWK &LUFXLWLQFRUUHFWO\ GHFOLQHG *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V³UHTXHVWWR
recognize a new federal cause of action under [Section] 301(a) of the Labor
0DQDJHPHQW 5HODWLRQV $FW´ IRU WRUWLRXV LQWHUIHUHQFH RI FRQWUDFW73 As to
the first issue, the Court held that the ratification dispute was for the
District Court to decide.74 As to the second, it concluded that Granite Rock
could not bring a tortious interference of contract claim under Section
301(a) of the LMRA.75
1. The Labor Contract Formation Issue
The Court first addressed if D GLVSXWH DV WR ZKHWKHU WKH SDUWLHV¶
agreement to submit their dispute to arbitration was a matter for an
arbitrator or a judge to decide.76 The specific issue was whether Granite
Rock and Local 287 agreed to arbitrate the question of when the contract
was ratified and thereby formed.77 As an initial matter, Justice Thomas
noted that both parties agreed that the arbitration clause in the contract was
valid and that certain issues should be arbitrated pursuant to the clause.78
The initial question in arbitration disputes is whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate a particular issue, which often implicates the question of
contract formation.79 When the question is if a contract has been formed,
72. See *UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGof Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2853 (2010)
(holding that the Ninth Circuit erred by referring resolution of the ratification date of
the December CBA to arbitration because it should be done judicially, but finding no
HUURU LQ WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW¶V UHIXVDO WR create a new tortious interference with contract
cause of action under Section 301(a)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 2855 (explaining that courts typically determine whether parties have
DJUHHGWR³VXEPLWDSDUWLFXODUGLVSXWHWRDUELWUDWLRQ´ LQWHUQDOTXRWDWLRQPDUNVRPLWWHG 
(citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002))).
77. See id. at 2855± ³>$ GLVSXWH RQ@ FRQWUDFW IRUPDWLRQ    LV JHQHUDOO\ IRU
FRXUWVWRGHFLGH´ 
78. See id. at 2856± QRWLQJWKDW*UDQLWH5RFNKDG³FRQFHGHGERWKWKHIRUPDWLRQ
and the validity of the . . . arbitration clauVH´ 
79. See id. DW  ³>$@ FRXUW PD\ RUGHU DUELWUDWLRQ RI D SDUWLFXODU GLVSXWH RQO\
where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute´ emphasis
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that issue goes to a court to decide, because a court cannot require a
defendant to arbitrate rights and liabilities of a contract to which she is not
bound. But the Court distinguished Granite Rock as concerning when, not if
Local 287 had ratified the CBA.80 Granite Rock asserted that the contract,
which contained a no-strike clause, became binding before Local 287 went
on strike, which in turn rendered Local 287 in breach of the contract.81
Local 287 asserted that the contract was not formed before the strike, but
afterwards²therefore, Local 287 argued it should not be held liable for
breach of contract when it went on strike.82
Compelling arbitration of a particular issue is appropriate in situations in
which both parties have already agreed to arbitrate the issue.83 When the
parties agree to arbitrate a certain issue, they do so with the assumption that
the arbitrator will decide the caVH ZLWKLQ WKH IUDPHZRUN RI WKH SDUWLHV¶
contract.84 The parties assume that an arbitrator will use the provisions of
their contract to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties,
including when those rights and responsibilities come into existence.
Before an arbitrator can construe the terms of a contract, however, the
rights and responsibilities must have already come into existence, that is,
when the contract is formed. Justice Thomas emphasized that ³>I@RU
purposes of determining arbitrability, when a contract is formed can be as
critical as whether LWZDVIRUPHG´85
Justice Thomas also DGGUHVVHGWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHDOOinclusive arbitration clause in the CBA covered the issue of when the
contract was formed. He noted that WKH1LQWK&LUFXLW³RYHUORRNHGWKHIDFW
that this theory of the ratification dispute¶s arbitrability fails if the CBA
was not formed at the time the unions engaged in the acts that gave rise to
*UDQLWH5RFN¶VVWULNHFODLPV´86 In this way, the majority rejected the Ninth
&LUFXLW¶VDWWHPSWWRWLHWKHDUELWUDELOLW\RIWKHDecember &%$¶VUDWLILFDWLRQ
in original)).
80. See id. DW  Q QRWLQJ WKDW DOWKRXJK WKH XQLRQ¶V ratification vote is not
usually a requirement for proper formation of a CBA, it was in the instant case because
both Local 287 and Granite Rock agreed that a ratification vote was a prerequisite).
81. See id. at 2854 (explaining that Granite Rock first asked the District Court to
remedy the breach by enjoining the strike).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 2856±57 ³$UELWUDWLRQLVVWULFWO\µDPDWWHURIFRQVHQW¶DQGWKXVµLV
a way to resolve those disputes²but only those disputes²that the parties have agreed
WRVXEPLWWRDUELWUDWLRQ>@¶´ HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO  FLWDWLRQVRPLWWHG 
84. See id. at 2859 & n.8 (analogizing the approach courts take in determining
arbitrability in labor cases to the role of courts in cases governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act²DFRXUW¶VUROHLVWRVXEPLWRQO\WKRVHJULHYDQFHV³WKDWWKHSDUWLHVKDYH
DJUHHGWRVXEPLW´ 
85. Id. at 2860 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 2861.
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date with the arbitrability of the strike claims.87
Indeed, because the union began its strike on July 6th, but may not have
ratified the agreement²and consequently had not formed a contract²until
August 22nd, there was not necessarily a CBA for the July no-strike
dispute to ³arise under.´88 :KLOH WKHUH ZDV QR GLVSXWH WKDW WKH &%$¶V
DUELWUDWLRQFODXVHFRYHUHG³DOOGLVSXWHVDULVLQJRXWRIWKLVDJUHHPHQW´WKH
Court found that issues of formation did not so obviously fall under the
GHILQLWLRQRI³DULVLQJXQGHU´89
Because the Court framed the issue as one of contract formation, the
&RXUW IRXQG WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW¶V UDWLRQDOH XQSHUVXDVLYH EHFDXVH ³WKH
[December] CBA was not [necessarily] formed at the time the unions
HQJDJHG LQ WKH DFWV WKDW JDYH ULVH WR *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V VWULNH FODLPV´90
Finally, Justice Thomas noted that the Ninth Circuit should have read the
³DULVLQJXQGHU´ODQJXDJHRIWKHDUELWUDWLRQSURYLVLRQ to determine whether
the clause covered the formation-date dispute, rather than merely focusing
on whether the no-VWULNH FODXVH ZDV FRYHUHG E\ WKH &%$¶V DUELWUDWLRQ
clause.91 In essence, the agreement itself did not contemplate that
arbitration would answer all issues²instead, the arbitration clause, like the
no-strike clause, were part of the contractual scheme. Justice Thomas
concluded that Granite Rock did not consent to arbitration merely because
it sued under the contract that contained the arbitration clause.92
ThH &RXUW GLVWLQJXLVKHG WKH FDVH¶VWLPLQJ LVVXH DV DW\SLFDOLQ WKDW WKLV
dispute centered on when, not whether, Local 287 ratified the new
collective bargaining agreement.93 The Court dispelled Local 287 and the
1LQWK &LUFXLW¶V UHOLDQFH XSRQ WZR SULQFLSOHV Whe Court had previously set
forth in arbitrability cases.94 Instead, the Court focused on consent²or
87. See id. at 2861 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for failing to observe that if, as
Local 287 contended, the December CBA was ratified in August rather than July, the
no-VWULNH FODXVH RI WKH 'HFHPEHU &%$ ZRXOG EH LQDSSOLFDEOH WR WKH SDUWLHV¶ GLVSXWH
and the matter would not be arbitrable).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 2862 (couching WKH &RXUW¶V conclusion RQ D ³UHODWLYHO\ QDUURZ´
UHDGLQJRIWKH'HFHPEHU&%$¶V³DULVLQJXQGHUWKLVDJUHHPHQW´ODQJXDJHDVWRH[FOXGH
a dispute as to the ratification date of the same agreement).
90. See id. at 2861 (mentioning the additional procedural requirement for
mediation prior to arbitration under the December CBA).
91. Id. at 2862.
92. Id. at 2862±63.
93. See id. at 2856.
94. 7KH ILUVW SULQFLSOH UHOLHG XSRQ ZDV WKDW ³DQ\ GRXEWV FRQFHUQLQJ WKH VFRSH RI
DUELWUDO LVVXHV VKRXOG EH UHVROYHG LQ IDYRU RI DUELWUDWLRQ´ Id. at 2857 (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)).
7KH VHFRQG SULQFLSOH ZDV WKDW³LQ FDVHV JRYHUQHG E\ WKH )HGHUDO $UELWUDWLRQ $FW   
courts must treat the arbitration clause as severable from the contrDFW´ XQOHVV D SDUW\
challenges the validity of the arbitration clause or the formation of the contract. Id. at
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rather, the lack thereof.95 Indeed, Justice Thomas ultimately concluded that
a court ³PXVW UHVROYH WKH [formation-date] disagreement´ EHFDXVH /RFDO
287 disputed the formation of the December CBA, and thus the arbitration
clause.96 In short, the Court ruled the presumption in favor of arbitrability
³RYHUULGHVWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWDFRXUWPD\VXEPLWWRDUELWUDWLRQµRQO\WKRVH
disputes . . . that the parties have agreed to submit[.]¶´97 Policy concerns,
WKH &RXUW QRWHG KDG QHYHU EHHQ KHOG ³DV D VXEVWLWXWH IRU SDUW\
DJUHHPHQW´98
In dicta, the Court explained, regardless of whether the dispute was one
RI FRQWUDFW IRUPDWLRQ WKH GLVSXWH IHOO ³RXWVLGH WKH VFRSH RI WKH SDUWLHV¶
DUELWUDWLRQ FODXVH´ WKDW D ³SUHVXPSWLRQ IDYRULQJ DUELWUDWLRQ FDQQRW FXUH´
because the ratification date went WR³WKH&%$¶VYHU\H[LVWHQFH´GXULQJWKH
July strike.99 Second, even if the CBA could be interpreted to cover the
formation dispute, the arbiWUDWLRQ FODXVH¶V UHPDLQLQJ SURYLVLRQV FOHDUO\
indicated that use of the arbitration machinery was expressly limited to
those disputes between Granite Rock and Local 287 that were affirmatively
addressed in the other provisions of the CBA.100
The Court also addressed Local 287¶V UHWURDFWLYLW\ DUJXPHQW101 Local
287 argued that because the parties executed a document in December 2004
that made the CBA effective as of the previous May; WKH&%$¶VDUELWUDWLRQ
clause was therefore effective during the July strike period.102 However,
because Local 287 did not raise this argument in the Court of Appeals, the
majority found that the argument had been waived.103
2857 (citations omitted).
95. See id. at 2856 & n.4, 2857 & n.6 (observing that the parties agreed that given
the facts of their case, a valid formation of the contract required a union ratification
vote).
96. Id. at 2858.
97. Id. at 2859 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
943 (1995)) (alteration in original).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 2862 (distinguishing that thH DUELWUDELOLW\ RI /RFDO ¶V -XO\ VWULNH
activity is linked to whether the December CBA had been ratified at the point in the
time when the complained-of strike actually occurred).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2861.
102. See id. (noting that Local 287 did not argue that the no-strike clause was
retroactive, however Local 287 did propose the retroactivity of the arbitration clause
ZDV DQ ³DOWHUQDWLYH JURXQG RQ ZKLFK WKH &RXUW FRXOG RU VKRXOG DIILUP WKH [Ninth
&LUFXLW¶V@MXGJPHQW´).
103. See id. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Stevens, agreed that a tortious
LQWHUIHUHQFHRIFRQWUDFWFODLPZDV³QRWFRJQL]DEOH´XQGHU6HFWLRQ D  Id. at 2866
6RWRPD\RU - FRQFXUULQJ LQ SDUW GLVVHQWLQJ LQ SDUW  6KH SDUWHG ZLWK WKH PDMRULW\¶V
view that Local 287 had waived its retroactivity argument. See id. at 2868±69. The
dispute, in her opinion, should be decided by an arbitrator. Id. at 2868. As to the waiver
LVVXH-XVWLFH6RWRPD\RUIRFXVHGRQWKHSDUWLHV¶LQWHQWLQWKDWWKH\³H[SUHVVO\FKRVHWR
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Concluding its discussion of the first issue, the Court refused to accept
Local 287¶VFRQWHQWLRQ²and the finding of the lower court²that Granite
Rock impliedly consented to arbitration by bringing VXLW ³WR HQIRUFH WKH
&%$¶V no-strike SURYLVLRQV´104 7KH &RXUW IRXQG WKDW *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V
attempt to seek an injunction of the strike in order to arbitrate the grievance
did not result in its consent to arbitrate the date at which the CBA became
effective.105 7KH&RXUWVHSDUDWHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VDWWHPSWVWRDUELWUDWHLVVXHV
related to the strike from the December &%$¶V IRUPDWLRQ DQ LVVXH WKDW
Granite Rock had always maintained was beyond the reach of the CBA.106
2. The Federal Tort Claim Issue
7KH &RXUW UHMHFWHG *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW 6HFWLRQ  D 
SHUPLWWHGLWWREULQJDIHGHUDOWRUWFODLPIRU,%7¶VDOOHJHGLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWK
the CBA.107 Granite Rock contended that the Court should reject the
majority view of the Courts of Appeals on the issue, because to accept their
UHDVRQLQJ ZRXOG KDYH FRQWUDGLFWHG WKH ODUJHU SROLF\ JRDO RI ³SURPRWLQJ
industrial peace and economic stability through judicial enforcement of
CBAs, [as well as] with [the] &RXUW¶V SUHFHGHQWV KROGLQJ WKDW D IHGHUDO
common law of labor contracts is necessary to further [that] JRDO´108 In
addition, Granite Rock maintained that a federal tort claim under Section
 D ZDVQHFHVVDU\EHFDXVHRWKHUUHPHGLHVZHUH³HLWKHr unavailable or
LQVXIILFLHQW´109
7KH &RXUW UHMHFWHG ERWK *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V SROLF\ DUJXPHQW DQG LWV
contention that failure to allow a federal tortious interference with contract
claim against IBT under Section 301(a) would place Granite Rock in a
wholly untenable position.110 7KH&RXUWYLHZHG*UDQLWH5RFN¶VSRVLWLRQLQ
a more flexible light, and pointed out that, while Section 301(a) did create a
body of federal law to deal with the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreement issues, allowing Granite Rock to bring a federal tort claim under
make the agreement effective IURP0D\´Id. at 2867. As a result, she argued
that it did not matter whether the parties ratified the CBA in July or in August because
it was already effective retroactively to May. Thus, in her view WKH GLVSXWH ³DULVHV
XQGHU´WKH&%$Id.
104. Id. at 2862 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 2864 (resting this conclusion on the narrow question that the Court
felt was before it²whether Granite Rock should have augmented remedial avenues
besides those already available).
108. Id. at 2863±64.
109. Id. at 2864.
110. See id. (characterizing an extension of Section 301(a) to tortious interference
FODLPVDVDV³UHTXLU>LQJ@DKRVWRISROLF\FKRLFHV´ 
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this statute would create policy concerns that could upset the balance struck
between unions and employers under federal labor statutes.111 The Court
preferred to retain Section 301(a)¶V FXUUHQW OLPLW RQ common law
contractual remedies and rather than extend its reach to tort claims.112
Justice Thomas concluded that even if Section 301(a) did authorize the
federal courts to create a common law claim for tortious interference of
contract, it would be premature for the Court to decide the issue because
Granite Rock had not shown that other remedies were unavailable.113 For
instance, Granite Rock failed to show that state claims were insufficient to
provide a remedy.114 Granite Rock also failed to show that breach of
contract or administrative claims, such as those falling under an alter-ego
or agency theory, against the IBT would fail on remand.115
%-XVWLFH6RWRPD\RU¶V9LHZ
The Realpolitik of an Experienced Trial Court Judge
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred with the
majority that Granite Rock could not bring a federal tort claim under
Section 301(a), but disagreed that the formation dispute was one for the
courts, and not for an arbitrator, to resolve.116 While the majority framed
the formation issue as based on when, not whether, the CBA became
binding,117 -XVWLFH6RWRPD\RUDUJXHGWKDWWKH³H[SUHVVUHWURDFWLYLW\´RIWKH
CBA neatly disposed of the formation dispute.118 ,Q -XVWLFH 6RWRPD\RU¶V
view, the CBA was retroactively effective at a date earlier than dates upon
which both Granite Rock and Local 287 contended ratification occurred;
111. See id. ³7KH EDODQFH IHGHUDO VWDWXWHV VWULNH EHWZHHQ HPSOR\HU DQd union
relations in the collective-EDUJDLQLQJDUHQDLVFDUHIXOO\FDOLEUDWHG>@´ LQWHUQDOFLWDWLRQV
omitted)).
112. See id. REVHUYLQJD³IUHH-ZKHHOLQJLQTXLU\´IRUDMXGLFLDOO\ FUDIWHG³GHVLUDEOH
UXOH´ ZDV QHYHU LQWHQGHG E\ WKH &RXUW KDV LW KDV GHYHORSHG federal common law to
effectuate Section 301(a)).
113. See id. DW ³*UDQLWH5RFN¶VFDVHIRUDQHZIHGHUDOFRPPRQ-law cause of
action is based on assumptions about the adequacy of the avenues of relief that are at
OHDVWTXHVWLRQDEOH´ 
114. Id. (espousing the other remedies still available to Granite Rock on remand and
those that Granite Rock had already availed itself of).
115. Id. Justice Thomas noted that the agency or alter-ego claim against the
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 8QLRQ PLJKW EH ³HDVLHU WR SURYH WKDQ XVXDO>@´ EHFDXVH WKH 1/5%¶V
GHFLVLRQ VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH ³,%7 DQG /RFDO >@ ZHUH DIILOLDWHG LQ  LQ D ZD\
UHOHYDQW WR *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V FODLPV´  Id. FLWLQJ ,QW¶O %KG 2I 7HDPVWHUV /RFDO 
(Granite Rock Co.) 347 N.L.R.B. 339, 340 n.6 (2006)).
116. See id. at 2866±67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(observing that there was no such dispute as to formation because both Granite Rock
and Local 287 had expressly made the December CBA retroactive to May 1, 2004).
117. See id. at 2860 (majority opinion).
118. See id. at 2868 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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VKH ZURWHWKDW ³ZH FDQ VFDUFHO\ SUHWHQGWKDW WKH SDUWLHV KDYH D IRUPDWLRQ
GLVSXWH´119 Lastly, Justice 6RWRPD\RUGRZQSOD\HGWKHPDMRULW\¶Vargument
that Local 287 had waived its ability to raise the express retroactivity in the
'HFHPEHU &%$ DV DQ DIILUPDWLYH GHIHQVH WR WKH LVVXH RI WKH &%$¶V
formation date.120 :KLOHVKHQRWHGWKDWLWZDV³UHJUHWWDEOH´WKDW/RFDO
had not raised the issue in either the district court or the court of appeals,
VKHIRXQGWKHDUJXPHQWZDV³RQH[the Court] FDQQRWLJQRUH´121
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to settle the true scope of
Section 301(a). Instead, the Court summarily pronounced any consideration
of the possible toUW GLPHQVLRQ RI 6HFWLRQ  D  DV ³SUHPDWXUH´ -XVWLFH
7KRPDV ZURWH ³>Z@H VHH QR UHDVRQ IRU D GLIIHUHQW UHVXOW KHUH EHFDXVH LW
would be premature to recognize the federal common law tort Granite Rock
requests in this case even assuming that [Section] 301(a) authorizes us to
GRVR´122 While this Delphic statement will not change how the majority of
FLUFXLW FRXUWV DOUHDG\ YLHZ 6HFWLRQ  D ¶V VFRSH123 it will lend
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2864 (majority opinion).
123. See Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1174±75, 1175 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (referring
to a string of opinions from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits that all refused to hold a federal tort claim as cognizable under
Section 301(a)), DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶GLQSDUWVXEQRP*UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGof
Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
A decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Court in 1981, Wilkes-Barre
Publishing Co., is the only decision holding that a tortious interference of contract
claim may arise under Section 301(a). See Wilkes-%DUUH 3XEO¶J Co. v. Newspaper
Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372, 380±82 (3d Cir. 1981). Wilkes-Barre
3XEOLVKLQJ &RPSDQ\ ³:LONHV-%DUUH´  ILUVW EURXJKW VXLW LQ GLVWULFW FRXUW DOOHJLQJ LQ
relevant part, that the International Guild, the newspaper trade unions, the Wilkes-Barre
Council of Newspaper Unions, and eight other individual defendants had tortiously
induced a breach of a collective bargaining agreement under Section 301(a). Id. at 374.
Wilkes-Barre alleged that, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, members
of the Local Guild created a new publication called the &LWL]HQV¶9RLFH while on strike.
Id. DW  $QG E\ HQFRXUDJLQJ XQLRQ PHPEHUV WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ WKH YHQWXUH ³WKH
unions and individuals involved in the &LWL]HQV¶ 9RLFH enterprise tortiously interfered
ZLWKWKH>&%$@´ Id. at 376 (emphasis in original). While the district court dismissed
the federal tort cause of action for failure to state a claim, the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that a claim for tortious interference of contract was cognizable under Section
301(a). Id. DW  7KH FRXUW KHOG 6HFWLRQ  D  ³reaches not only suits on labor
FRQWUDFWV EXW VXLWV VHHNLQJ UHPHGLHV IRU YLRODWLRQ RI VXFK FRQWUDFWV´ Id. at 380.
Furthermore, the court found its conclusion consisteQW ZLWK WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V
Section 301(a) jurisprudence. In his opinion, Judge Gibbons noted that Supreme Court
SUHFHGHQWVXJJHVWHG6HFWLRQ D VKRXOGEHUHDGEURDGO\DV³>D@OOVXLWVIRUYLRODWLRQ
of collective bargaining agreements are governed by feGHUDO ODZ>@´ Id. More telling,
KRZHYHU ZDV WKH FRXUW¶V DGKHUHQFH WR SUHVHUYLQJ XQLIRUPLW\ ZLWKLQ WKH FROOHFWLYH
bargaining arena. The Wilkes-Barre court was less concerned with whether the remedy
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uncertainty to the issue given Third Circuit precedent124 and the lack of
Congressional action in clarifying the statute.
The Court, in its attempt to preserve the careful calibration that ³IHGHUDO
statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collectiveEDUJDLQLQJDUHQD´125 may actually have unwittingly achieved the opposite
effect. The CRXUW VKRXOG KDYH IROORZHG -XVWLFH 6RWRPD\RU¶V SUDJPDWLF
approach to the arbitrability issue, an approach that highlighted her
adherence to the landmark principles of the Steelworkers Trilogy and one
that more elegantly dealt with the dispute by finding it to be a classic
H[DPSOHRID³FRQWURYHUV>\@WKDWODERUDUELWUDWRUVDUHFDOOHGXSRQWRUHVROYH
HYHU\GD\´126
The consistent theme in Supreme Court precedent addressing Section
301(a) is federal uniformity within the collective bargaining sphere.
However convenient a ruling on this issue would have been, by failing to
make a definitive decision about whether a federal tort claim is cognizable
under Section 301(a), the Court strayed from its commitment to stability.
The Ninth Circuit was also hesitant to recognize such a claim, choosing
not to intrude into the legislative domain regarding the scope of Section
301(a). That circuit maintained that it was not the duty of the courts, but of
Congress to clarify Section  D ¶VWUXHUHDFK127 Nonetheless, there is no
evidence that Congress intends to clarify the Act, especially given the
litany of pressing domestic128 and international concerns.129 The Ninth
&LUFXLW EHOLHYHG WKDW LW ZDV XOWLPDWHO\ &RQJUHVV¶ MRE WR FODULI\ Section
 D ¶V VFRSH DQGWKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW VHQt the issue back to the circuits
was labeled as one of contract or one of tort; rather, it IRXQG WKDW ³>D@ KROGLQJ WKDW
tortious interference with a collective bargaining agreement is not a matter governed by
federal law would leave open the possibility of lack of uniformity in scope of
obligation which the [Supreme] Court in Lucas Flour sought WR SUHYHQW´ Id. at 381.
Lastly, the Third Circuit QRWHGWKDWWKHUHJXODWLRQRIWRUWLRXVLQWHUIHUHQFHFODLPV³GRHV
QRW LQYROYH DQ DUHD WUDGLWLRQDOO\ UHOHJDWHG WR WKH VWDWHV´ DV WKH HVVHQFH RI WKH FODLP
originates from federal common law governing labor agreements. Id.
124. See Wilkes-Barre, 647 F.2d at 381±82 (holding that a tortious interference of
contract claim can arise under Section 301(a) of the LMRA).
125. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2864.
126. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
127. $OWKRXJKLWJDYHRWKHUUHDVRQVWRGHQ\*UDQLWH5RFN¶VDUJXPHQWVWRILQGWKDWD
IHGHUDOWRUWFODLPFRXOGDULVHIURP6HFWLRQ D WKH1LQWK&LUFXLWZURWHWKDW³>D@Q\
µgap¶ WKDWPLJKWH[LVWLQ&RQJUHVV¶VODERUODZGHVign is for Congress and not for us to
ILOO´Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008), DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶GLQSDUWVXE
nom. *UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGRf Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
128. As of this writing, domestic concerns facing Congress include how to deal with
a struggling economy, healthcare, and the aftermath of the biggest oil spill in United
States history.
129. Although there are always pressing international concerns, Congress has had its
hands full with how to deal with the war on terror.
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unresolved.
As 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the Steelworkers Trilogy,130 it
VHHPV KDUGO\ FRLQFLGHQWDO WKDW -XVWLFH 6RWRPD\RU¶V GLVVHQW HFKRHV
principles similar to those set forth in 1960. Her language immediately
brings to mind the principle of deference to arbitration. She invokes United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. early in her
GLVVHQWWRVWDWH³>D@QRUGHUWRDUELWUDWHWKHSDUWLFXODUJULHYDQFHVKRXOGQRW
be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
GLVSXWH 'RXEWV VKRXOG EH UHVROYHG LQ IDYRU RI FRYHUDJH´131 In addition,
DQ\GLVFXVVLRQRIDQDUELWUDWLRQFODXVH¶VVFRSHVKHFRQWHQGHGPXVWKave a
presumption in favor of arbitrability.132
Following the Steelworkers Trilogy LQ  WKH MXGLFLDU\¶V SHUFHSWLRQ
of, and deference to, arbitration became dramatically positive.133 The
principle of deference rang especially true with Justice Sotomayor. By
finding that the ratification dispute arose under the arbitration clause of the
CBA and deferring to the arbitrator, Justice Sotomayor sent a clear signal
to the majority that the Court should reaffirm an expansive scope of arbitral
authority, rather than pointlessly complicate an already convoluted subject
area.
In addition, by arguing that an arbitrator should resolve the questions
surrounding the July strike because they are precisely the sort of questions
that arbitrators are called upon to resolve every day, Justice Sotomayor
echoed another principle set forth in the Trilogy: the emphasis of stability
in the collective bargaining process over drafting perfection. In Warrior &
Gulf -XVWLFH 'RXJODV ZURWH WKDW ³>D@ PDMRU IDFWRU LQ DFKLHYLQJ LQGXVWULDO
peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the
FROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQW´134 While Justice Douglas understood that
a collective bargaining agreement could not hope to outline all disputes that
may arise between parties, he aUJXHGWKDW³>D&%$@LVPRUHWKDQDFRQWUDFW
it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen

130. See cases cited supra note 1.
131. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2866 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582±83 (1960).
132. Id.
133. William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards²Thirty
Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 464, 465±67 (1984) ³Steelworkers Trilogy established the proposition
that substantial deference was to be given to arbitration awards²deference more
considerable than that enjoyed by the Labor Board and by the trial courts
WKHPVHOYHV´ 
134. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
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FDQQRWZKROO\DQWLFLSDWH´135
Justice Sotomayor focused on the retroactive effect of the December
CBA DQGDYRLGHGWKHPDMRULW\¶VZRUGSOD\RI when as opposed to whether
formation occurred.136 She wrote that:
When it comes to answering the arbitrability question, it is
entirely irrelevant whether Local 287 ratified the CBA in August .
RULQ-XO\,QHLWKHUFDVHWKHSDUWLHV¶GLVSXWH²which
postdates May 1²FOHDUO\µDULV>HV@XQGHU¶WKH&%$which is all
the arbitration provision requires to make a dispute referable to an
arbitrator.137
-XVWLFH 6RWRPD\RU¶V GLVVHQW LV ERWK HOHJDQW DQG HIILFLHQW 6KH ZRXOG
LPSRVH D ³VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG´ VROXWLRQ 6KH DYRLGV WKH PDMRULW\¶V VWUXJJOHV
ZLWK SDUVLQJ HDFK SDUW\¶V DUJXPHQWV RYHU ZKHQ FRQWUDFW IRUPDWLRQ
RFFXUUHG +RZHYHU KHU DUJXPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ /RFDO ¶V ZDLYHU RI WKH
retroactivity argument are somewhat porous, because such arguments may
be deemeGZDLYHGSXUVXDQWWRWKH&RXUW¶V5XOHZKHQSDUWLHVGRQRW
raise them in a timely fashion.138 Despite this flaw, she recognized that
adherence to some of the salient principles of the Trilogy carry greater
weight in this case than blind commitment to procedure.
In failing to rule definitively on the tort dimension, the Court not only
lost an opportunity to clarify a circuit split, albeit a lopsided one, but also
continued to muddy the water surrounding the precise scope of Section
301(a). As a result, by WU\LQJWRSUHVHUYHWKH³EDODQFH>WKDW@IHGHUDOVWDWXWHV
strike between employer and union relations in the collective bargaining
arena[,]´139 the Court, ironically, made this balance more difficult to
maintain.
The Steelworkers Trilogy provided the federal judiciary with principles
that became the bedrock of labor arbitration jurisprudence. One of these
principles is for courts to resolve any doubts as to whether an arbitration
clause covers a particular dispute in favor of arbitrability.140 Another
principle is for courts to recognize that drafters of collective bargaining
agreements often cannot anticipate every situation that might lend itself to
135. Id.
136. See Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) RSLQLQJWKDWWKHGLVSXWHZDV³VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG´JLYHQWKH'HFHPEHU
&%$¶VUHWURDFWLYLW\ODQJXDJH 
137. Id. (alteration in original).
138. Id. at 2868.
139. Id. at 2864.
140. See Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582±83 (providing that a matter should not be
GHQLHG DUELWUDWLRQ ³XQOHVV LW PD\ EH VDLG ZLWK SRVLWLYH DVVXUDQFH WKDW WKH DUELWUDWLRQ
FODXVHLVQRWVXVFHSWLEOHRIDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKDWFRYHUVWKHDVVHUWHGGLVSXWH´ .
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arbitration.141 There is an underlying theme in these principles: unions,
employers, and the federal courts should all be participants in a culture that
promotes arbitration of disputes. And as an ultimate goal, the principles
promote federal uniformity and certainty within the collective bargaining
sphere.
The Supreme Court in Granite Rock strayed from its ultimate goal.
7KRXJKWKH&RXUWFRQFHGHVERWKWKDW,%7¶VDFWLRQV³VWULNHDWWKHKHDUWRI
the collective-bargaining process federal labor laws were designed to
SURWHFW´142 and that Third Circuit precedent strays from the other courts in
that it recognizes tortious interference for this type of conduct,143 the Court
left the tortious interference question unanswered for the sake of judicial
restraint. Because the Court found it premature to clarify a sixty-three year
old law, fifty years after the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court has left the
federal courts with uncertainty.
At the same moment, the Court failed to recognize that CBAs are more
than just contracts. CBAs are ³generalized code[s] to govern a myriad of
cases which . . . draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.´144 Parties to a CBA
thus do not merely contract between themselves; they agree to be
participants in a system that promotes arbitration.
Unlike the majority, Justice Sotomayor takes a more traditional
approach. In her opinion, when both parties signed the CBA, which
essentially predated the July strike, they both agreed to arbitrate any issues
that might arise out of their agreement²no matter how convoluted the
facts may be. In doing so, she retains the values that the Steelworkers
Trilogy presents: that no draftsman could have anticipated this dispute and
that any doubts to arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitrability.
Because her opinion is a minority position, the core values of the
Steelworkers Trilogy do not prevail, and judicial uncertainty remains.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty-three years, both the Ninth Circuit,145 explicitly,
141. Cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
   ³7KHGUDIWVPHQPD\QHYHUKDYHWKRXJKWRIZKDWVSHFLILFUHPHG\VKRXOGEH
DZDUGHGWRPHHWDSDUWLFXODUFRQWLQJHQF\´ .
142. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2865.
143. Cf. id. DW  ³7KH >1LQWK &LUFXLW@ MRLQHG YLUWXDOO\ DOO RWKHU &LUFXLWV LQ
KROGLQJWKDWLWZRXOGQRWUHFRJQL]HVXFKDFODLPXQGHU6HFWLRQ D ´ 
144. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
145. See Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that assertions
by Granite Rock that the precedent from other circuit courts refusing to hold a federal
common law of torts under Section 301(a) is distinguishable based on the close
UHODWLRQVKLSRI/RFDODQG,%7LV³XQVXSSRUWHGE\SUHFHGHQW´  DII¶GLQSDUWUHY¶G
in part sub nom. *UDQLWH5RFN&RY,QW¶O%KGRf Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
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and the Eleventh Circuit,146 impliedly, have fallen in line with the majority
of their sister circuits and away from the sole contrary Third Circuit
Wilkes-Barre Publishing decision. With the congruence of all of the other
circuits denying tort claims in the Section 301(a) context, the Supreme
&RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ QRW WR VHULRXVO\ FRQVLGHU ZKHWKHU WR UHFRJQL]H D IHGHUDO
tort claim in the Section 301(a) context at this time was not unexpected.
Such quick treatment is also puzzling, not because the Court declined to
recognize an expansion of Section 301(a) but because it used such casual
ODQJXDJH LQ GRLQJ VR $IWHU PDNLQJ UHIHUHQFHV WR WKH ³KRVW RI SROLF\
FKRLFHV´ WKDW FRXOG upset the balance Section 301(a) has maintained
between unions and employers, the Court went no further²apparently
ILQGLQJ WKDW WKH SDUWLHV¶ EULHIV GLG D JRRG HQRXJK MRE RI H[SODLQLQJ WKRVH
³LPSRUWDQW´ EDODQFH GLVUXSWHUV )XUWKHUPRUH WKH &RXUW XVHG WKH ZRrd
³SUHPDWXUH´ WR ODEHO *UDQLWH 5RFN¶V UHTXHVW WR H[SDQG Section  D ¶V
scope. While the Court may have found it premature given the direction
and general agreement among the circuits, concluding its discussion on the
issue in this way left Section 301(a ¶VVFRSHPRUHRSHQWKDQWKH&RXUWPD\
have wanted.
This issue of whether a tortious interference of contract claim has a place
in federal common law will continue to arise in collective bargaining
disputes similar to the one that occurred between Granite Rock and IBT, as
D SDUHQW XQLRQ¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ D GLVSXWH LQYROYLQJ D ORFDO EUDQFK LV QRW
XQFRPPRQ 7KXV WKLV ZDV DQ LVVXH ULSH IRU WKH &RXUW¶V FODULILFDWLRQ
Nonetheless, an in depth discussion of whether a tortious interference of
contract claim is cognizable under Section 301(a) will be reserved for
another day.147

146. Cf. Xaros v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 1987)
KROGLQJ WKDW IRU SXUSRVHV RI 6HFWLRQ  D  ZKHUH WKH FDXVH RI DFWLRQ LV ³PHUHO\
UHODWHG´WRDFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQWWKDWFDXVHRIDFWLRQGRHVQRWDULVHXQGHU
the agreement for the purposes of a Section 301(a) action in federal court).
147. Similar to the paucity of courts favoring a federal tort claim, the number of
articles in support of this expansion of Section 301(a) is also lacking. An extensive
search on Lexis found one article proposing a tortious interference of contract claim to
be cognizable under Section 301(a). One article appeared to support that claim given its
WLWOHEXWDIWHUIXUWKHUUHYLHZLWRSSRVHGH[SDQGLQJ6HFWLRQ D WR³SURYLGHDIHGHUDO
WRUW FODLP DJDLQVW LQWHUIHULQJ WKLUG SDUWLHV´ Cf. Elizabeth Z. Ysrael, Note, Federal
Common Law of Labor Contracts: Recognizing A Federal Claim of Tortious
Interference, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1051±52 (1986) (arguing that the text and
legislative history of Section 301(a) indicate that Congress only envisioned
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements between the parties to the agreement,
rather than the creation of rights against non-parties).

PRIVATE ORDERING OF EMPLOYEE PRIVACY:
PROTECTING EMPLOYEES¶ EXPECTATIONS OF
PRIVACY WITH IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
RIGHTS
LINDSAY NOYCE*
With the growth of technology in the workplace, employee privacy is an
increasingly significant legal issue. Employees, perhaps irrationally,
often overestimate the amount of privacy they should expect in
technological communication. A United States Supreme Court decision
in June 2010, City of Ontario v. Quon, highlights the importance of
privacy in the workplace and emplo\HHV¶ SULYDF\ expectations.
Although various constitutional, tort, and statutory causes of action
protect employee privacy, each theory has limitations and ultimately
fails to protect some reasonable expectation of privacy. Some courts
have recognized an implied-in-fact contract theory in the context of
employment law, often to protect job security. The implied-in-fact
contract theory may be a valuable avenue for the protection of
employee privacy. A court applying an implied-in-fact contract theory
to protect employee privacy will determine whether the employer and
employee reached an enforceable agreement, albeit an implied
DJUHHPHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDF\ULJKWVE\FRQVLGHULQJWKH
WRWDOLW\ RI WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV DQG WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH
expeFWDWLRQV:KHUHRWKHUFDXVHVRIDFWLRQIDLOWRSURWHFWDQHPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace, the implied-in-fact
contract theory may be available as an alternative. To align employer
and employee expectations, employers should consider this potential
cause of action when establishing polices and practices bearing on
employee privacy issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technology continues to be an increasingly important part of American
life inside and outside the workplace. E-mail is often the preferred form of
communication between co-workers. In daily interactions, text messaging
has taken over as a primary form of quick communication. Anyone familiar
with technological communication may assume some inherent sense of
privacy associated with these activities. Even when communicating in fora
accessible by the public, such as social networking sites, employees often
do not consider that their employers and co-workers can readily gain access
to this information. If an employee working entirely from home maintains a
social networking page on which her privacy preferences permit only
certain people to view her information, is it reasonable for the employee to
expect her information will be kept private from her employer and coworkers that do not have access to her information? Certainly, the
employee should not expect privacy with respect to those to whom the
employee has granted permission to view her networking page. There is an
innate tension between an employee intentionally making information
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public and feeling that her information is private. Yet, with the expansion
of social networking, growing use of technology in the workplace, and
feeble boundariHVEHWZHHQZRUNDQGKRPHHPSOR\HHV¶HOHFWURQLFSULYDF\
is a pressing legal issue. A recent United States Supreme Court case, City
of Ontario v. Quon,1 brought employee privacy issues to the forefront of
current legal discourse.
Whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a
common theme in causes of action protecting employee privacy. When an
employee accesses a password-protected e-mail account or sends a text
message on a cell phone, even a company-issued phone, it is
understandable that the employee instinctively feels a sense of privacy in
the content of the communication.2 But is it reasonable for an employee to
expect privacy in the contents of e-mails sent while at work? Is it
reasonable to expect privacy if the employee is on company time but off
the work premises? Or in text messages sent using a company phone? Is it
reasonable for an employee to expect privacy in messages, materials, or
conversations that refer to off-GXW\DFWLYLWLHVVXFKDVWKHHPSOR\HH¶VGDWLQJ
life? The circumstances of the workplace and the actions taken by the
HPSOR\HU ZLOO GLFWDWH ZKHWKHU DQ HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ LV
reasonable.3 When an employee does have a reasonable expectation of
privacy and the employer breaches that expectation, the employee might
assert breach of an implied contractual right to privacy. Where
constitutional, tort, and statutory causes of action fail to provide a remedy
IRU DQ HPSOR\HU YLRODWLRQ RI DQ HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI
privacy, the implied-in-fact contract might fill the gaps left by these other
causes of action.4 This breach of contract claim may be asserted
irrespective of any adverse employment action being taken against the
employee.
Whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is
important in several causes of action that an employee may assert against

1.
130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
2.
But cf. id. at 2629±30 (hesitating to declare that employees have reasonable
expectations of privacy vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment, because
courts must have knowledge and experience to weigh such expectations and cell
phones and text messages are too recent of a development to predict the future
consequences of a broad holding).
3.
Cf. id. (noting that an employee¶s expectation of privacy is also influenced by
³ZKDWVRFLHW\DFFHSWVDVSURSHUEHKDYLRU´LQWKHFRQWH[WRIQHZWHFKQRORJ\ 
4.
See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private
Lives, 66 LA. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2006) (suggesting that an implied contract right to
privacy might alleviate the potential unfair practice of employers offering privacy
rights through policy statements but then ignoring such policies when the employer
finds it convenient to do so).
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an employer, when the employee claims a protectable privacy interest.5
Those causes of action, particularly the implied-in-fact contract, and the
importance of the employeH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ZLOODSSHDU
in the subsequent parts of this Article. Part II will explore the development
of privacy issues in the workplace and the interaction of employee privacy
rights with employment at-will.6 Part III will discuss the implied-in-fact
employment contract as well as how such a contract may encompass
privacy rights and create protectable employee privacy interests.7 Part III
will also look at the related doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing that some courts have held is implicit in all employment
contracts, including employment at-will contracts, and how this covenant
might protect employee privacy.8 Part IV will explore the Fourth
Amendment privacy rights of public sector employees, including the recent
United States Supreme Court case City of Ontario v. Quon, and will
suggest how the circumstances in Quon could support a successful claim
for breach of an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy in many states.9
Finally, Part V will summarize the various sources of privacy rights in the
employment context and discuss the importance of private ordering.10
II. CREATING PRIVACY RIGHTS IN AN AT-WILL WORKPLACE
With the growing use of technology in the workplace, employee privacy
rights are an important legal concern for employers as well as employees.
Before exploring any particular causes of action for employee privacy, it is
necessary to understand how privacy fits within the law generally and how
it specifically fits in the employment relationship. Privacy has become a
common legal issue in various areas of the law, including employment
law.11 The evolution of a right to privacy began with an 1890 article by
5.
See generally Robert Sprague, Orwell was an Optimist: The Evolution of
Privacy in the United States and its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 83 (2008) (exploring the difficulties and development of the legal
right to privacy as it developed in the United States).
6.
See infra Part II (discussing both the common law and statutory exceptions to
the at-will employment doctrine).
7.
See infra Part III.A±B.1 (analyzing state court opinions that have sustained
implied contracts as an exception to at-will employment).
8.
See infra Part III.B.1±2 (noticing the subtle interplay between implied contracts
and implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing).
9.
See infra Part IV (arguing that in some jurisdictions the employee in City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) might have prevailed in protecting his privacy
ULJKWVXQGHUDQLPSOLHGFRQWUDFWWKHRU\UDWKHUWKDQXQGHUWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFXUUHQW
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
10. See infra Part V (concluding that when employees have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, causes of action sounding in contract might afford them the
most flexible legal protection).
11. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
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Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, who urged courts to recognize a right
to privacy that would protect citizens from intrusions by the press.12
:DUUHQDQG%UDQGHLVGHVFULEHGWKLVULJKWWRSULYDF\DV³WKHULJKWWREHOHW
DORQH>@´GHULYLQJIURPWKHULJKWWROLIHIRXQGLQWKH'XH3URFHVV&ODXVHRI
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.13 Since then,
privacy has evolved and expanded in the United States, and legal privacy
rights exist in common law, constitutional law, and statutes.14 Under each
source of privacy protection, the proponent of the protection must have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.15 An employee asserting a legal right to
privacy, regardless of the source of that right, must demonstrate a
reasonable expectation of privacy.16
&RPSHWLQJ ZLWK DQ HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\ H[SHFWDWLRQ are WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
legitimate business interests. Courts balance these competing interests
against one another to determine whether an employer violation of an
HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ ZDV XQZDUUDQWHG RU
unreasonable under the circumstances.17 Academic literature has
recognizeG WKDW SULYDF\ LQ WKH ZRUNSODFH LV ³GLIILFXOW WR UHFRQFLOH´ ZLWK
employment at-will, the default in employment contracts.18 To understand
REV. 193, 195 (1890) (FULWLFL]LQJ³LQVWDQWDQHRXVSKRWRJUDSKVDQGQHZVSDSHU>IRU@
LQYDG>LQJ@ WKH VDFUHG SUHFLQFWV RI SULYDWH DQG GRPHVWLF OLIH´ ; See also Selmi, supra
note 4, at 1038± FDOOLQJSULYDF\ WKH³ODZ¶VFKDPHOHRQVHHPLQJO\ HYHU\ZKHUHDQG
QRZKHUH DW WKH VDPH WLPH´ DQG VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW SULYDF\ KDV EHFRPH D ODUJHU LVVXH LQ
employment law, in part, because lifetime employment historically facilitated trust but
KDV EHFRPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ XQOLNHO\ LQ WRGD\¶V Hmployment environment); James A.
Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-Duty Behavior,
43 GA. L. REV. 133, 137 (2008) (arguing the demand for employers to supply nonwork-related benefits, such as health care benefits, has invLWHGHPSOR\HUVLQWRZRUNHUV¶
SULYDWH OLYHV LQ RUGHU IRU WKH HPSOR\HU WR DVFHUWDLQ ZKHWKHU WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDWH
activities are costing the employer money).
12. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11DW ³2IWKHGHVLUDELOLW\²indeed of
the necessity²of some such protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press
LVRYHUVWHSSLQJLQHYHU\GLUHFWLRQWKHREYLRXVERXQGVRISURSULHW\DQGRIGHFHQF\´ 
13. See id. DW ³*UDGXDOO\WKHVFRSHRIWKHVHOHJDOULJKWVEURDGHQHGDQGQRZ
the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life²the right to be let alone´ 
14. See Sprague, supra note 5, at 93±109 (tracing the development of privacy rights
in the United States).
15. See id. at 93 (noting that protecting the home and a reasonable expectation of
privacy invaded by unreasonable intrusion are common themes in privacy causes of
action).
16. See id. DW H[SODLQLQJWKDWDSULYDWHHPSOR\HHPD\DVVHUWDQ³LQWUXVLRQXSRQ
VHFOXVLRQFODLP´LQVWHDGRIDGLUHFW)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWclaim, but the starting question
is still whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy).
17. See id. at 111±13 (discussing how other areas of law may lead some employers
to intrude too far into monitoring employees in order to detect and stop behavior that
may subject employers to liability).
18. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 4, DW ³Another curious aspect of the privacy
literature . . . is that . . . it frequently ignores workplace issues . . . [because] how can an
employee assert a right to privacy when he or she has so few rights to begin with?´ 
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how privacy issues fit into employment law, it is essential to examine the
employment at-will doctrine and its exceptions.
A. Employment At-Will and Its Exceptions
The increasing willingness of courts to acknowledge exceptions to
employment at-will, including the implied-in-fact contract for job security,
demonstrates that courts are likely to accept the implied-in-fact contract as
a theory of protecting employee privacy. An implied-in-fact contract for
employee privacy is an exception to employment at-will for an employee
ILUHG EDVHG RQ HYLGHQFH REWDLQHG WKURXJK D EUHDFK RI WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy. It is a well-settled rule of law that,
absent an express employment contract to the contrary, the employment atwill doctrine is the default rule in the vast majority of United States
jurisdictions.19 The employment at-ZLOOUXOHSURYLGHVWKDW³HLWKHUSDrty may
terminate the service, for any cause, good or bad, or without cause, and the
RWKHU FDQQRW FRPSODLQ LQ ODZ´20 The Payne court, often cited for its
articulation of the at-will rule,21 also held that the cause of termination
could be morally wrong without attachment of legal liability.22 Although
19. See Matthew W. Finkin, Shoring up the Citadel (At-Will Employment), 24
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1,    GHVFULELQJWKH$PHULFDQ/DZ,QVWLWXWH¶VGUDIW
restatement on the law of employment as construing the at-will employment rule as a
³ZHOOHVWDEOLVKHG´GHIDXOWUXOH TXRWLQJ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 3.01 cmt. a (Discussion Draft 2006))); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to Working
Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the
Restatement in its Place, 13 EMPL. RTS. & EMP. POL¶Y J. 143, 154 (2009) (suggesting it
would be a waste of political capital for advocates of reform to debate whether
employment at-will is in fact the default rule). But see Montana Wrongful Discharge
From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (2009) (abrogating the atwill employment doctrine by making it a wrongful discharge for an employer to
terminate an employee without good cause, provided that the employee has completed
WKHHPSOR\HU¶VSUREDWLRQDU\SHULRGRIHPSOR\PHQW .
20. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 517±19 (1884) (preferring that
individual choice regarding whether to work govern the relationship between employer
and employee, rather than a rule imposed by law), overruled in part, Hutton v. Watters,
179 S.W. 134 (1915); see also Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The
Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 653±54 (2000) (defining
employment at-will as allowing either party to terminate the relationship for any
reason, without liability).
21. See, e.g., Ballam, supra note 20, at 687 (calling the Payne FRXUW¶VGHVFULSWLRQ
WKH ³FODVVLF H[SRVLWLRQ´ RI WKH HPSOR\PHQW DW-will rule); Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing
Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for Employment Termination Law, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 112 n.1 (2006) (citing Payne for the point that
employers have an unrestricted right to terminate employees who do not have an
employment contract for a definite term); Nadjia Limani, Righting Wrongful
Discharge: A Recommendation for the New York Judiciary to Adopt a Public Policy
Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL¶Y & ETHICS J.
309, 313 n.26 (2006) (relying on the Payne FRXUW¶V DUWLFXODWLRQ RI WKH at-will
employment doctrine).
22. See Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519±20 (explaining that a threat to discharge is not an
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most American employees are employed at-will, there are numerous
common law and statutory exceptions to the doctrine. In fact, a right to
employee privacy might be characterized as an exception to the
employment at-will rule.
Despite employment at-will, common experience demonstrates that
employers are not, in fact, empowered to terminate an employee for
absolutely any reason. For example, an employer cannot lawfully terminate
an employee because of the employeH¶V UDFH23 But employees often
overestimate their legal protections and believe an employer would be
liable for terminating an employee out of personal animus.24 While it is
arguably not a sound business practice,25 under employment at-will,
personal dislike is a perfectly valid reason for terminating an employee.26
Up against this framework, one might presume that an employer can
OHJDOO\WHUPLQDWHDQHPSOR\HHEDVHGRQDQHPSOR\HH¶VSHUVRQDOFKRLFHVRU
conduct that an employer does not agree with, but the analysis is not so
simple. The trend in employment law has been to invalidate the legality of
terminations when there is no good cause.27 Exceptions to the pure
employment at-will rule are numerous and include federal and state
statutes, discharges in violation of public policy, and implied contracts.28
illegal act).
23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2006) (prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of race, as well as color, sex, religion, and national origin).
24. See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong are Employees About their Rights, and
Why Does it Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 9 (2002) (discussing studies in which
³DSSUR[LPDWHO\QLQHW\SHUFHQW of employees VXUYH\HGEHOLHYHGWKDWLWZDVµXQODZIXO¶WR
fire an employee based on personal dislike (citing Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning,
and Law: ([SORULQJWKH,QIOXHQFHVRQ:RUNHUV¶/HJDO.QRZOHGJH, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
447, 456-67, 462 (1997))  ³2ver eighty percent believed that it was illegal for an
employer to fire an employee in order to hire another willing to do the same job for a
ORZHUZDJH´Id.
25. See Erica Worth, In Defense of Targeted ERIPs: Understanding the Interaction
of Life-Cycle Employment and Early Retirement Incentive Plans, 74 TEX. L. REV. 411,
411, 415 (1995) (observing that, even in the context of worker productivity and old
DJHHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWLQFHQWLYHSODQVVHUYHDVD³UHODWLYHO\SDLQOHVVZD\>IRUHPSOR\HUV@
to ease oldeU HPSOR\HHV RXW RI WKH ZRUN IRUFH´ VLQFH ³D ZRUNHU ZKR OHDYHV KDSS\ LV
OHVV OLNHO\ WR VXH´ WKDQ RQH ZKR LV ILUHG RXWULJKW²no matter how illegal such an act
might be).
26. See Ballam, supra note 20, at 653 (recognizing that employers are able to
terminate the employment relationship at their discretion). But cf. Alex Long, The
Disconnect Between At-Will Employment and Tortious Interference with Business
Relations: Rethinking Tortious Interference Claims in the Employment Context, 33
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491, 491±92 (2001) (pointing out that although an employer may be able
to terminate an employee out of simple dislike, a supervisor ZKRDFWVRXWRI³SHUVRQDO
KRVWLOLW\´PD\EHOLDEOHXQGHUDFODLPRIWRUWXRXVLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKEXVLQHVVUHODWLRQV 
27. See Ballam, supra note 20, at 687 (predicting an increasing abrogation of the
at-will employment doctrine in the twenty-first century).
28. See Ann L. Rives, <RX¶UH 1RW WKH %RVV RI 0H $ &DOO IRU )HGHUDO /LIHVW\OH
Discrimination Legislation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 555 (2006) (explaining that
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The employment at-will rule applies only to the termination of the
employment relationship, but an employee need not be discharged or
experience any adverse employment action for the employee to assert a
breach of an implied contractual right to privacy when the employer has
YLRODWHG WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ ,Q such a
scenario, it is not accurate to characterize an implied-in-fact contract right
to privacy as an exception to the at-will rule, because this right may operate
LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI DQ\ FKDQJH LQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V HPSOR\PHQW VWDWXV <HW
when an employer terminates an employee in conjunction with a breach of
the employee¶V privacy rights, such a cause of action essentially acts as an
exception to employment at-will.
B. Employee Privacy Protection as an Exception to Employment At-Will
The growing concern over employee privacy rights has contributed to
the erosion of the employment at-will doctrine.29 If an employer could
terminate an employee for absolutely any reason, it is impossible to discern
how an employee could successfully exercise any right to privacy. For
instance, if an employee refuses to submit to a drug test or reveal a piece of
information to her employer, the employer could simply terminate the
employee, leaving her without legal recourse.30
With regard to employee privacy, there are federal and state
constitutional protections;31 statutory protections, such as off-duty conduct
statutes prohibiting employers from discharging workers for certain
conduct occurring outside of work premises;32 common law privacy and
four major public policy exceptions protect employees: refusal to commit illegal acts,
exercise of statutory rights, whistleblower activities, and performance of civic duties).
29. See Ballam, supra note 20, at 685±87 (discussing how the traditional at-will
doctrine has been tempered through abusive discharge torts, public policy limitations,
prohibitions on fraudulent inducements, promissory estoppel, and increasing concern
for privacy rights).
30. See id. at 686±87 (suggesting an employee lacks privacy rights if she is unable
to make free choices because she is fearful of losing her job).
31. See, e.g. 2¶&RQQRU Y 2UWHJD  86     KROGLQJ that
³>L@QGLYLGXDOVGRQRWORVHFourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the
JRYHUQPHQWLQVWHDGRIDSULYDWHHPSOR\HU´ 
32. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2009) (making it aQ ³XQIDLU
employment practice for an employer to terminate . . . any employee due to that
employee¶s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during
QRQZRUNLQJ KRXUV´ ZLWK FHUWDLQ H[HPSWLRQV  Additionally, there are various federal
statutes protecting specific areas of employee privacy. See Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (2006) (banning employer use of
polygraph testing for pre-employment screening); Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (Supp. II 2008) (foreclosing the
use of genetic information in employment decisions by employers); Americans with
'LVDELOLWLHV $FW ³$'$´ , 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (prohibiting employers from
inquiring about whether an applicant is disabled unless the inquiry is job-related and
consistent with business necessity).
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public policy tort protections;33 and contractual protections.34 It is possible
to frame these as sources of employee privacy protection or as exceptions
to employment at-will. The former is probably a more accurate
characterization because an employer might infringe upon an employee¶V
right to privacy absent termination.35 In the employment context, there are
three basic kinds of intrusions that may give rise to an employee privacy
claim: surveillance, such as monitoring e-mail and telephone
communications; testing, such as drug testing or medical testing; and
LQTXLU\ LQWR DQ HPSOR\HH¶V RII-duty conduct, such as political and
recreational activities.36 Surveillance and testing involve more of an
intrusion than inquiry into off-duty conduct, because²while perhaps not
WKH HPSOR\HU¶V EXVLQHVV²off-duty conduct involves personal facts more
than it involves private information.
Privacy protections may be available to employees to defend against
each of these intrusions. In the employment relationship, one possible
source of employee privacy protection is an implied-in-fact contract.37
:KHQDQHPSOR\HU¶VDFWLRQVFUHDWHDUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\IRU
the employee, the implied-in-fact contract may be available to the
employee to assert protectable privacy rights. An implied right to privacy
can protect against each type of intrusion, whether surveillance, testing, or
inquiry into off-duty conduct, if the employee has a reasonable expectation
of privacy based upon the circumstances of the workplace. The success of
33. See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1992)
UHO\LQJ RQ WKH FRPPRQ ODZ WRUW RI LQYDVLRQ RI SULYDF\ WR KROG DQ HPSOR\HH¶V
discharge contrary to public policy).
34. Cf. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND
ITS LIMITATIONS 301 (2007) (observing that parties can contractually agree to the extent
RI WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\ ULJKWV WKURXJK SULYDWH RUGHULQJ²which may be either
express or implied).
35. )RU H[DPSOH DQ HPSOR\HU PLJKW PRQLWRU DQ HPSOR\HH¶V FRPPXQLFDWLRQ LQ D
PDQQHU WKDW EDVHG XSRQ HPSOR\HU SROLFLHV DQG SUDFWLFHV YLRODWHV WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy, thereby violating the employeH¶V ULJKW WR SULYDF\
regardless of any adverse employment action against the employee. The contract is
breached by the intrusion of privacy rather than by terminating or disciplining the
employee. See infra Part III (discussing causes of action based upon an implied
contract right to privacy).
36. Case examples used in this Article will involve situations under each of these
intrusions. See infra Part III.B-IV.A and accompanying text.
37. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1043 (recognizing that, although privacy
expectations are generally inconsistent with the employment relationship, an implied
FRQWUDFWULJKWPD\DULVHZKHQ³WKHHPSOR\HUWROHUDWHVRUSHUPLWVFHUWDLQDFWLRQV´DQGLW
LV³PDQLIHVWO\XQIDLUIRUDQHPSOR\HUWRFRQIHUSULYDF\ULJKWVWKURXJKSROLcies, written
or implied, and then to turn around and ignore those policies when it is advantageous to
do so.´ see also Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment
Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 715 (1996) (cautioning that proponents of market
HIILFLHQF\EHOLHYH³WKHSDUWLHVWRDQHPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQVKLS>FDQ@EHVW
MXGJHWKHLULQWHUHVWV>@´DQGFRXUWVVKRXOGOHDYHSULYDF\PDWWHUVWRSULYDWHEDUJDLQLQJ 
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an alleged implied-in-fact contract right will depend heavily on the
FLUFXPVWDQFHV EXW LW LV DQ DYDLODEOH FDXVH RI DFWLRQZKHQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
conduct creates and subsequently violates aQ HPSOR\HH¶V reasonable
expectation of privacy.
III. IMPLIED-IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: A LESSER±KNOWN
VEHICLE FOR ENFORCING PRIVACY RIGHTS
While it is rare for parties to an employment relationship to bargain out
of the at-will paradigm, the default rule allows for this opportunity.38 The
terms of an employment contract are those to which the parties agree, and
as with other types of contracts, employment contracts may contain implied
terms.39 According to a 2007 survey, forty-five states recognize the implied
contract as a common law exception to the employment at-will rule.40
Differences in the law in this area exist because common law causes of
action arising under state law differ from state to state. In some states,
implied-in-fact contract theories can establish a right to job security.41 The
1981 California case, 3XJK Y 6HH¶V &DQGLHV ,QF,42 is regarded as the
seminal employment law case recognizing an implied employment
contract.43
A. Implied-in-Fact Contracts for Job Security
In Pugh, the issue was whether the plaintiff, a long term and loyal
employee of the company, had an implied contractual right to for cause
38. See Matthew W. Finkin et al., Proceeding, Working Group on Chapter 2 of the
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13
EMPL. RTS. & EMP. POL¶Y J. 93, 110 (2009) (suggesting that the at-will default is likely
to last because little negotiation occurs at the outset of most employment relationships,
many workers do not understand or are not aware of the default rule, and there is often
unequal bargaining power between the parties).
39. See id. at 114-15 (discussing the proposed text of a RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW).
40. See Sonne, supra note 11, at 160 (noting that common law exceptions to
employment at-will demonstrate a policy toward modifying the default rule for
FLUFXPVWDQFHVEH\RQGWKHHPSOR\HH¶VFRQWURORUIRUWKHSXEOLFJRRG).
41. See id. at 159±160 (discussing how many states rely on implied contracts,
including those found in employer handbooks and manuals and oral representations, to
limit the at-will doctrine).
42. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981), disapproved of by *X] Y %HFKWHO 1DW¶O
Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
43. See, e.g., Finkin et al., supra note 38, at 114±15 (illustrating, through Pugh, the
factors courts consider in determining whether an implied employment contract exists);
Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 358 (2008) (noting that the California courts first
addressed the implied employment contract issue four months prior to the Pugh
decision in Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980) but that
Pugh LVWKH³PRUHIDPRXVGHFLVLRQ´ 
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termination.44 The court laid out various factors to ascertain whether an
implied-in-fact employment contract existed: payment of independent
consideration; the personnel policies and practices of the company; the
HPSOR\HH¶VORQJHYLW\DWWKHFRPSDQ\DFWLRQVDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQVRIWKH
employer; and industry practice.45 Whether an implied-in-fact employment
contract exists is a fact-specific analysis that requires considering the
totality of the circumstances.46 /RRNLQJ WR WKH ³WRWDOLW\ RI WKH SDUWLHV¶
UHODWLRQVKLS>@´ WKH Pugh court held that the employee had established a
prima facie case that his employer breached an implied employment
FRQWUDFWE\FRQVLGHULQJWKHSODLQWLII¶VGXUDWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQWSUDLVHDQG
promotions received; lack of criticism; oral assurances; and employer
policies.47 In other words, based on their implied-in-fact contract, the
employer could only discharge Pugh if the employer had good cause.48
Courts and commentators have recognized that the concept espoused by
the court in Pugh²QRWUHTXLULQJFRQVLGHUDWLRQLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHZRUNHU¶V
continued employment²correctly applies general contract principles to the
employment context.49 Allowing implied-in-fact contract terms in
44. See Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918±920 (explaining that ³>D@IWHU  \HDUV RI
HPSOR\PHQW ZLWK 6HH¶V &DQGLHV ,QF LQ ZKLFK KH ZRUNHG KLV ZD\ XS WKH FRUSRUDWH
ladder from dishwasher to vice president :D\QH3XJKZDVILUHG´ 
45. See id. at 925±26 (holding independent consideration²consideration other than
WKHZRUNHU¶VFRQWLQXHGHPSOR\PHQWZLWKWKHFRPSDQ\²to be but one factor of many
to consider in the analysis).
46. See Foley v. Interactive 'DWD &RUS  3G    &DO   ³>7@KH
WRWDOLW\RIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´ see also Dupree v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 222 (10th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that the
inquiry regarding whether an implied contract right exists is normally a factual one);
Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776, 780 (N.M. 1993) (examining written
representations such as employee handbooks, oral representations, party conduct, and
the combination of representations and conduct).
47. See Pugh, 171 Cal. Rtpr. at 329 (remanding with the instruction that the
employer had the burden of proving Pugh was terminated for cause); see also Pugh v.
6HH¶V&DQGLHV,QF (Pugh II), 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 195, 214 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming
WKHWULDOFRXUW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDW3XJKKDGEHHQWHUPLQDWHGIRUFDXVH 
48. See 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926± QRWLQJ KRZHYHU WKDW ³ZKHUH DV KHUH WKH
employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must
of necessity be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment.´ 
49. See Foley3GDW REVHUYLQJWKDWUHTXLULQJ³VHSDUDWHFRQVLGHUDWLRQDV
DVXEVWDQWLYHOLPLWDWLRQ´WRWKHILQGLQJRIDQHQIRUFHDEOHFRQWUDFW³ZRXOGEHµFRQWUDU\
to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶´ TXRWLQJ CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-3 (2d ed. 1977)));
Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924±25 (noting that requiring consideration other than
continued employment is inconsistent with the general rule for contract formation that
courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration (citing CALAMARI & PERILLO,
CONTRACTS § 4-3 (2d ed. 1977))). See also Eales v. Tanana Valley Med.-Surgical Grp.,
663 P.2d 958, 960 (Alaska 1983) (finding the independent consideration requirement
XQVRXQG XQGHU FRPPRQ ODZ FRQWUDFW UXOHV EHFDXVH ³>W@KHUH LV QR UHTXLUHPHQW RI
mutuality of obligation with respect to contracts formed by an exchange of a promise
for performance.´ , Fineman, supra note 43, at 362 (explaining that Pugh and Foley
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employment contracts will not negate the at-will rule; implied contract
rights arise only when it appears from the circumstances that the parties
intended to be contractually bound to implied contract terms.50 In practice,
courts differ in their degree of acceptance of implied-in-fact employment
contract terms.51 Some courts formalistically require offer, acceptance, and
consideration, while other courts adopt a more fact-specific approach
IRFXVHG RQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ 7KH 7HQWK &LUFXLW &RXUW RI
Appeals, applying Colorado law, rejected the argument that an employee
can aggregate employer-issued documents into a legally binding contract
without showing the elements of a contract were met as to each
document.52 In contrast, some courts have held that implied contracts are
HQIRUFHDEOH EDVHG XSRQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQV53
Consequently, the jurisdiction will determine whether the empOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectations will be sufficient to recognize and enforce an
implied-in-fact contract or whether the exchange must formally meet all of
the elements of a contract.
B. Potential for Implied-in-Fact Contracts Protecting Employee Privacy
Where employer actions and representations create reasonable
expectations of employee privacy, jurisdictions that recognize an impliedin-fact employment contract would acknowledge an implied contract right
to privacy because that right is negotiable and can be altered by contract.54
applied general contract principles to the employment relationship).
50. See Foley  3G DW  ³3HUPLWWLQJ SURRI RI DQG UHOLDQFH RQ LPSOLHG-infact contract terms does not nullify the at-will rule, it [sic] merely treats such contracts
LQDPDQQHULQNHHSLQJZLWKJHQHUDOFRQWUDFWODZ´ 
51. See Dupree  )G   QRWLQJ D ³>K@LJK WKUHVKROG IRU LQYRNLQJ WKH
LPSOLHG FRQWUDFW GRFWULQH´  Ball v. Ark. Dep't of Cmty. Punishment, 10 S.W.3d 873,
876 (Ark. 2000) (requiring a manual or handbook to contain an express agreement to
be sufficient to invoke the exception for an implied-in-fact employment contract);
Adams v. Pre Finish Metals, Inc., No. WD-96-039, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2053, *12±
13 (Ct. App. May 16, 1997) (holding that handbooks and manuals will rarely be
sufficient to create an implied-in-fact contract right if the employee could not otherwise
establish a promissory estoppel claim based on the same facts).
52. See Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1464±65 (10th Cir. 1994)
HODERUDWLQJWKDWXQGHU&RORUDGRODZWKHHPSOR\HHPXVWEHDZDUHRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
SROLF\ DQG VXFK SROLF\ PXVW LQIOXHQFH WKH HPSOR\HH¶V FRQWLQXHG HPSOR\PHQW to
constitute an acceptance). But see Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d
1257, 1268 n.10 (N.J. 1985) (holding that an employee need not rely on²or even be
aware of²an employer policy in order to benefit from it and for it to create an implied
contract right).
53. See Fineman, supra note 43 DW  ³>7@KH >Foley and Pugh] decisions also
LQFRUSRUDWH WKH LGHD WKDW LPSOLHG FRQWUDFWV DUH HQIRUFHDEOH EHFDXVH RI HPSOR\HHV¶
reasonable expectations . . . . This is potentially a different inquiry than whether the
HPSOR\HU¶VDFWLRQVDQGSROLFLHVH[SUHVVDQLQWHQWWRRIIHUMRESURWHFWLRQV´ 
54. See, e.g., Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 209 F.3d 1122, 1130±31 (9th
&LU  KROGLQJWKDWDQ³REMHFWLYHO\UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\´GHSHQGVRQ
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An implied-in-fact contract claim may arise when an employee has been
terminated, and feels as though her privacy rights were infringed, because
VKH KDG D UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ EDVHG XSRQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
conduct and policies.55 7KH HPSOR\HH¶V claim can be framed as a narrow
way of arguing that her at-will employment status was negated by an
implied contract right to privacy.56 The employee, however, need not be
terminated in order to assert a breach of contract claim for violating the
HPSOR\HH¶V ULJKW WR SULYDF\ )RU H[DPSOH DQ HPSOR\HH PD\ KDYH D
contractual right to privacy in the content of text messages sent using a
company issued phone. If the employer accesses the content of an
HPSOR\HH¶V WH[W PHVVDJHV WKH employee could bring suit against the
employer for breach of contract, even if the employer did not terminate the
HPSOR\HHEDVHGRQWKRVHPHVVDJHV,WLVWKHWHUPVRIWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFW
that will determine what actions constitute a breach, and the emplo\HH¶V
reasonable expectations will assist the court in ascertaining those terms.57
An implied-in-fact contract for employee privacy may become
enforceable when an employer makes representations to an employee that
JLYH ULVH WR WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[Sectation of privacy in some
aspect of her job or personal life and the employer breaches those
representations. The employee may assert a cause of action for breach of an
implied-in-IDFW FRQWUDFW SURWHFWLQJ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\ 7KH PRUH
specific and definite the assurances given by the employer, the more likely
it is a court will find that the assurances created an implied-in-fact contract
right.
In 1992, the Tenth Circuit considered whether an employee acquired
privacy rights based on an implied contract under Oklahoma law.58 In
Dupree v. United Parcel Service, two employees were terminated after
the deal struck between labor and employment because consent is usually a defense to a
privacy action).
55. See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that the employee had an asserted expectation to a right to privacy based on
existing policies), disapproved of by *X] Y %HFKWHO 1DW¶O ,QF  3G  &DO
2000).
56. In fact, a handful of employee-plaintiffs have advanced such an argument. See,
e.g., Vasey, 29 F.3d at 1464 (asserting an implied-in-fact contract right based, in part,
on written representations that the employer would respect the dignity and privacy of
employees); Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222 (advancing an implied-in-fact contract right
based on oral and written statements that employees would be treated fairly);
Greenrock v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 08-CV-404-TCK-TLW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36360, *1±2 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 28, 2009) (claiming employer actions violated an
implied-in-fact contract right that employees be treated with respect and dignity).
57. See Vasey, 29 F.3d aW  ILQGLQJ WKDW D PDQXDO FRQWDLQLQJ ³YDJXH
DVVXUDQFHV´GLGQRWFUHDWHDFRQWUDFWEHFDXVHWKHHPSOR\HHFRXOGQRWKDYHUHDVRQDEO\
concrete expectations of what those assurances meant).
58. Dupree, 956 F.2d at 219.

40

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:1

word of their romantic involvement spread around the office.59 The
employees argued an implied contract voided their at-will status by
creating certain privacy ULJKWV DQG EDVHG WKHLU FODLP RQ ³UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
>WKDW@ZHUHPDGHWRWKHPERWKRUDOO\DQGLQSROLF\PDQXDOV´60 The Tenth
Circuit enumerated the following five factors as critical to the evaluation of
whether an implied contract exists under Oklahoma law: ³ D HYLGHQFHRI
VRPHµVHSDUDWHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶EH\RQGWKHHPSOR\HH¶VVHUYLFHWRVXSSRUWWKH
implied term, (b) longevity of employment, (c) [provisions in] employer
KDQGERRNV DQG PDQXDOV G  WKH HPSOR\HH¶V GHWULPHQWDO UHOLDQFH RQ RUDO
statements and company policies and practices, and (e) promotions and
FRPPHQGDWLRQV´61 The court acknowledged the inquiry is a factual one
typically to be decided by a jury, but VWLSXODWHG³[i]f the alleged promises
are nothing more than vague assurances . . . the issue can be decided as a
PDWWHU RI ODZ´62 The statement relied on by the employees in the
FRPSDQ\¶V SROLF\ PDQXDO²³:H 7UHDW 2XU 3HRSOH )DLUO\ DQG :LWKRXW
)DYRULWLVP´²was held by the court to be too vague, as a matter of law, to
create an implied contract right to privacy.63
Two years later, the Tenth Circuit approached a similar argument
applying Colorado law in Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp.64 There, the
employee worked for the employer for thirty-three years in various
positions before being terminated in a round of layoffs.65 The court
discussed the procedural requirements for an implied-in-fact employment
contract, holding that the employee must prove the employer made an offer
WRWKHHPSOR\HHDQGWKHHPSOR\HH¶VLQLWLDORUFRQWLQXHGVHUYLFHTXDOLILHGDV
acceptance and consideration.66 Further, for a handbook or manual to
59. Id. at 220±21.
60. Id. at 222.
61. Id. But cf. Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984)
(discussing that some jurisdictions do not require separate consideration and consider
such a requirement to be contrary to general contract principles against inquiring into
the sufficiency of consideration), disapproved of by *X]Y%HFKWHO1DW¶O,QF3G
1089 (Cal. 2000).
62. Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222.
63. Id.
64. 29 F.3d 1460, 1460 (10th Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 1463.
66. See id. at 1464 (elaborating that to qualify as an offer, the employer must have
³manifested his willingness to enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the
employee in understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the employer
and that the employee¶s assent would conclude the bargain.´). Dupree and Vasey were
both decided by the Tenth Circuit, but in Dupree separate consideration was a
prerequisite to finding an implied employment contract whereas in Vasey the
HPSOR\HH¶V FRQWLQXHG VHUYLFH FRXOG EH VXIILFLHQW FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WR VXSSRUW DQ LPSOLHG
employment contract. The difference is due to the Dupree court applying Oklahoma
law and the Vasey court applying Colorado law.
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constitute an offer under Colorado law, it must be communicated to the
employee.67 The employee in Vasey relied on statements in company
PHPRV WKDW WKH HPSOR\HUZDV FRPPLWWHGWR ³WKH GLJQLW\ DQG SULYDFy due
DOO KXPDQ EHLQJV´ WR SURYLGLQJ ³D VDIH DQG KHDOWK\ ZRUNSODFH´ DQG WKH
HPSOR\HU³EHOLHYHVLQWKHKLJKHVWHWKLFDOVWDQGDUGV´68 Like in Dupree, the
FRXUW KHOG WKHVH JHQHUDO VWDWHPHQWV ZHUH ³YDJXH DVVXUDQFHV´ DQG WRR
indefinite to contractually bind the employer to an implied contract.69
Another example of a court rejecting privacy assurances in an employee
manual as too vague is the Oklahoma Supreme Court case Gilmore v.
Enogex, Inc.70 Gilmore was terminated for refusing to submit to a random
drug test conducted on all employees.71 Gilmore asserted breach of an
implied contract right to privacy based on the employee manual which
provided: ³[t]he Company will respect the privacy of its employees and
will involve itself in their personal lives only to the extent that job
performance or conflict of interest is involved or where assistance
programs are made available on a voluntary participation basis.´72 The
court recognized it is possible for an employee manual or handbook to give
rise to an implied contract, but rejected that the cited provision was
sufficient to implicate an implied contract right to privacy.73 While
arguably more specific than the handbook statements in Dupree and Vasey,
WKH 2NODKRPD 6XSUHPH &RXUW KHOG WKDW *LOPRUH¶V LPSOLHG FRQWDFW FODLP
was insufficient because the employee handbook provision did not contain
DQ\VSHFLILFWHUPVRQO\³YDJXHDVVXUDQFHV´74

67. See id. (HODERUDWLQJWKDW³DQHPSOR\HU¶VOLPLWHGGLVWULEXWLRQRILWVHPSOR\PHQW
manual or policy indicates the employer did not intend the manual to operate as a
contractual offer to the employee (citing Kuta v. Joint Dist. No. 50(J), 799 P.2d 379,
382 (Colo. 1990))). But see Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1268
n.10 (N.J. 1985) (observing that, with regard to employer policy manuals, ³HPSOR\HHV
neither ha[ve] to read it, know of its existence, or rely on it to benefit from its
provisions any more than employees in a plant that is unionized have to read or rely on
a collective-EDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQWLQRUGHUWRREWDLQLWVEHQHILWV´ 
68. Vasey, 29 F.3d at 1465.
69. Id.
70. 878 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1994).
71. Id. at 362.
72. See id. at 368 (emphasis omitted) (looking to the text of the employee manual
WR LGHQWLI\ LI DQ LPSOLHG FRQWUDFW H[LVWHG  7KH HPSOR\HH¶V RULJLQDO SXEOLF SROLF\
DUJXPHQWZDVUHMHFWHGEHFDXVH³when [his] privacy concerns [were] balanced against
Enogex¶legitimate interest in providing a drug-free workplace, his invasion-of-privacy
claim fails to meet the law's highly-offensive-to-a-reasonable-person WHVW´Id. at 366±
67.
73. Id. at 368.
74. See id DW  ³7KLV FRXUt, while willing to imply the existence of a contract
and construe the terms, will not imply terms in the context of obscure or ambiguous
ODQJXDJH´ 
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Although these cases failed to hold that an implied contract right to
privacy was created, each of them did accept that such a right may exist
where there were more definite assurances of privacy protection.75 While
the Tenth Circuit and the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not give any
guidance as to what kind of statement would be sufficiently specific and
definite to give rise to an implied contract right to privacy, these cases
indicate some courts will require definite and specific promises of privacy
from employers in order to find an implied contract right to privacy.76 A
TXHVWLRQRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQHPSOR\HH¶Vimplied contract right to privacy
can be framed as whether the totality of the circumstances suffices to create
a reasonable expectation of privacy for the employee.77 For the employees
in Dupree, Vasey, and Gilmore, the lack of specificity in the handbook
made those provisions insufficient to create reasonable privacy
expectations; it was not reasonable for these employees to rely on the
handbook statements.78 In contrast to the higher threshold required under
Oklahoma and Colorado law to find implied contract rights with regard to
employee privacy,79 other courts have been more willing to invoke the
doctrine.80
1. The Implied Contract Doctrine: Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp.
Contrary to the cases described above, courts occasionally find that an
implied contract right to privacy exists. Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp. has
been cited as recognizing an implied contract for certain employee privacy
protection.81 The Rulon-Miller FRXUW UHOLHG KHDYLO\ RQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
75. E.g., id.
76. E.g., Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1464 (10th Cir. 1994);
Dupree v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 222±23 (10th Cir. 1992).
77. See, for example, Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222±ZKLFKUHOLHGRQWKHHPSOR\HH¶V
understanding of employer-issued materials, as well as the representations of those
materials for determining the existence of an implied contract.
78. :KHQIUDPHGLQWHUPVRIWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\WKH
analysis is similar to that of a Fourth Amendment analysis²protecting citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures by government actors²for public employees.
79. See id. (referencing the requirement of definite promises in order to create an
enforceable contractual right (citing Krause v. Dresser Indus., Inc. 910 F.2d 674, 678
(10th Cir. 1990))); see also Gilmore, 878 P.2d at 368 (explaining the requirements of
an implied contract).
80. See Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533 (Ct. App. 1984)
(XSKROGLQJ D MXU\ YHUGLFW ILQGLQJ WKH HPSOR\HU EUHDFKHG DQ HPSOR\HH¶V LPSOLHG
contract right to privacy), disapproved of by *X] Y %HFKWHO 1DW¶O ,QF  3G 
(Cal. 2000).
81. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 4, at 1043± FDOOLQJWKHFRXUW¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRIDQ
LPSOLHG FRQWUDFW ULJKW RI HPSOR\HH SULYDF\ WKH ³PRVW LPSRUWDQW DVSHFW´ RI WKH FDVH 
See also Terry Morehead Dworkin, ,W¶V 0\ /LIH²Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job
Employee Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47, 78 (1997) (discussing
that Rulon-Miller¶V DQDO\VLV RI a breach of implied contract rights can be used in the
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H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ DV LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V FRQGXFW 5XORQMiller worked her way through the ranks at IBM from receptionist to
marketing manager.82 Before her final promotion, Rulon-Miller was in a
relationship with an employee of an IBM competitor.83 Rulon-0LOOHU¶V
superiors assured her the relationship was not an issue but later told her it
FUHDWHG D ³FRQIOLFW RI LQWHUHVW,´ DQG VKH PXVW HQG LW RU ORVH KHU MRE84 A
manager told her she had time to think it over, only to terminate her the
following day.85
Rulon-Miller, and the court, relied on an IBM memo issued to managers
VWUHVVLQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIHPSOR\HHV¶SULYDF\LQWKHLURII-the-job lives.86
7KHFRXUWVXPPDUL]HGWKHFRPSDQ\SROLF\DV³RQHRIQRFRPSDQ\LQWHUHVW
in the outside activities of an employee so long as the activities did not
interfere with the work of the ePSOR\HH´87 While IBM claimed D³FRQIOLFW
RI LQWHUHVW´ DV WKH UHDVRQ IRU 5XORQ-0LOOHU¶V WHUPLQDWLRQ WKH FRXUW
GHWHUPLQHGWKHUHZDVVXIILFLHQWHYLGHQFHWRXSKROGWKHMXU\¶VILQGLQJWKDW
the romantic relationship did not create a conflict of interest.88 The court
XSKHOG WKH MXU\¶V ILQGLQJ WKDW Rulon-Miller had a right to privacy in her
SHUVRQDO URPDQWLF OLIH EDVHG RQ ³VXEVWDQWLYH GLUHFW FRQWUDFW ULJKWV   
IORZLQJWRKHUIURP,%0SROLFLHV´89 In upholding that Rulon-Miller had an
implied contract right to privacy, the court may have also relied on the
context of privacy rights); Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment
Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 43 n.79 (2001)
(describing Rulon-Miller DV³>D@ZHOO-known case that can be understood on contract
JURXQGV´ DQG FLWLQJ WKH SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW ³>L@n the private sector . . . workers rarely
succeed in their claims unless they can show that the employer held out the expectation
RIUHVSHFWLQJSULYDF\DQGWKHQEUHDFKHGWKHH[SHFWDWLRQ´ 
82. Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 527±28.
83. Id. at 528.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 528±29.
86. See id. at 529±30 (stating that Rulon-Miller relied on company policies and,
according to DPHPRLVVXHGWR,%0PDQDJHUV³,%0¶VILUVWEDVLFEHOLHILVUHVSHFWIRU
the individual, and the essence of this belief is a strict regard for his right to personal
SULYDF\´ 7KLVSROLF\GRHVQRWDSSHDUDQ\PRUHVSHFLILFWKDQWKHVWDWHPHQWVUHOLHGRQ
by the employee in Gilmore. Contra Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 368 (Okla.
1994) (discussing that the employee actually received and had knowledge of the
employee manual containing a statement that ³[t]he Company will respect the privacy
of its employees and will involve itself in their personal lives only to the extent that job
performance or conflict of interest is involved or where assistance programs are made
available on a voluntary participation basis.´). Yet, the California court in Rulon-Miller
was willing to accept that an implied contract right to privacy existed while the
Oklahoma Supreme Court was not. This divergence PD\EHGXHWRWKHFRXUWV¶GLIIHULQJ
acceptance and willingness to invoke the implied-in-fact contract to protect employee
privacy.
87. 208 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 532.
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assurances made by Rulon-0LOOHU¶V VXSHUYLVRUV WKDW WKH UHODWLRQVKLS ZDV
not a problem.90 In sum, the court found sufficient evidence to support that
Rulon-Miller had a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the
HPSOR\HU¶VFRQGXFW91
The court clearly affirmed that company policy established that IBM had
no interest in the off-duty conduct of an employee unless the conduct
LQWHUIHUHG ZLWK WKH HPSOR\HH¶V ZRUN92 Assuming the Rulon-Miller court
was in fact finding an implied contract right, the court primarily relied upon
the written policy distributed to IBM managers.93 Conceivably, the court
could have based this conclusion on the fact that Rulon-0LOOHU¶VVXSHULRUV
knew of and permitted the relationship when promoting her.94 While a
written policy will usually be stronger evidence of an implied contract
right, an implied-in-fact contract takes all of the facts and circumstances
into consideration in determining whether such a contract right exists.95

90. See id. at 528 (recounting, in some detail, Rulon-0LOOHU¶V VXSHUYLVRU¶V
testimony informing her that he did not ³have any problem with [her relaWLRQVKLS@´
SULRUWRKROGLQJWKDWVKHFRXOGUHDVRQDEO\UHO\XSRQ,%0¶VZULWWHQSULYDF\SROLFLHV .
91. Framing this issue as one of reasonable reliance is similar to a promissory
estoppel analysis, which allows an employee to recover based upon reasonable reliance
RQ D GHILQLWH SURPLVH E\ WKH HPSOR\HU ZKHUH UHOLDQFH LV WR WKH HPSOR\HH¶V GHWULPHQW
and nonenforcement would be unjust. See Estrin v. Natural Answers, Inc., 103 F.
$SS¶[ WK&LU (listing the elements of a promissory estoppel claim as:
³ D FOHDU DQG GHILQLWH SURPLVH  ZKHUH WKH SURPLVRU KDV D reasonable expectation
that the offer will induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; 3. which
does induce actual and reasonable action or forbearance by the promisee; and 4. causes
DGHWULPHQWZKLFKFDQRQO\EHDYRLGHGE\WKHHQIRUFHPHQWRIWKHSURPLVH´  Nguyen
v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 1995) (defining promissory estoppel as
DOORZLQJ³recovery even in the absence of consideration where reliance and change of
position to the detriment of the promisee make it unconscionable not to enforce the
promise.´) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also Coats v.
Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 78012, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1699, *22 (Ct. App.
Apr. 12, 2001) (holding summary judgment to be appropriate on a promissory estoppel
claim where the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy).
92. Rulon-0LOOHU¶V ³VXEVWDQWLYH GLUHFW FRQWUDFW ULJKWV´ EDVHG RQ ,%0¶V FRPSDQ\
SROLFLHV PDNHV WKH FRXUW¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH FRYHQDQW RI JRRG IDLWK DQG IDLU GHDOLQJ
implicit in employment at-will contracts unnecessarily confusing. Perhaps in a
jurisdiction that recognizes both causes of action, it is a legal distinction without a
practical difference. Although it may be immaterial if the result is the same, it is
unclear whether the court couched its analysis on a breach of an implied contract right
derived from the circumstances or a breach of an implicit covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. See Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
93. See id. DW  HQXPHUDWLQJ WKH SROLF\ VHW IRUWK E\ ,%0¶V IRUPHU FKDLUPDQ
FOHDUO\VWDWLQJWKHHPSOR\HH¶VULJKWWR privacy).
94. See id. DW  UHFRXQWLQJ D FRQYHUVDWLRQ GHPRQVWUDWLQJ PDQDJHPHQW¶V
knowledge of the relationship).
95. See, e.g., Dupree v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 222 (10th Cir.
1992) (acknowledging that the ³inquiry [regarding] whether an implied contract right
H[LVWV LV >D@ IDFWXDO´ RQH  Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 388 (Cal.
1988) ³>7@KHWRWDOLW\RIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´ 
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While the Rulon-Miller court did not explicitly discuss how the facts met
common law contract requirements, the exchange²even absent the IBM
policy²can fit within the contract definition of a bargained-for exchange
consisting of an offer, an acceptance, and consideration. Prior to receiving
the promotion, Rulon-Miller was promised by her superior that her
romantic relationship was not an issue.96 In offering her the promotion, it
was an understood condition of her acceptance that she could continue the
relationship. In accepting the promotion, Rulon-Miller was accepting, as a
condition of her new employment contract, that she could stay in the
relationship while working in her new position. Her continued service to
the company in the promoted position constituted consideration.
The facts can be analyzed to meet the elements of a contract, but crucial
to finding an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy LV WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation. The assurances by her supervisors could induce a
reasonable expectation that what the supervisors said was accurate, and the
relationship was not a problem. Based on the representations by her
superiors, Rulon-Miller did have a reasonable expectation that her
relationship was not a matter of concern for her employer, and this
reasoQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ VKDSHG E\ KHU HPSOR\HU¶V FRQGXFW FUHDWHG DQ
implied contract right.97 Under the facts of the case, it does seem RulonMiller was treated unfairly by her long time employer. The court indicated
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could provide RulonMiller with relief because IBM failed to afford Rulon-Miller the protection
of a company policy. Similarly, other decisions have invoked the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to protect employee privacy
rights.98
2. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Luedtke v.
Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.
The Rulon-Miller court made reference to the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing present in employment at-will contracts.99 The
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is another cause of action an

96. Rulon-Miller testified her manager stated to KHU ³, GRQ¶W KDYH DQ\ SUREOHP
ZLWK>WKHUHODWLRQVKLS@<RX¶UHP\QXPEHURQHSLFN,MXVWZDQWWRDVVXUH\RXWKDW\RX
DUHP\VHOHFWLRQ´Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
97. See Rulon-Miller, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 528±29 & nn. 2±3 (recounting RulonMiOOHU¶V WULDO FRXUW WHVWLPRQ\ RI WKH FRQYHUVDWLRQV WKDW WRRN SODFH EHWZHHQ KHU DQG
management).
98. See, e.g., Leudtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1223±24
(Alaska 1992) (identifying a covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a qualification
of the at-will employment rule).
99. See Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222 (discussing the Rulon-Miller FRXUW¶VKDQGOLQJRI
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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employee may assert against an employer to allege infringement of the
HPSOR\HH¶V right to privacy.100 Implied contract rights and the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing are similar but distinct theories.
While forty-five states recognized the implied contract theory as of 2007,
only nine recognized the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
theory.101 The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing affords the
employee the protection of employer policies without requiring the court to
find that such policies created an implied contract.102 Thus, an employee
PLJKW DVVHUW ERWK FDXVHV RI DFWLRQ ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\
rights when a finding of such privacy rights is supported by an employer
policy. As the name of the covenant indicates, courts often rely on fairness
principles to determine if an employer violated the implied covenant of
JRRG IDLWK DQG IDLU GHDOLQJ HYHQ DEVHQW WKH HPSOR\HU¶V YLRODWLRQ RI D
company policy.
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. is one case in which a court held
that the employer violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Luedtke was terminated after testing positive for marijuana.103 The
Alaska Supreme Court held that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is implied in all at-will employment contracts, and its breach is determined
E\ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V LQWHQW DQG EDG IDLWK104 :KLOH WKH FRXUW¶V DQDO\VLV
UHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKHGUXJWHVWZDVDWHUPRI/XHGWNH¶VHPSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFW,
it did not hold that an implied contract right to privacy prohibited the
employer from drug testing him. Rather, the court held that the employer
did not treat Luedtke fairly, noting that he was tested for drugs without
notice when other employees were not similarly tested.105 This analysis
100. See Sonne, supra note 11, at 145±46 (listing the limitations to employment atwill with regard to privacy, including implied contract rights and the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing), Rives, supra note 28, at 555 (discussing cause for termination);
see also Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions,
124 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2001, at 3, 4 (analyzing the implied contract and the
covenant of good faith and faith dealing as two of the three major common law
exceptions to employment at-will, with public policy being the third major exception).
101. See Sonne, supra note 11, at 160, n.149 (citing JOHN F. BUCKLEY, IV &
RONALD M. GREEN, 2007 STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES LAW § 5.02
tbl. 5.1 (2007)).
102. See, e.g. WILLIAM E. HARTSFIELD, Wrongful Discharge, 2 INVESTIGATING
EMPLOYEE CONDUCT § 14:13 n.19 (2010) (surveying decisions recognizing the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing regarding employee privacy), available at
Westlaw IEMPC.
103. See Luedtke, 834 P.2d at 1222 (noting that the employee was given neither the
opportunity to retest nor any other options).
104. See id. at 1223±24 (citing Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska
1983)).
105. See id. at 1225± ³:HDJUHHWKDWWKHUHLVQRHYLGHQFHRIVXEMHFWLYHEDGIDLWK
RQ 1DERUV¶ SDUW EXW DV ZH KDYH DOUHDG\ stated, the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing also requires that the employer be objectively fair. The superior court found
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IRFXVHV RQ IDLUQHVV EDVHG RQ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI
SULYDF\ GXH WR WKH HPSOR\HU¶V DFWLRQV²rather than fitting the
circumstances into the requirements of contract formation. Luedtke had a
reasonable expectation that he would not be tested for drugs because he
was not given advance notice and no other employees were tested.106
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing may afford an employee
protection in some states when the circumstances do not amount to a
mutually bargained-for exchange within a contract framework, the
HPSOR\HU¶VFRQGXFW reasonably causes the employee to expect privacy, and
the treatment of the employee is manifestly unfair.107 Yet, most state
judiciaries have rejected the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in employment contracts based on the justification that such a cause of
action would deviate too far from the employment at-will doctrine.108 The
underlying inquiries in an implied-in-fact contract case and an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing case are the same²did the
employee have a reasonable expectation of privacy? Employee privacy
expectations are central to other causes of action as well; public employees
are afforded constitutional protection where the employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy based on the realities of the workplace.

that Luedtke was tested for drug use without prior notice, that no other employee was
similarly tested, and that Nabors suspended Luedtke immediately upon learning of the
results of the test. Nabors does not dispute these findings. We hold as a matter of law,
WKHVHIDFWVFRQVWLWXWHDYLRODWLRQRIWKHFRYHQDQWRIJRRGIDLWKDQGIDLUGHDOLQJ´ 
106. Id.
107. According to a 2000 study, the following states recognized the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment at-will contracts: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, Utah,
and Wyoming. See Muhl, supra note 100, at 4, Ex. 1. The analysis for finding a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is similar to the implied-in-fact
FRQWUDFWDQDO\VLVLQMXULVGLFWLRQVWKDWIRFXVRQWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQV
rather than strictly requiring that the circumstances meet the elements of contract
formation.
108. See, e.g., 0XUSK\ Y %DQFURIW &RQVWU &R  ) $SS¶[   G &LU
2005) (recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
at-will relationships in Delaware, but qualifying that this exception has a narrow
DSSOLFDWLRQEHFDXVHWKHFRYHQDQW³FRXOGVZDOORZWKHGRFWULQHRIHPSOR\PHQWDWZLOO´
(citing Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 401±03 (Del. 2000))); Pittman v. Larson
Distribution Co., 724 P.2d 1379, 1385 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to extend the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment contracts); White v. State, 929
P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) UHIXVLQJ³WRDGRSWDEURDGµEDGIDLWK¶H[FHSWLRQ
to the employment-at-will rule which would have implied a covenant of good faith and
IDLU GHDOLQJ LQ HYHU\ HPSOR\PHQW FRQWUDFW´ EHFDXVH VXFK DQ H[FHSWLRQ ZRXOG LQWUXGH
too greatly upon the employment relationship). But see Thomas C. Kohler & Matthew
W. Finkin, Bonding and Flexibility: Employment Ordering in a Relationless Age, 46
AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 382 (1998) (noting that an implied covenant of good faith and fair
GHDOLQJ RQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V SDUW LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK DQ DW-will relationship, according to
many state courts).
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IV. PRIVACY RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
For public employees, the analysis can be quite different because the
government-employer must comply with the protections of the Fourth
$PHQGPHQWWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&RQVWLWXWLRQJXDUDQWHHLQJWKH³ULJKWRIWKH
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
XQUHDVRQDEOH VHDUFKHV DQG VHL]XUHV´ E\ JRYHUQPHQW DFWRUV109 Under the
implied-in-fact contract analysis, whether the employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy is a hidden inquiry because courts have not
explicitly stated what the standard is. In contrast, under the Fourth
Amendment analysis for public employees, courts expressly inquire
whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy.110 The
8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVKHOGWKDW³>L@QGLYLGXDOVGRQRWORVH)RXUWK
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of
a private employer. The operational realities of the workplace, however,
may make some employees¶ expectations of privacy unreasonable when an
LQWUXVLRQ LV E\ D VXSHUYLVRU UDWKHU WKDQ D ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW RIILFLDO´111
Under the Ortega framework, in order to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, a public employee must have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and the government-HPSOR\HU¶VLQWUXVLRQPXVWEHXQUHDVRQDEOH112
Whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a
threshold analysis to be determined on a case-by-case basis considering all
RI WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV DQG ³RSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV´ RI WKH ZRUNSODFH113 This
ad hoc determination may look similar to the analysis of whether an
implied-in-fact contract exists as both require the court to take account of
the totality of the FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V SROLFLHV
practices, and representations.114
A. City of Ontario v. Quon
Quon exemplifies the similarities and overlap of the privacy rights of

109. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
110. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 906 (9th Cir.
2008) GLVFXVVLQJDSROLFHRIILFHU¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\DQGKROGLQJLWWR
be reasonable), UHY¶G VXE QRP City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). In
Quon, the Supreme Court distanced itself from the holding that a reasonable
expectation of privacy is a threshold requirement in Fourth Amendment employee
privacy cases. See 130 S. Ct. at 2628-29. After Quon, it is unclear what the correct
analytical framework is for a public employee Fourth Amendment claim.
111. 2¶&RQQRUY2UWHJD86  (plurality opinion) (emphasis in
original).
112. Id. at 725±26.
113. Id. at 717±18.
114. For discussion regarding the totality of the circumstances analysis for an
implied contract, see supra note 43±45 and accompanying text.
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public employees under the Fourth Amendment and a cause of action for
an implied contract right to privacy. Quon worked as a sergeant for the
Ontario Police Department and received a two-way pager from his
employer.115 Quon signed an acknowledgement of a policy regarding
computer, Internet, and E-mail usage, which stated, in part, WKDW ³>X@VHUV
should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these
UHVRXUFHV´116 Quon was aware that, while there was no official policy
regarding employer-issued pagers, the pager messages would fall under the
computer, Internet, and E-mail usage policy.117 When an employee
exceeded the contracted-for 25,000±character±per±month allotment,
/LHXWHQDQW'XNH4XRQ¶VVXSHUYLVRUZRXOGFROOHFWSD\PHQWIURPWKHXVHU
for these overages.118 4XRQ ZHQW RYHU KLV SDJHU¶V FKDUDFWHU DOORWPHQW
several times and was told by Duke that so long as Quon paid for the
overages, the department would not conduct an audit to determine whether
they were personal or business in nature.119 Quon paid the overages for
several months and his pager messages were not audited; however, an audit
ZDV ODWHU FRQGXFWHG E\ UHYLHZLQJ WKH SDJHU WUDQVFULSWV DQG 4XRQ¶V
superiors found that many of his pager messages were personal and
sexually explicit.120 The principal harm suffered by Quon was that various
persons within the department reviewed the content of the pager messages.
Quon filed suit asserting constitutional protections in the content of the
pager messages under the Fourth Amendment, and the district court held
that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages due to
'XNH¶V LQIRUPDO SROLF\ RI QRW DXGLWLQJ D SDJHU LI WKH HPSOR\HH SDLG WKH
overuse charges.121 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed and held that, although the employer had a policy purporting
that there should be no expectation of privacy by employees, the
115. Quon, 529 F.3d at 895.
116. See id. at 896 (reserving for the government-employer the right to review
HPSOR\HH¶V ³QHWZRUN DFWLYLW\´ ZLWK RU ZLWKRXW QRWLFH however cautioning that such
systems should not be used for personal matters).
117. See id. (observing that, while Quon testified he remembered the meeting where
the policy was announced, he did not recall his supervisor announcing that the
'HSDUWPHQW¶VH-mail policy would cover the pager messages).
118. Id. at 897 ³8QGHU WKH &LW\¶V FRQWUDFW ZLWK $UFK :LUHOHVV HDFK SDJHU ZDV
DOORWWHGFKDUDFWHUVDIWHUZKLFKWKH&LW\ZDVUHTXLUHGWRSD\RYHUDJHFKDUJHV´ .
119. Id 7KH SDUWLHV¶ GHVFULSWLRQV RI WKH H[FKange differed. According to Duke, he
WROG4XRQ³WKDW>4XRQ@KDGWRSD\IRUKLVRYHUDJHWKDW,GLGQRWZDQWWRGHWHUPLQHLI
the overage was personal or business unless they wanted me to, because if they said,
µ,W¶VDOOEXVLQHVV,¶PQRWSD\LQJIRULW¶WKHQ,ZRXOGGRDQDXGLWWRFRQILUPWKDW´Id.
4XRQ TXRWHG 'XNH DV VWDWLQJ WKH IROORZLQJ ³LI \RX GRQ¶W ZDQW XV WR UHDG LW SD\ WKH
RYHUDJHIHH´Id.
120. Id. at 898. The stated purpose of the audit was to determine whether the 25,000
character allotment was sufficient to cover business use of the pagers. Id.
121. Id. at 899.
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³RSHUDWLRQDOUHDOLW\´DWWKH'HSDUWPHQWZDVFRQWUDU\WRWKLVSROLF\122 The
FRXUWUHOLHGRQWKH³RSHUDWLRQDOUHDOLW\´RI'XNH¶VLQIRUPDOSROLF\ZKLFK
he made particularly clear to Quon²that employee pagers would not be
audited if the employee paid any overage fees.123 In addition to relying on
this informal policy, the court considered the employer practice of not
DXGLWLQJ4XRQ¶VSDJHUPHVVDJHV for several months when Quon exceeded
his monthly character allotment and paid for his overages.124 Thus, the
court considered the oral representations of the employer as well as its
policies and practices and concluded Quon did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the pager messages.125
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued an
opinion on June 17, 2010.126 One of the questions presented to the Court
was whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy when
WKH HPSOR\HU¶V DFWXDO SUDFWLFH DQG LQIRUPDO SROLF\ GLIIHUHG IURP WKH
official employer policy.127 In their respective briefs, the parties agreed that
the reasonable expectation of privacy test is a fact-specific inquiry but
differed on which facts they advocated before for the Court. Quon urged
WKH YLHZ WKDW DQ HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ PXVW EH determined
based on all the circumstances of the employment relationship and focused
WKH &RXUW¶V DWWHQWLRQWR 'XNH¶V informal policy and actual practice of not
DXGLWLQJ WKH RIILFHUV¶ SDJHU PHVVDJHV128 The employer, also using a
³WRWDOLW\RIWKHRSHUDWLRQDOUHDOLWLHV´WHVWXUJHGWKH&RXUWWRFRQFHQWUDWHRQ

122. Id. at 906±07.
123. Id. at 907.
124. See id ³4XRQ KDG H[FHHGHG WKH  FKDUDFWHU OLPLW µWKUHH RU IRXU WLPHV¶
and he had paid for the overages every time without anyone reviewing the text of the
PHVVDJHV´ 
125. See id GLVPLVVLQJWKH&LW\¶VDUJXPHQWWKDW'XNHFRXOGQRWFUHDWHDUHDVRQDEOH
expectation of privacy because he was not a policymaker). Unimportant for the
purposes of this Article, the Ninth Circuit also held that the search was unreasonable
DQG WKXV YLRODWHG 4XRQ¶V )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW ULJKWV See id. at 909 (concluding that
UHYLHZLQJ WKH FRQWHQW RI WKH WH[W PHVVDJHV ³ZDV H[FHVVLYHO\ LQWUXVLYH LQ OLJKW RI WKH
QRQLQYHVWLJDWRU\REMHFWRIWKHVHDUFK´ 
126. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
127. See AM. BAR ASS¶N, Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases: April
Cases 2009±2010 Term: City of Ontario, CA v. Quon, Docket No. 08-1332,
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/april2010.shtml (last visited Nov. 29,
  IROORZ ³4XHVWLRQV 3UHVHQWHG´  ³:KHWKHU D 6:$7 WHDP PHPEHU KDV D
reasonable expectation of privacy in text-messages transmitted on his SWAT pager,
where the police department has an official no-privacy policy but a non-policymaking
lieutenant announced an informal policy of allowing some personal use of the
SDJHUV´ 
128. See Brief of Respondent at 39±41, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010) (No. 08-1332) (arguing that workplace circumstances are important and that an
HPSOR\HU¶V DQQRXncement that employees do not have a privacy expectation, without
considering those circumstances, is not a legitimate regulation).
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the factors GLPLQLVKLQJ 4XRQ¶V expectation of privacy, including that the
SDJHUZDVLVVXHGE\WKHHPSOR\HUDQGWKHGHSDUWPHQW¶VIRUPDOQR-privacy
policy.129
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, determinHGWKDWWKHFDVH³>FRXOG@
be resolved by settled principles [to determine] when a search is
UHDVRQDEOH´UDWKHUWKDQGHOYLQJLQWRWKHUHDVRQDEOHQHVVRIWKHHPSOR\HH¶V
privacy expectations.130 The Court assumed Quon did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy DQG DYRLGHG WKH ³RSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV´ LVVXH131
+RZHYHU LQ GLFWD WKH &RXUW GLVFXVVHG WKH SDUWLHV¶ GLVDJUHHPHQW RYHU
whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy and noted that
ZKHWKHU 'XNH¶V RUDO VWDWHPHQWV FRQVWLWXWHG D FKDQJH LQ WKH 'HSDUWPHQW¶V
SROLF\ ZRXOG EHDU RQ WKH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI 4XRQ¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ132 The
&RXUW FDXWLRQHG DJDLQVW WKH RYHUH[SDQVLRQ RI DQ HPSOR\HH¶V ³UHDVRQDEOH
H[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\´LQQHZIRUPVRIWHFKQRORJ\133 Yet, the Court noted
that clearly defined employer policies wLOO KDYH DQ HIIHFW RQ HPSOR\HHV¶
reasonable expectations.134
Because the Court wanted to avoid a broad determination of employee

129. Brief of Petitioner at 41±45, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(No. 08-1332).
130. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2624.
131. See id. at 2628±29 (sidestepping the two-part framework used in the Ortega
SOXUDOLW\ EXW VWDWLQJ ³ZHUH ZH WR DVVXPH WKDW LQTXLU\ LQWR µRSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV¶ ZHUH
FDOOHG IRU´ LW ZRXOG EH QHFHVVDU\ WR FRQVLGHU WKH IDFWV EHDULQJ RQ WKH OHJLWLPDF\ of
4XRQ¶VH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\LQKLVSDJHUPHVVDJHV After Quon, it is unclear whether
the Court has rejected the Ortega SOXUDOLW\ DSSURDFK LQ IDYRU RI -XVWLFH 6FDOLD¶V
DSSURDFK ³+LV RSLQLRQ ZRXOG KDYH GLVSHQVHG ZLWK DQ LQTXLU\ LQWR µRSHUDWLRQDO
realLWLHV¶ DQG ZRXOG FRQFOXGH µthat the offices of government employees . . . are
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.¶ But he would also
KDYHKHOGµWKDWJRYHUQPHQWVHDUFKHVWRUHWULHYHZRUN-related materials or to investigate
violations of workplace rules²searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and
normal in the private-employer context²GRQRWYLRODWHWKH)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW¶´Id. at
 DOWHUDWLRQ LQ RULJLQDO  FLWDWLRQV RPLWWHG  FLWLQJ 2¶&RQQRU Y 2UWHJD  86
709, 731±32 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
132. See id. at 2629. ³>,@W ZRXOG EH QHFHVVDU\ WR DVN ZKHWKHU 'XNH¶V VWDWHPHQWV
could be taken as announcing a change in OPD policy, and if so, whether he had, in
fact or appearance, the authority to make such a change and to guarantee the privacy of
text messaging. It would also be necessary to consider whether a review of messages
sent on police pagers, particularly those sent while officers are on duty, might be
justified for other reasons, including performance evaluations, litigation concerning the
ODZIXOQHVVRISROLFHDFWLRQVDQGSHUKDSVFRPSOLDQFHZLWKVWDWHRSHQUHFRUGVODZV´ 
133. See id. at 2629±30 (elaborating that the evolution of technology as it relates to
LQIRUPDWLRQWUDQVPLVVLRQ³LVHYLGHQWQRWMXVWin the technology itself but in what society
DFFHSWVDVSURSHUEHKDYLRU´DQG³LWLVXQFHUWDLQKRZZRUNSODFHQRUPVDQGWKHODZ¶V
treatment of them, will evolve.´  ³3UXGHQFH FRXQVHOV FDXWLRQ EHIRUH WKH IDFWV LQ WKH
instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and
extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided
FRPPXQLFDWLRQGHYLFHV´Id. at 2629.
134. Id. at 2630.

52

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:1

expectations of privacy in employer-provided communication devices, it
assumed Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy and held, more
narrowly, that the search was reasonable DQGGLGQRWYLRODWH4XRQ¶V Fourth
Amendment rights.135 In discussing whether the search was too intrusive,
WKH &RXUW DJDLQ FRQVLGHUHG WKH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI 4XRQ¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI
privacy and determined WKDW 4XRQ¶V FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW KLV PHVVDJHV ZHUH
completely private in all circumstances was unreasonable.136 The Court
ultimately held that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding the search
unreasonable.137
While the Court did not directly address whether Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the content of his pager messages, it did generally
state the factors a court should consider when approaching the issue.138 The
&RXUW¶V GLFWD UHJDUGLQJ DQ HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\
may be persuasive in future breach of implied contract cases. The facts in
Quon could potentially give rise to an implied-in-fact contract claim for a
private sector employee for whom a constitutional cause of action is
unavailable.
The conclusion by the Ninth Circuit that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the pager messages is similar to finding that Quon
had an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy in the pager messages based
on the oral assurances, policies, and practices of his public employer. The
CRXUW XVHG WKH ³RSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV´ ODQJXDJH from the Ortega &RXUW¶V
opinion139 to refer WR 'XNH¶V LQIRUPDO SROLF\ DQG SUDFWLFH RI QRW DXGLWLQJ
pagers when employees paid their overage fees.140 The use of looking at
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2631 ³(YHQLIKHFRXOGDVVXPHVRPHOHYHORISULvacy would inhere in his
messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his messages
ZHUHLQDOOFLUFXPVWDQFHVLPPXQHIURPVFUXWLQ\´ 
137. Id. at 2632±33. The Court elaborated WKDW EHFDXVH ³WKH HPSOR\HU KDG D
legitimate reason for WKHVHDUFK´DQG³WKHVHDUFKZDVQRWH[FHVVLYHO\LQWUXVLYHLQOLJKW
RIWKDWMXVWLILFDWLRQWKHVHDUFKZRXOGEHµUHJDUGHGDVUHDVRQDEOHDQGQRUPDOLQWKH
private-HPSOR\HUFRQWH[W¶´Id. at 2633 TXRWLQJ2¶&RQQRUY2UWHJD86
(1987) (plurality opinion)).
138. See id. at 2634±35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for its
³UHFLWDWLRQ RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ DUJXPHQWV FRQFHUQLQJ DQG DQ H[FXUVXV RQ WKH FRPSOH[LW\
and consequences of answering, that admittedly irrelevant threshold queVWLRQ´ -XVWLFH
6FDOLD ZDUQV WKDW ORZHU FRXUWV DQG OLWLJDQWV ZLOO UHDG WKH &RXUW¶V GLJUHVVLRQ DV DQ
LQVWUXFWLRQ WR GHOYH LQWR DUJXPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ ³HPSOR\HU SROLFLHV KRZ WKH\ ZHUH
communicated, and whether they were authorized, as well as the latest trends in
HPSOR\HHV¶ XVH RI HOHFWURQLF PHGLD´ Id. 2635±36. These are the same fact-specific
TXHVWLRQVDFRXUWGHFLGLQJDQHPSOR\HH¶VLPSOLHG-in-fact contract right to privacy case
would consider; WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI WKH &RXUW¶V GLJUHVVLRQ PD\ VSUHDG IXUWKHU WKan
Justice Scalia fears.
139. 480 U.S. at 717.
140. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir. 2008), UHY¶G
sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
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³RSHUDWLRQDO UHDOLWLHV´ WR HQKDQFH DQ HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\
rather than diminish it, is unique.141 This reasoning recognizes that the
actual facts and circumstances of the particular workplace must be
considered to determine whether an employee has a right to privacy
predicated on her reasonable expectation of privacy. Under either a Fourth
Amendment or an implied-in-fact contract framework, the underlying
inquiry is whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy.142
B. An Implied-in-Fact Contract Theory after Quon?
Because Quon was a public sector employee, he was able to invoke
Fourth Amendment protection against his employer.143 The Supreme
&RXUW¶V KDQGOLQJ RI WKH FDVH PD\ VLJQDO WKDW D ZLGHU UDQJH RI SXEOLF
employer conduct will be found reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court distanced itself from the analytical framework that inquired, as a
WKUHVKROGPDWWHULQWRWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\144
7KLV OLPLWDWLRQ RQ D SXEOLF HPSOR\HH¶V FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DYHQXH IRU UHOLHI
makes the implied contract theory an important alternative for public
employees in many states. Depending on applicable state law, a public
employee in Quon¶V SRVLWLRQ may be able to assert a successful cause of
action based on an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy.145 As
141. Cf. Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that
police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that would preclude
EUHDWKDO\]HUWHVWLQJEHFDXVHWKH³RSHUDWLRQDOUHDOLWLHV´RIWKHZRUNSODFHZHUHVXFKWKDW
the officers were already subject to drug testing as a condition of employment); United
States v. Esser, )$SS¶[ WK&LU  KROGLQJWKDWan employee did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse where a posted policy
informed individuals that purses were subject to inspection on the property and all
employees were required to read all posted policies); United States v. Ziegler, 456 F.3d
1138, 1143 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that the company policy entitling personnel
WR DGPLQLVWUDWLYH DFFHVV RI HPSOR\HHV¶ FRPSXWHUV GLPLQLVKHG WKH UHDsonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the employee-SODLQWLII¶V FRPSXWHU ,
superseded by 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).
142. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628.
143. Id. at 2627.
144. Id. at 2633.
145. Public employees in many states can, in addition to a Fourth Amendment cause
of action, assert a claim based on an implied employment contract. Such a cause of
action is not limited in its application to private sector employees because public sector
employees can enter into contracts with their government employers just as private
sector employees can contract with their employers. See, e.g., Bennett v. Marshall Pub.
Library, 746 F. Supp. 671, 679 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (finding that the public employee
had a claim based on the common law implied contract doctrine); Whittington v. State
'HS W RI 3XE 6DIHW\  3G  10 &W $SS   UHYHUVLQJ WKH WULDO FRXUW¶V
ILQGLQJ WKDW ³just-cause public employees do not have the right to sue their
governmental employer for breach of an implied employment contraFW´ &DEDQHVVY
Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 54±62, 232 P.3d 486, 502±04 (holding that, although the
plaintiff was a public employee, an implied-in-fact employment contract was created
based on an existing employee manual). But see Bernstein v. Lopez, 321 F.3d 903,
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previously discussed, courts vary greatly from state to state in their
recognition and acceptance of the implied-in-fact employment contract.146
Like the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy analysis
employed by the Ninth Circuit and considered by the Supreme Court, an
implied-in-fact contract analysis would be fact-intensive and scrutinize the
HPSOR\HH¶Vreasonable expectation of privacy.147
In an implied contract analysis, a court would take into account the
totality of the circumstances, including the oral assurances, policies, and
practices of the employer.148 The official policy of the police department in
Quon was that of no expectation of privacy, but the informal policy and
actual practice of the department was to refrain from auditing the pagers so
long as the officer paid any overage charges for the pager text messages. 149
Duke orally assured Quon specifically that his pager messages would not
be audited if Quon paid for the overage charges.150 A court may find that
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his pager
messages based on these facts²the Ninth Circuit reached that conclusion
under its Fourth Amendment analysis.151 A court that accepts the existence
of an implied-in-fact contract as an informal, open-ended question might
find this reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to give rise to an
enforceable right to privacy in the content of the messages.
Some courts are more rigid in their implied-in-fact contract analysis,
requiring the facts to formalistically meet contract formation requirements.
It is possible the Quon facts qualify as a bargained-for exchange sufficient
to establish an implied-in-fact contract for privacy in the content of the
pager messages. Applying the facts to the elements of contract formation,
'XNH¶V RUDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ ZDV DQ RIIHU E\ WKH HPSOR\HU152 The terms of
905- WK &LU   ³>,W LV D@ ORQJ-VWDQGLQJ SULQFLSOH RI &DOLIRUQLD ODZ « WKDW
neither an express nor an implied contract can restrict the reasons for, or the manner of,
WHUPLQDWLRQ RI SXEOLF HPSOR\PHQW SURYLGHG E\ &DOLIRUQLD VWDWXWH´ FLWLQJ Portman v.
Cty. Of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1993))).
146. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing that courts differ in
acceptance of implied-in-fact contracts).
147. The underlying issues in Fourth Amendment and implied-in-fact contract
claims are quite distinct. Implied contracts are about an agreement²albeit an implied
one²between the parties, while the Fourth Amendment is about a fundamental right to
be free from unreasonable government intrusion. Nonetheless, these theories share a
common theme in an HPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\
148. See )ROH\ Y ,QWHUDFWLYH 'DWD &RUS  3G   &DO   ³>7@KH
WRWDOLW\ RI WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV GHWHUPLQHV WKH QDWXUH RI WKH FRQWUDFW´  See also supra
note 50±52 and accompanying text.
149. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2008),
UHY¶GVXEQRP City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 906.
152. Id. at 897.
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the offer were: if the employee paid for the overages, then his pager
messages would not be audited.153 By paying for the overages, the
employee was accepting the offer.154 Additionally, payment constituted the
HPSOR\HH¶V consideration.155 7KH HPSOR\HU¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ ZDV QRW
auditing the pager messages when the employee met his end of the bargain.
In some jurisdictions, WKHHPSOR\HH¶Vcontinued employment could also be
consideration for the agreement because the arrangement added an
DGGLWLRQDOHPSOR\PHQWWHUPWRWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFW,WLVQRWQHFHVVDU\WR
use continued employment as consideration in this case because payment to
the employer for the pager overages provided a separate consideration.156
7KHHPSOR\HH¶Vcontract right to privacy in the pager messages prohibited
his employer from auditing the contents of those messages irrespective of
any adverse employment action taken against the employee. In other
words, the employer breaches the contract by reviewing the pager messages
after the employee has paid the overuse charges, not by demoting or
terminating the employee because of the contents of those messages.157
While the facts can be analyzed in terms of offer, acceptance, and
consideration, a court considers the totality of the circumstances to
ascertain if an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy exists; an
HPSOR\HH¶V reasonable expectation of privacy is integral to this assessment.
As with the Fourth Amendment analysis articulated by the Ortega plurality
and discussed in Quon, a reviewing court takes a fact-based approach to
determine if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. In Quon, the Court
looked at whether the police department issued the pager and had an
153. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625. Cf. Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460,
1464 (10th Cir. 1994) GLVFXVVLQJWKDWDQRIIHURFFXUVZKHQ³WKHHPSOR\HUPDQLIHVW[s]
his willingness to enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the employee in
understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the employer and that the
employee¶s assent [will] conclude the bargain.´ TXRWLQJ &RQW¶O $LU /LQHV ,QF Y
Keenan, 732 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
154. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625 (noting WKDWDIWHU4XRQ¶VHPSOR\HUWRld him that
he would not be audited so long as he paid, Quon paid for the overage charges);
Fineman, supra note 43, at 382 (explaining that an employee can establish acceptance
by performing the terms of the offer).
155. See Fineman, supra note 43, at 383 (³8QGHUHVWDEOLVKHGODZQRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ
beyond performance is required on the part of the promisee in accepting a . . .
FRQWUDFW´ 
156. As discussed in Part III, some courts do not accept continued employment as
sufficient consideration to find an implied employment contract. Other courts have held
that requiring separate consideration is contrary to the general contract principle that
courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
157. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626 (mentioning WKDW 4XRQ ZDV RQO\ ³DOOHJHGO\
GLVFLSOLQHG´IRUKLVH[FHVVLYHSDJHUXVDJH Assuming Quon¶V employment status was
at-will, the department presumably could have terminated him for the excess pager use
without auditing his pager and without breaching his right to privacy in the contents of
the messages.
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RIILFLDOSROLF\RI³QRH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\RUFRQILGHQWLDOLW\´Zith regard
to internet use and E-mail.158 The balancing of these factors will determine
whether the totality of the circumstances created an enforceable implied-infact contract right to privacy in the pager messages.
In a jurisdiction allowing an implied-in-fact contract theory for public
employees, it is possible an employee in Quon¶VSRVLWLRQ would succeed in
a cause of action against his employer for breach of an implied-in-fact
contract right to privacy.159 Although the Supreme Court avoided the
reasonable expectation of privacy issue in its Fourth Amendment analysis,
under an implied-in-fact contract theory, the case turns on whether a court
accepts that the circumstances created a reasonable expectation of privacy
for the employee.160 This depends on the importance a court places on the
HPSOR\HU¶V LQIRUPDO SROLF\ DQG DFWXDO SUDFWLFH RI QRW DXGLWLQJ WKH SDJHU
messages when the employee paid for the overages. In reality, most
employees probably rely on the actual practice of their employers in
forming privacy expectations rather than formal policies²which most
employees may have seen only once when commencing employment.161
This parallels the empirical findings that many employees believe their
legal protection is greater than what at-will employment affords.162 Where
constitutional protections are unavailable or inadequate, an employee,
under circumstances similar to Quon, could argue breach of an implied-infact contract right to privacy.

158. Quon v. Arch Wireless Oper. Corp., 529 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir 2008), UHY¶G
sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
159. The implied-in-fact contract cause of action was unavailable to the Quon
plaintiffs because California law does not permit such a claim for public employees.
See Hoesterey v. City of Cathedral City, No. 93-56239, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 23316,
*11- WK&LU$XJ  ³&DOLIRUQLDODZSURKibits all contractual arrangements
ZKLFK SXUSRUW WR DOWHU WKH WHUPV RI D SXEOLF HPSOR\HH¶V HPSOR\PHQW´  Many
jurisdictions recognize an implied-in-fact contract cause of action for public
employees. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 388 (Cal. 1988)
³>7@KHWRWDOLW\RIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´ 
161. See Justin Conforti, Comment, 6RPHERG\¶V:DWFKLQJ0H:RUNSODFH3ULYDF\
Interests, Technology SurveiOODQFH DQG WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW¶V 0LVDSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH
Ortega Test in Quon v. Arch Wireless, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 461, 485 (2009)
³4XRQ VH[SHFWDWLRQZDVUHDVRQDEOHEHFDXVHDQ\HPSOR\HHZKRZRXOGKDYHEHHQWROG
that he could avoid an audit of his messages if he paid the overages himself would
H[SHFWKLVPHVVDJHVWRUHPDLQSULYDWHLIKHNHSWSD\LQJ´ 
162. See supra notes 24±26 and accompanying text (explaining that employees tend
to genuinely believe it is unlawful to dismiss an employee because of the ePSOR\HU¶V
personal dislike of the individual).
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V. WHAT¶S NEXT?: THE VALUE OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT RIGHTS
The implied-in-fact contract may serve a gap-filling function to protect
the privacy of public employees where a constitutional theory fails. While
private employees do not have the constitutional privacy protections
DIIRUGHGWRSXEOLFHPSOR\HHVVRPHVWDWHVUHFRJQL]HDSULYDWHHPSOR\HH¶V
right to privacy in the workplace through the public policy exception to the
at-will employment doctrine.163 RHFRJQLWLRQ RI DQ HPSOR\HH¶V ULJKW WR
privacy as a matter of public policy, however, is often narrowly
construed.164 Where the public policy exception fails to protect employee
privacy, the employee may have recourse by pursuing a breach of an
implied-in-fact contract right to privacy. Implied contract, implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and public policy are distinct
causes of action; some court opinions have, however, merged these theories
in the context of employee privacy protection. The overlap of these theories
is exemplified in the Rulon-Miller decision with regard to the implied-infact contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.165
Another example of blended theories in the employment privacy context is
Luedtke, where the Alaska Supreme Court recognized a public policy
supporting protection of employee privacy and opined that an employer
violation of that public policy could become a breach of the implied

163. See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 621±23 (3d Cir.
  KROGLQJWKDWXQGHU3HQQV\OYDQLDODZLIDGLVFKDUJHLV³UHODWHGWRDVXEVWDQWLDO
and highly offensive invasion of the emplo\HH¶V SULYDF\´ ZKHQ DOO RI WKH IDFWV DQG
circumstances are considered, the termination is in violation of public policy and the
employer may be liable for wrongful discharge); see also Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406
S.E.2d 52, 57 (W. Va. 1990) (finding a public policy right to privacy whereby an
HPSOR\HU PD\ QRW ³Lntrude upon this right of his employee absent some showing of
UHDVRQDEOH JRRG IDLWK REMHFWLYH VXVSLFLRQ´ EXW JUDQWLQJ DQ H[FHSWLRQ ZKHUH WKH
employee is in an occupation involving the safety of others). But see Hennessey v.
Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d 170, 176 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW SULYDF\ LV DQ LPSRUWDQW VRFLHWDO YDOXH EXW LW LV ³WRR DPRUSKRXV D
VWDQGDUG´WREHDSXEOLFSROLF\H[FHSWLRQWRWKHDW-will employment doctrine).
164. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 74 (2000) (explaining that the public
policy tort is narrow because it is only implicated when the health or safety of the
SXEOLF LV VXIILFLHQWO\ LPSDFWHG  )LQGLQJ WKDW YLRODWLQJ DQ HPSOR\HH¶V SULYDF\ DIIHFWV
the public sufficiently enough to give rise to a public policy cause of action is a broad
understanding of the public policy exception, and many state courts have not accepted
such a broad interpretation. See, e.g., Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840,
846 (8th Cir. 2002) UHMHFWLQJDSXEOLFSROLF\SURWHFWLQJHPSOR\HHSULYDF\EHFDXVH³QR
well-recognized and clear Iowa public policy protects an at-will employee's privacy
interest in a romantic relationship with a co-ZRUNHU´  Hennessey, 589 A.2d at 176
³SULYDF\ WKRXJK DQ LPSRUWDQW YDOXH RI RXU VRFLHW\ LV WRR DPRUSKRXV D VWDQGDUG WR
TXDOLI\DVDFOHDUPDQGDWHRISXEOLFSROLF\´ 
165. See supra notes 91±103 and accompanying text.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing.166 A court might bring the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing into an implied contract or a public
policy analysis where the court finds that the employee was treated
unfairly.
In addition to these common law causes of action, there are statutory
exceptions to employment at-will that protect certain aspects of employee
privacy. Like the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, these
statutes are limited in the scope of employee conduct protected and the
employer actions prohibited; for this reason, the implied-in-fact contract
cause of action is an important protection that an employee may assert
when statutory protections are unavailable.
A. An Open Field for Legislation:
Off-Duty Conduct Statutes and their Limited Impact on
Employee Privacy Rights
Some states have attempted to clarify the law in the area of employee
privacy by legislating for broad employee protection of legal off-duty
conduct.167 2QH RI WKH EURDGHVW LV &RORUDGR¶V RII-duty conduct statute,
which makes it unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee for the
HPSOR\HH¶VODZIXOFRQGXFWRIf-GXW\DQGRIIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VSUHPLVHVXQOHVV
the conduct creates a conflict of interest or relates to a bona fide business
purpose.168 The Colorado statute protects a vast range of off-duty activity
DQG GHSDUWV IURP WKH &RORUDGR FRXUWV¶ WUDGLWLRQDO VXSSRUW of the
employment at-will doctrine.169 These broader statutes can be viewed as
SURWHFWLQJDVSHFWVRIDQHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDWHOLIHLQZKLFKWKHHPSOR\HHZLOO
166. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1992).
167. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2010) (making it unlawful for an
employer to discharge an employee for engaging in any lawful activity off the
HPSOR\HU¶V SUHPLVHV DQG GXULQJ QRQZRUNLQJ KRXUV XQOHVV LW UHODWHV WR D ERQD ILGH
occupational requirement or is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest); N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2009) (making it unlawful for an employer to discharge an
HPSOR\HH EHFDXVH RI WKH HPSOR\HH¶V SROLWLFDO DFWLYLWLHV OHJDO XVH RI FRQVXPDEOH
products off work hours and off work premises, legal recreational activities outside
work, or union membership). See also Sonne, supra note 11, at 170 (explaining that
off-duty conduct statutes were first enacted in the 1990s as protection against
workplace discipline for off-duty smoking but have evolved in some states into
sweeping protection of all legal off-duty conduct).
168. See § 24-34-402.5(1).
169. See generally Jessica Jackson, Comment, &RORUDGR¶V /LIHVW\OH 'LVFULPLQDWLRQ
Statute: A Vast and Muddled Expansion of Traditional Employment Law, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 143, 148±58 (1996) (discussing cases which hold that §24-34-402.5(1) protects
activities such as sexual orientation, membership in the Ku Klux Klan, and interoffice
GDWLQJ ZKLFK ³XQGHUPLQHV DQG FRQWUDGLFWV GHFDGHV RI VWURQJ VXSSRUW IRU HPSOR\PHQW
at-ZLOO SULQFLSOHV´ E\ HIIHFWLYHO\ JLYLQJ HPSOR\HHV WKH YDVW SURWHFWLRQ RI DQ LPSOLHG
covenant of good faith and fair dealing recognized in other states but rejected by
Colorado courts).
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generally have a reasonable expectation to be free from employer intrusion
and involvement.170 For instance, employees typically expect that their
participation in lawful product consumption or lawful recreational activities
outside of work is not RI WKHLU HPSOR\HUV¶ concern when such lawful
conduct does not impact job performance. Perhaps categorizing off-duty
conduct statutes as protecting employee privacy is inaccurate.171 Off-duty
conduct statutes protect personal facts and involvement in personal
activities that may not exactly be private.172 While the conduct protected
may QRW EH UHOHYDQW WR DQ HPSOR\HH¶V MRb capabilities, whether an
employee engages in a particular recreational activity is not really a private
DVSHFWRIWKDWHPSOR\HH¶VOLIH173
Regardless of whether off-duty conduct statutes may accurately be
described as protecting employee privacy, in certain situations, such
statutes may diminish the need for an aggrieved employee to assert a cause
of action based on an implied-in-fact contract for privacy.174 Under the
facts of Rulon-MillerWKHHPSOR\HHZRXOGEHSURWHFWHGE\&RORUDGR¶VRIIduty conduct statute because Rulon-Miller was terminated for engaging in
lawful, off-duty conduct²namely, having a romantic relationship with an
employee of a competitor company.175 Rulon-0LOOHU¶V FRQGXFW GLG QRW
create a conflict of interest or relate to a bona fide business interest of her
employer.176 Therefore, an employee in Rulon-0LOOHU¶V VLWXDWLRQ LQ
&RORUDGRFRXOGDVVHUWSURWHFWLRQXQGHU&RORUDGR¶VRII-duty conduct statute
rather than arguing an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy. However,
Colorado¶V off-duty conduct statute would not impact an employee under

170. See id DW  ³7KH &RORUDGR OHJLVODWXUH V MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU HQDFWLQJ VXFK D
broad statute was that employers should not be able to tell employees what to do on
thHLU RZQ WLPH´  see also, Sonne, supra note 11, at 172 (stating that statutes were
³MXVWLILHG E\ D VHHPLQJO\ LQQRFXRXV DSSHDO DJDLQVW µXQUHDVRQDEOH LQWUXVLRQV LQWR
>ZRUNHUV @OLYHVDZD\IURPZRUN´ DOWHUDWLRQLQRULJLQDO 
171. See Sonne, supra note 11 DW  UHDVRQLQJ WKDW ³OLIHVW\OH´ VWDWXWHV DUH
overbroad and encompass more than privacy abuses).
172. For example, whether or not someone smokes is not necessarily private
information as it might be readily observable during non-work hours. However,
³VPRNHUV¶ULJKWV´VWDWXWHVKDYHH[LVWHGIRUZHOORYHUDGHFDGHSee Jackson, supra note
169, at 143±45.
173. Stated differentlyLQTXLU\LQWRDQHPSOR\HH¶VODZIXORII-duty conduct is not as
intrusive as surveillance or drug testing.
174. See Jackson, supra note 169, at 150±52 (discussing that while Colorado does
recognize an implied employment contract theory based on an employer handbook, this
theory will protect employee privacy only in rare circumstances whereas the Colorado
³OLIHVW\OHGLVFULPLQDWLRQ´ statute protects a wide range of legal activities).
175. Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 527±29 (Ct. App. 1984),
disapproved of by *X]Y%HFKWHO1DW¶O,QF3G &DO .
176. Id. at 533.

60

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:1

the Quon facts EHFDXVH4XRQ¶VFRQGXFWZDVQRWRII-duty.177 5DWKHU4XRQ¶V
conduct occurred while he was on-duty using company property.178 Even
the broadest off-duty conduct statutes cannot adequately protect an
HPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ZKHUHWKHHPSOR\HUFUHDWHV
that expectation with respect to on-duty activities.
Off-duty conduct statutes are also limited in that they only protect
employees from termination based upon the applicable conduct.179 If an
employee is merely disciplined, he does not have a cause of action under
these statutes.180 In contrast, if an employee has an employment contract²
express or implied²SURWHFWLQJWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDF\WKHHPSOR\HHZLOO
have a breach of contract cause of action against the employer based on the
WHUPVRIWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFWZLWKRXWWKHSUHUHTXLVLWHWKDWWKHHPSOR\HHEH
terminated to assert her claim. While state legislatures are providing greater
statutory protection to workers, there are limitations to these legislative
protections that can be supplemented by common law causes of action like
the implied-in-fact contract.
Due to the problems that the jurisdictional differences of state off-duty
conduct legislation create for multistate companies, arguments have been
made for the passage of federal legislation regarding employee privacy
rights with respect to off-duty conduct.181 While such federal legislation
177. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2626 (2010) (observing that
GXULQJWKHUHYLHZRI4XRQ¶VWH[WPHVVDJHVDOOPHVVDJHV4XRQVHQWZKLOHRII-duty were
QRWUHYLHZHGGXULQJ4XRQ¶VGLVFLSOLQDU\SURFHGXUHV 
178. Id. To be sure, some of the conduct probably occurred off-duty because Quon
had access to the pager during his non-working hours; however, because the pager was
provided by the employer for business purposes, the conduct would fall under the
statutory exception of being for a bona fide business purpose. See COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2010) (exempting discharges that relate to the furtherance of a
³ERQDILGHRFFXSDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQW´ 
179. Compare § 24-34-402.5(1) (limiting WKH VWDWXWH¶V application to employee
termination), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2009) (applying 1HZ<RUN¶V
off-duty conduct statute to refusals to hire, discharge, and discrimination).
180. &RORUDGR¶VRII-duty conduct statute would not protect Quon because he was not
WHUPLQDWHGDIWHUKLVHPSOR\HU¶VLQWUXVLRQRIKLVSULYDF\LQWHUHVWVSee Quon, 130 S. Ct.
at 2626 (establishing that Quon was disciplined as opposed to terminated for his
actions).
181. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?:
Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions,
6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 680±83 (2004) (proposing uniform employee privacy
legislation to address the significant variance of employee privacy issues across the
country); see also Rives, supra note 28 at 554, 563±64 (calling for specific federal
OHJLVODWLRQSURWHFWLQJHPSOR\HHV¶ULJKWWRHQJDJHLQODZIXORII-duty conduct that would
³VWDQGDUGL]>H@ HPSOR\HH SULYDF\ ULJKWV DFURVV VWDWH OLQHV´  Other commentators have
opined that state off-duty conduct statutes were enacted prematurely and unnecessarily.
See Sonne, supra note 11, at 183±84 (citing evidence that employers realize it is
FRXQWHUSURGXFWLYH WR KDYH RYHUO\ LQWUXVLYH SROLFLHV ZLWK UHJDUG WR HPSOR\HHV¶ SULYDWH
lives). Additionally, survey data indicates that employers and employees have similar
expectations with regard to what information is acceptable for an employer to gather
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would advance the goal of standardizing the protection afforded employees
in their activities outside of work, it would not pURWHFW HPSOR\HHV¶
reasonable expectations of privacy in activities conducted while on-duty.
Future legislation in this area likely will focus on discrete classes of
information²as most privacy legislation does. There is not a
comprehensive legislative answer, but the implied-in-fact contract may be
available to fill some gaps left by attempted legislation that fails to protect
HPSOR\HHV¶UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQVRISULYDF\
B. The Limits of Implied-in-Fact Contract Rights
This Article has proposed that the central theme of employment actions
brought by public and private employees asserting privacy protection is the
presence of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Because of this
commonality, the implied-in-fact contract theory can supplement where
other causes of action fail to protect employee privacy. In determining
whether an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy exists, courts look at
the totality of the circumstances.182 Whether the employee had a reasonable
H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ RU FRXOG ³UHDVRQDEO\ UHO\´ RQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
assurances, policies, and practices, is important in deciding whether an
implied-in-fact contract right to privacy exists.183 The question is whether
WKH SDUWLHV KDG DQ HQIRUFHDEOH DJUHHPHQW SURWHFWLQJ WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
privacy; to answer that question, courts look at the circumstances and the
HPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQVIf the employee cannot demonstrate a
UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ EDVHG XSRQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V DFWLRQV WKH
employee will not prevail.184 An employee that did not subjectively expect
privacy will be less likely to feel wronged by what might otherwise be
and examine about an employee. Sonne, supra note 11, at 184±85. The lack of case law
on the issue is probably the best evidence that sweeping, federal legislation would be
an inefficient endeavor. Id. at 185. Shepardizing ³COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34402.5(1)(a) (2010 ´ yields only 23 case results and 66 law review articles, indicating it
is of greater academic concern that employees receive this protection than a practical
problem. Statute last Shepardized using LexisNexis on February 21, 2011.
182. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 363, 388 (Cal. 1988)
³>7@KHWRWDOLW\RIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVGHWHUPLQHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´ 
183. See Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984)
GLVFXVVLQJKRZDQHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ZLOOEHLPSRUWDQWWR
DQ LPSOLHG FRYHQDQW RI JRRG IDLWK DQG IDLU GHDOLQJ FODLP EHFDXVH WKH HPSOR\HH¶V
UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQZLOOLPSDFWWKHFRXUW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKHHPSOR\HH
was treated unfairly), disapproved of by *X]Y%HFKWHO1DW¶O,QF3G &DO
2000).
184. See Nancy J. King et al., Workplace Privacy and Discrimination Issues Related
to Genetic Data: A Comparative Law Study of the European Union and the United
States, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 79, 122 (2006) (explaining that under other privacy causes of
action which an employee can assert against an employer, such as the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, an employer can avoid liability by reducing employee privacy
expectations).
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FRQVLGHUHGWKHHPSOR\HU¶VLQIULQJHPHQWRIVXFKSULYDF\DQGEHOHVVOLNHO\
to sue the employer.185
To avoid liability, emplR\HUV VKRXOG EH FRJQL]DQW RI WKHLU HPSOR\HHV¶
expectations of privacy and manage those expectations appropriately.
When an employer is successful in this endeavor, it will not be subject to
liability for violating employee privacy rights because the employee will
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy on which to base a claim. If an
HPSOR\HU SXEOLF RU SULYDWH FDQ VXFFHVVIXOO\ PDQDJH LWV HPSOR\HHV¶
expectations of privacy, courts will be less inclined to find the employer
liable, and the employee will be less likely to file suit against the employer
LQ WKH ILUVW SODFH )URP WKH HPSOR\HU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH PDQDJLQJ HPSOR\HH
expectations of privacy is the first line of defense against liability for
alleged infringements of employee privacy; it is also in the best interest of
the employee if the parties have similar expectations with regard to
employee privacy.186 Setting clear and definite company policies while
ensuring that all employees are aware of these policies aligns the
expectations of the parties and DYRLGVHPSOR\HHV¶H[SHFWDWLRQVRISULYDF\
from being inflated beyond what the employer intends. Additionally,
employers may require that supervisors not deviate from the formal
policies.187
185. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 293 (2003) (explaining that when terminated or
laid off employees perceive the process as fair, they are less likely to sue their former
employer); Ann M. Anderson, Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad and the Limits of
Vicarious Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages, 78 N.C. L. REV. 799, 826±27 (2000)
(asserting that, in the discrimination context, when employer policies are implemented
in good faith, employees are more receptive and less likely to file suit); Worth, supra
note 25, at 415 (observing WKDW³DZRUNHUZKROHDYHVKDSS\LVOHVVOLNHO\WRVXH.´ 
186. See Eric Krell, Privacy Matters, 55 HR MAG., no. 2, Feb. 2010 at 43, 44
(declaring that managing employee privacy expectations is an important matter for
FRPSDQLHVIRUPDQ\UHDVRQVEHFDXVH³>W@KHULVNVRIPLVPDQDJLQJHPSOR\HHV¶SULYDF\
can be severe: lost revenue, lost productivity, legal or regulatory actions, declines in
EUDQG YDOXH DQG VKDUHKROGHU YDOXH DQG UHFUXLWLQJ DQG UHWHQWLRQ SUREOHPV´  %HVLGHV
legal ramifications, effective management in the area of privacy expectations will have
benefits to a business in terms of productivity and company value. Human resource
professionals realize it is important that privacy expectations of employers and
employees be aligned, and it is a bad business practice for employers to be overly
intrusive and unnecessarily monitor employee activities. See id. (noting the importance
of aligning the privacy expectations of employers and employees). See also Declan C.
Leonard & Angela H. France, Balancing Business Interests with Employee Privacy
Rights, LEGAL REP. (6RF¶\for Human Res. Mgmt., Alexandria, Va.), Jun. 1, 2003, at 2,
available at http://www.shrm.org/Publications/LegalReport/Pages/CMS_005109.aspx
(explaining that unnecessary monitoring can create poor employee morale, and
companies should justify all monitoring in terms of protecting a legitimate business
interest and communicate this to its employees). Effective communication between
employees and employers is important to accomplishing these goals.
187. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (observing that,
absent Duke¶V contradiction of WKH GHSDUWPHQW¶VIRUPDO SROLF\ ZLWK KLV RZQ LQIRUPDO
policy, determining whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy would likely

2011]

PRIVATE ORDERING OF EMPLOYEE PRIVACY

63

It may be in the best interest of the employer²in terms of morale and
productivity²to intentionally provide employees with certain expectations
of privacy. Inevitably, the realities of the workplace and actual practices
cause managers and supervisors to deviate from formal company policies;
as in Quon, there will invariably be situations where formal policies differ
from realities in the workplace. When an employee has a reasonable
H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ EDVHG XSRQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V FRQGXFW DQG SROLFLHV
some courts will find that sufficient to recognize an implied-in-fact contract
right to employee privacy.188 Alternatively, contract rights for employee
privacy need not be derived from the circumstances; employers and
employees can explicitly agree to certain privacy rights in an express
contract.
In an employment relationship, private ordering is perhaps the
preeminent way for the parties to have coinciding expectations about their
relationship. OQH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK DQ HPSOR\HU FDQ PDQDJH LWV HPSOR\HHV¶
expectations of privacy is through private ordering.189 While employment
law has moved toward greater government mandates and regulation of the
relationship,190 WKHUXOHVVHWE\WKHSDUWLHV¶WKHPVHOYHVDUHVWLOOLPSRUWDQWLQ
defining their relative rights.191 Private ordering can be accomplished
through an express contract between the parties and may provide an
employee with privacy protection. While an express contract right to
employee privacy is possible, it is unlikely that an employer will expressly
not have been a difficult issue for the Court to decide).
188. See Fineman, supra note 43, at 364 (explaining that some courts find that
³LPSOLHGFRQWUDFWVDUHHQIRUFHDEOHEHFDXVHRIHPSOR\HHV¶UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQV´ 
189. Private ordering is another term for the freedom of contract, or the ability of the
parties to define the terms of their relationship. See, e.g., Steven H. Kropp,
Deconstructing Racism in American Society ± The Role Labor Law Might Have Played
(But Did Not) in Ending Race Discrimination: A Partial Explanation and Historical
Commentary, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 397 (2002) (discussing private
ordering as one means for ending workplace racial prejudice).
190. See GLYNN ET AL., supra note 34 DW [[Y ³>7@KH ODZ JRYHUQLQJ WKH
employment relationship has developed away from private ordering and toward greater
government regulation.´ 
191. See Kohler & Finkin, supra note 111, at 382 (explaining that employment law
LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV LV IRXQGHG RQ D EHOLHI LQ WKH ³HIILFLHQF\ RI SULYDWH RUGHULQJ´ 
Under Fourth Amendment case law precedent for public employees, private ordering
SOD\VDQLQWHJUDO UROHLQWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDF\SURWHFWLRQEHFDXVHWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
RIWKHZRUNSODFHGHWHUPLQHWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ Conforti,
supra note 167, at  ³[B]ecause an employee¶s privacy expectation must be
reasonable before he has any Fourth Amendment protection, and because the Ortega
framework works on a contextual rather than a categorical approach, private ordering
has defined workplace privacy. Therefore, employers may alter the context of a given
workplace to eliminate employee privacy expectations.´   7KLV DVVHVVPHQW PD\ EH
LQFRUUHFW LQ OLJKW RI WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Quon to refrain from embracing the
analytical framework set forth by the Ortega plurality. See supra note 134 and
accompanying text (explaining that Quon abandoned the Ortega approach).
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contract to give employees privacy protection.
When an employer fails to adequately manage employee expectations of
privacy, the implied-in-fact contract cause of action may be claimed where
there are no applicable statutory, constitutional, or tort protections. Because
WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ UHODWLRQVKLS GHWHUPLQH DQ HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy, the interaction of the parties and the
WHUPVVHWE\WKHHPSOR\HUDQGWKHHPSOR\HHGHILQHWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSULYDF\
rights. Naturally, employees acquire expectations based on the day-to-day
practices of the workplace and reasonably expect that employers will act in
accordance with prior conduct. If an employer consistently acts in a manner
contrary to a formal policy, as was the situation in Quon DQ HPSOR\HH¶V
expectation may reasonably align with the actual practices of the workplace
rather than the formal policies of the company.192
When an employer acts inconsistently with prior representations or
practices, the employer sets itself up for potential liability for breach of an
implied contract right because the employer¶V actions may be at odds with
WKH HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\  An implied-in-fact
contract cause of action is available to employees based on the terms of the
contract set by the parties, and a court will ascertain those terms by
considering the circumstances of the workplace and whether the employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of any statutory, constitutional, or tort protection available to
an employee, an implied-in-fact contract cause of action may be available
when the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy based upon the
circumstances of the workplace. Because the claim is fact-dependant, an
implied-in-fact contract theory offers an employee more flexible protection
than other causes of action. In light of the trend toward greater government
regulation over the employment relationship, it is probable that further
federal and state legislation will be passed in an effort to provide
employees with heightened privacy protection. Inevitably, there will be
gaps in protection afforded by these statutes. Like the off-duty conduct
statutes, new legislation may only protect employees from termination.193
:KHUH D VWDWXWRU\ VFKHPH GRHV QRW DGHTXDWHO\ SURWHFW DQ HPSOR\HH¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy, the implied-in-fact contract argument is
available.
Some jurisdictions may methodically require that the facts meet the
192. See supra Part IV (discussing KRZ4XRQ¶VH[SHFWDWLRQRISULYDF\ZDVFUHDWHGE\
KLVVXSHUYLVRU¶VUHSHDWHGGHYLDWLRQVIURPWKHHPSOR\HU¶VDFWXDOSROLFLHV).
193. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2010) (applying only to wrongful
terminations).
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elements of contract formation including an offer, an acceptance, and
consideration. Even in these jurisdictions, the HPSOR\HH¶V UHDVRQDEOH
expectation of privacy will be essential in determining whether the parties
reached an enforceable agreement regarding employee privacy. The
UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI DQ HPSOR\HH¶V H[SHFWDWLRQ RI SULYDF\ is determined by
the circumstances and the realities of the workplace. In Quon, the Supreme
Court opined as to circumstances creating reasonable privacy
expectations.194 7KH&RXUW¶VGLFWDPD\SURYHSHUVXDVLYHWRIXWXUHLPSOLHGin-fact contract causes of action. In the evolving legal climate with the
trend toward increasing employee protection and recognizing greater
privacy protection for all citizens, some courts will likely be more
accepting of implied-in-fact contracts for employee privacy. When an
employer fails to manage employee privacy expectations, the implied-infact contract may be the only cause of action available to protect an
HPSOR\HH¶Vreasonable expectation of privacy.

194. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (noting that a court
must decide if oral assurances contrary to an established employer policy do, in fact,
override the established policy).
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I. INTRODUCTION
For 17 years (1990-2007), I was privileged to serve as chief counsel to a
succession of five members of the National Labor Relations Board
³%RDUG´ 1 For more than six of those years, I was Chief Counsel to the
Chairman.2 From this unique perspective, I had an opportunity to observe
first-hand the process of decision-PDNLQJXQGHURXUQDWLRQ¶VSULQFLSDOODERU
ODZWKH1DWLRQDO/DERU5HODWLRQV$FW ³$FW´ 3 This Article will address an
important and controversial aspect of that process²the action of a given
1.
I hold the record in this regard. The members and dates are as follows: John
Randabaugh (1990-1994); Charles Cohen (1994-1996); John Higgins (1996-1997);
Peter Hurtgen (1997-2002); Robert Battista (2002-2007). Prior to that service (19751990), I was head of the General CouQVHO¶V'LYLVLRQRI$GYLFH7KDWRIILFHDGYLVHVWKH
General Counsel and Regional Directors on novel and complex legal issues and on
cases of major national importance.
2.
I served as Chief Counsel to Chairman Peter J. Hurtgen from 2001 to 2002 and
Chairman Robert J. Battista from 2002 to 2007.
3.
See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151±69 (2006) (declaring that
the U.S. government will protect, inter alia, the right of employees to choose whether to
unionize or not, under a policy of eliminating obstructions to the free flow of
commerce).
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set of Board Members to reverse the precedent of a prior set of Board
Members.
Each of these reversals has given rise to howls of protest by the party
who lost and stout defenses by the party who won. Often, the heat of the
conflict between the two parties is a measure of the importance of the issue.
In this Article, I have sought to shed objective light where there has been
only partisan heat.
I shall begin, in Part III, with a discussion of the statutory basis for
reversals. Part IV sets forth the arguments for and against the practice of
reversing precedent. Part V will then list the most important recent
reversals. Part VI will categorize these cases according to the basis for
reversals. Finally, I will set forth my views concerning the circumstances
under which reversals are appropriate or inappropriate.
II. BACKGROUND
As background, I note that the Board is composed of five Board
Members, one of whom is designated as Chairman.4 Each Member is
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.5 The
Members serve for five-year terms.6 Traditionally, the Board is composed
of three Democrats and two Republicans when the President is a Democrat
and three Republicans and two Democrats when the President is a
Republican.7 7KXVLWLVFXVWRPDU\WRVSHDNRID³'HPRFUDWLF%RDUG´DQGD
³5HSXEOLFDQ%RDUG´8 It is not XQXVXDOIRUD³'HPRFUDWLF%RDUG´WRUHYHUVH
LPSRUWDQWSUHFHGHQWVRID³5HSXEOLFDQ %RDUG´DQGYLFH-versa. However, in
recent years, this practice has increased markedly. This Article will focus
on these most recent years.

4.
See National Labor Relations Act § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (stating
WKDW³>W@he President shall designate [one of the five members of the Board] to serve as
&KDLUPDQRIWKH%RDUG´ 
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
See ERIC N. WALTENBERG, CHOOSING WHERE TO FIGHT: ORGANIZED LABOR
AND THE MODERN REGULATORY STATE, 1948-1987, at 19 (2002) (describing the
SROLWLFDO LGHRORJ\ RI WKH %RDUG DV ³WDFN>LQJ@ EDFN DQG IRUWK    LQ UHVSRQVH WR
presidential appointmeQWV´ 
8.
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Deadlock is Ending on Labor Board, N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
31,
2010,
at
B1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/business/01labor.html (assessing the changes that
are likely to occur to Bush-era Board precedent ZLWK 3UHVLGHQW 2EDPD¶V recess
appointments of two union lawyers to the NLRB WRFUHDWHD³'HPRFUDWLF%RDUG´).
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III. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR REVERSALS
The Board has wide discretion to interpret the Act as it wishes.9 The Act
is written in broad statutory terms.10 &RQJUHVV OHIW LW WR WKH %RDUG ³WR
develop and apply fundamental national labor policy . . . . [T]he function of
striking [the balance between competing interests] is often a difficult and
delicate responsibility which the Congress committed primarily to the
[Board]´11 $FRXUWZLOOXSKROGWKH%RDUG¶VSROLF\FKRLFHif LWLV³UDWLRQDO
and consistent with the Act . . . even if [the court] would have formulated a
GLIIHUHQWUXOHKDG>WKHFRXUW@VDWRQWKH%RDUG´12 In light of this degree of
discretion, it is to be anticipated that a given Board will not necessarily
agree with a prior Board. Further, as noted above, Board Members are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.13
Given political realitLHV LW PD\ EH DQWLFLSDWHG WKDW D ³'HPRFUDWLF %RDUG´
PD\ GLVDJUHH ZLWK WKH SUHFHGHQWV VHW E\ D SULRU ³5HSXEOLFDQ %RDUG´ DQG
vice-versa. As noted above and discussed below, that process has been
accentuated in recent years.

9.
See NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, ,QW¶O $VV¶Q RI %ULGJH :RUNHUV
(Ironworkers), 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) (noting that Congress delegated the task of
effectuating labor policy to the Board and its decision-PDNLQJ LV VXEMHFW WR ³OLPLWHG
MXGLFLDOUHYLHZ´ see also NLRB v. Ins$JHQWV,QW¶O8QLRQ, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960)
³:HUHFRJQL]HZLWKRXWKHVLWDWLRQWKHSULPDU\IXQFWLRQDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIWhe Board
to resolve the conflicting interests that Congress has recognized in its labor
OHJLVODWLRQ´  NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)
³7KH IXQFWLRQ RI VWULNLQJ WKDW EDODQFH WR HIIHFWXDWH QDWLRQDO ODERU SROLF\ LV RIWHQ D
difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the
1DWLRQDO/DERU5HODWLRQV%RDUGVXEMHFWWROLPLWHGMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ´ 
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ¶QV, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130±32 (1944)
(reasoning that the Board, as a governmental agency, shall interpret the broad language
of the Act to effectuate the policy and purposes of the Act), superseded by statute,
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 137
(1947), as recognized in, NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
11. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500±01 (1978) (citing Truck
Drivers, 353 U.S. at 96).
Of course, if the Board acts contrary to a specific provision of the Act, a court will
properly reverse the Board. See, e.g., H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107±08
(1970) (reversing both a decision of the Board and the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit because, even though the Board has broad powers to enforce the Act, its powers
do not extend to compelling parties to contract).
12. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (2001) (citations
omitted).
13. See National Labor Relations Act § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006).
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IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE PRACTICE OF REVERSING
PRECEDENT
A. Arguments For:
As discussed above, the practice of reversing precedent is consistent
with, and indeed contemplated by, the broad language of the Act and by the
appointment process of the Act. Further, a given Board Member is
appointed with the expectation that she will vote on a case according to her
conscience and her views as to what is best for national labor policy.14 If
those views are contrary to extant precedent, it is not unreasonable for the
Board member to decline to follow the precedent.
,Q DGGLWLRQ LQGXVWULDO FRQGLWLRQV FDQ FKDQJH WKURXJK WLPH DQG WRGD\¶V
economy may be quite different from that of yesterday. Thus, it may be
prudent to change a precedent that was formulated at a different time under
different conditions.
B. Arguments Against:
A reversal of precedent results in instability, unpredictability and
uncertainty in the law. Employers, employees, and unions cannot act in
reliance on the law, for it may change. What is lawful today may be
unlawful tomorrow and vice-versa. Further, lawyers run the risk that their
best advice will have disastrous consequences based on such reliance.
Finally, our society prides itself on being a nation of laws. Where precedent
changes simply because a different political group is in power, the public
becomes cynical about our ideals and disrespectful of the law.
V. RECENT REVERSALS OF PRECEDENT
A. Brown University
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that graduate
assistants who seek a degree at a university are students and not employees
under the Act.15 In so holding, the Board reversed a contrary policy in New
York University.16 It is interesting to note that New York University, had
14. See NLRB v. West Tex Util. Co., 214 F.2d 732, 741 (5th Cir. 1954) (stating
that the members of the Board are non-SDUWLVDQDQGWKHLUSXUSRVHLVWR³VLWDVMXGJHVWR
hear the issues of fact and to apply the Act in matters of the highest importance to all
FRQFHUQHG´ , denying enf., 106 N.L.R.B. 859 (1953).
15. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004) (diverging from prior Board
SUHFHGHQWWKDWJUDGXDWHVWXGHQWVIDOOZLWKLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³HPSOR\HH´XQGHU6HFWLRQ
2(3) of the Act, and adopting the view that the collective-bargaining process would be
counter to the educational process).
16. See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205±06 (2000) (finding that even
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itself reversed a precedent.17
B. Harborside Healthcare, Inc.
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that a pro-union
supervisory solicitation of union authorization cards from employees was
inherently coercive, absent mitigating circumstances.18 Under prior law,
coercion was found only if there was a promise of benefit or threat of
reprisal.19
C. Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia
In this case, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that
DQ HPSOR\HU UXOH SURKLELWLQJ ³DEXVLYH DQG SURIDQH´ ODQJXDJH ZDV QRW
unlawful on its face.20 In a prior ruling, the Board had held to the
contrary.21 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce that prior
ruling.22 In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, the Board acquiesced to the
&RXUW¶V YLHZ23 8QGHU WKH %RDUG¶V QHZ YLHZ WKH UXle would be unlawful
only if employees reasonably construed the words as prohibiting Section 7
activity²³[the right] to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection´24 In addition, the rule is unlawful if the rule was
discriminatorily motivated, or if the rule was actually applied to Section 7
though graduate assistants were predominantly students, they remained employees
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act).
17. See id. at 1217 (reasoning that physics graduate students who were receiving
stipends for research were not employees under the Act (citing Leland Stanford, 214
N.L.R.B. 621 (1974))).
18. See Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 906, 906 (2004) (reversing the
prior law that ³DQH[SOLFLWSURPLVHRIEHQHILWVRUWKUHDWRIUHSULVDO [was necessary] to
find [the FRQGXFW@REMHFWLRQDEOH´ .
19. See id. DW  KROGLQJ WKDW VXSHUYLVRUV¶ VROLFLWDWLRQV RI DXWKRUL]DWLRQ FDUGV
were acceptable because they were conducted without threat of reprisal, punishment or
intimidation (citing Millsboro Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 879, 880
(1999))).
20. Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004).
21. See Adtranz, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 291, 293±94 (2000) (holding that the employer
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a rule that prohibited abusive
language unless the rule made it clear that the rule was not intended to bar lawful union
organizing activity), enf. denied, F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
22. See Adtranz, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 19, 22, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (vacating the
decision below EHFDXVHWKH%RDUGIDLOHGWRFRQVLGHUWKH3HWLWLRQHU¶VHYLGHQFHDQGFLWHG
no support for its contention that a contrary result could ³FKLOO´ SURWHFWHG DFWLYLW\),
denying enf., 331 N.L.R.B. 291 (2000).
23. See Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. at 647.
24. Id. at 648 (citing National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
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activity.25
D. Alexandria Clinic, P.A.
Under Section 8(g) of the Act, a union must give a health care institution
ten days notice before striking.26 In Alexandria Clinic, P.A., the union gave
the required notice of day and time, but later delayed the start time for four
hours.27 No new notice was sent.28 Under Greater New Orleans Artificial
Kidney Center, WKHUHZRXOGEHQRYLRODWLRQEHFDXVHWKHUHZDV³VXEVWDQWLDO
FRPSOLDQFH´ZLWKWKHWHQ-day rule.29 In Alexandria Clinic, a Board majority
consisting of three Republicans held that there must be strict adherence to
the Act, and thus a new ten-day notice was required.30
E. Saint Gobain Abrasives, Inc.
In this case, a Board majority held that an employer is entitled to a
factual hearing on whether unlawful conduct by the employer caused the
employees to file a petition to decertify the union.31 Under prior law, the
Board would presume that there was a causal nexus, and would dismiss the
petition without a hearing.32 The new rule would result in a dismissal only
if, after a hearing, a causal nexus was shown.33
F. Crown Bolt, Inc.
Under prior law, an employer threat to close a plant in the event of
unionization was presumed to have been widely disseminated throughout
the facility, and this would taint the election process.34 In Crown Bolt, a
Board majority consisting of three Republicans placed the burden of proof

25. See id. at 647 (holding that a rule prohibiting abusive language is not a facial
interference with Section 7 activity (citing Adtranz, 253 F.3d at 22 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
26. See § 8(g), § 158(g).
27. See 339 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1262 (2003), enfd. sub nom. Minn. Licensed Practical
1XUVHV$VV¶QY. NLRB, 406 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2005).
28. Id.
29. 240 N.L.R.B. 432 (1979).
30. See id. at 1263, 1266 (refusing to adopt the precedent of ³substantial
compliance´).
31. See Saint Gobain Abrasives, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 434, 434±35 (2004).
32. C.f. id. at 435 (Liebman dissenting) (REMHFWLQJWRWKH%RDUG¶VQHZUXOHEDVHG
on previous law where an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to determine causal
nexus and that there was a presumption of such nexus (citing Priority One Servs., 331
N.L.R.B. 1527, 1527 n.2 (2000))).
33. See id. at 434 (majority opinion).
34. See Springs Indus., 332 N.L.R.B. 40, 40 (2000) (noting that it was WKH%RDUG¶V
traditional position to overturn an election, because of presumed dissemination of the
most serious threats, such as plant closure).
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on the union to show such dissemination.35 In doing so, the Board returned
to the rule of Kokomo Tube Co.36
G. IBM Corp.
In this case, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that
Weingarten rights37 do not apply to non-unionized employees.38 In so
holding, the Board reversed the prior holding of Epilespy Foundation.39
The Board returned to the rule of E.I. Dupont & Co.40
H. Oakwood Care Center
Here, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that the
employees of an employer (employer A) may not be placed, in a single unit,
with employees who are jointly employed by A and another employer.41 In
so holding the Board overruled Sturgis,42 and returned to Greenhoot, Inc.43
J. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.
In this case a Board majority consisting of three Republicans revised the
test for determining supervisory status under the Act.44 The decision was
35. See Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 776, 779 (2004) (deciding to overrule
Springs Industries and all other decisions that presume dissemination of plant-closure
threats and requiring the objecting party to prove the dissemination and its impact on
the election by direct and/or circumstantial evidence).
36. See 280 N.L.R.B. 357, 358 (1986).
37. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256±57 (1975) (holding that a
unionized employee under interrogation by an employer has a right²under Sections 7
and 8(a)(1) of the Act²upon request, to union representation).
38. See IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004) (reasoning that the purpose of
the Act would be best preserved if the rights recognized in Weingarten do not extend to
a workplace where, the employees are not represented by a union), enfd. sub nom.
Schult v. NLRB, No. 04-1225, 2004 WL 259890 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curium).
39. See 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 676 (2000), enfd. in part, enf. denied in part, 268 F.3d
1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Weingarten should be extended to employees in nonunionized
workplaces to afford them the right to have a coworker present at an investigatory
interview. Id.
40. See E.I. Dupont de Nemours (E.I. Dupont & Co.), 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 630
(1988) (limiting Weingarten rights to unionized workplaces under the analysis that it
EHVWHIIHFWXDWHVWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH$FWDQGDFKLHYHVWKH³IDLUDQGUHDVRQHG´EDODQFH
between the conflicting interests of labor and management).
41. See Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 663 (2004) (permitting
collective bargaining units of solely and jointly employed employees only by consent).
42. See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1308 (2000) (rejecting consent
requirements for such units and adopting a policy that hinges on the presence of a
³community of interest´).
43. See Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973) (holding that a multiemployer unit is not permitted unless there is a consensual basis for such a unit).
44. See Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 686 (2006) (following
FULWLFLVPRIWKH%RDUG¶VSULRULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6HFWLRQ  and refining its analysis of
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significant, because only employees and not supervisors are protected by
the Act.45 In general, the Board made it easier to show supervisory status.46
In revising the test, the Board was influenced by the fact that, in two prior
decisions, the Supreme Court had disagreed with Board tests under which
the Board had declined to find supervisory status.47
K. Toering Electrical Co.
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans set forth a new
requirement for determining that an applicant is an employee entitled to the
protection of the Act.48 The case arosH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI D ³VDOWLQJ´
campaign, i.e., the process in which a union sends union members to at job
VLWHZLWKWKHRSHQDQGH[SUHVVSXUSRVHRIXQLRQL]LQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶VZRUN
force at that site.49 Prior to Toering, it was not necessary for the General
Counsel to establish prima facie that the union member was genuinely
interested in seeking to establish an employment relationship.50 Under
Toering, that fact EHFRPHVDQHFHVVDU\SDUWRIWKH*HQHUDO&RXQVHO¶VSULPD
facie case.51
assessing supervisory status (citing NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706
(2001))).
45. See 348 N.L.R.B. at 687 (explaining that supervisors are excluded from the
$FW¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI ³HPSOR\HH´ DIWHU &RQJUHVV DPHQGHG WKH $FW to include Section
2(11) in response to WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ WKDW KHOG WKDW VXSHUYLVRUV ZHUH
employees for purposes of Section 2(3) (citing Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485 (1947))).
46. See id. at 688±89 (reasoning that because the putative supervisors practiced
independent judgment and regularly delegated tasks to subordinate employees, such as
nurses assistants, registered nurses are considered supervisory and thus not covered
under the Act).
47. See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706, 706 (2001), DII¶J, 193 F.3d
444 (6th 1999). Persons DUH VXSHUYLVRUV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH $FW ³LI   WKH\ KROG WKH
authority to engage in any [one] of the [twelve] listed supervisory functions, (2) their
µH[HUFLVH RI VXFK DXWKRULW\ LV QRW D PHUHO\ URXWLQH RU FOHULFDO QDWXUH EXW UHTXLUHV WKH
use of independent judgment.¶ DQG   WKHLU DXWKRULW\ LV KHOG µLQ WKH LQWHUHVW RI WKe
employer.¶´ Id. (quoting NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571,
573±74 (1994)).
48. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 225, 234 (2007).
49. See id. at 225 Q GHILQLQJ VDOWLQJ DV ³WKH DFW RI D WUDGH XQLRQ LQ VHQGLQJ D
union member or members to an unorganized jobsite to obtain employment and then
organize the employees´ LQWHUQDOTXRWDWLRQPDUNVRPLWWHG  citing Tualatin Elec., 312
N.L.R.B. 129, 130 n.3 (1993))).
50. See, e.g., Progressive Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 538, 551±53 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (uSKROGLQJWKH1/5%¶VGHFLVLRQby rationalizing that it was not necessary to first
show that the union member was trying to seek an employment relationship before
finding that the employer had engaged in an unfair labor practice by failing to consider
to hire a group of union members), enfg., Progressive Elec., Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 426
(2005).
51. See Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 231 (requiring that the General Counsel
prove that the union member who is claiming an unfair labor practice first prove that
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L. Register-Guard
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans ruled, inter alia, that in
order to show employer discrimination in the administration of a computeruse policy, the General Counsel must show that the employer engaged in
disparate treatment of similar activity, i.e., the employer permitted some of
these activities and prohibited others simply because of the Section 7 nature
of the latter.52 )RU H[DPSOH DQ HPSOR\HU FRXOG GUDZ D OLQH ³EHWZHHQ
charitable solicitations and non-charitable solicitations, between
solicitations of a personal nature . . . and solicitation for the commercial
sale of a product . . . between solicitation and mere talk, and between
business-related use and non business-UHODWHG XVH´53 In each of these
examples, WKH%RDUGKHOGWKDW³the fact that union solicitation would fall on
the prohibited side of the line [would] not establish´ unlawful
discrimination.54 In reaching this conclusion, the Board overruled Fleming
Co.55 and Guardian Industries Corp.56
M. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that employer
discipline imposed after an unlawful Weingarten interrogation was
nonetheless legal.57 The employer interrogated an employee without
observing the requirements of Weingarten.58 The employer thereby gleaned
evidence that the employee had engaged in misconduct, and the employer
disciplined the employee for this misconduct.59 Under some prior law the
discipline would be unlawful because it was based on evidence that was

she was legitimately seeking employment).
52. Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1118 (2007) (placing the burden on the
General Counsel when proving discrimination to show such disparate treatment), enfd.
in part, enf. denied in part, remanded sub nom. *XDUG3XEO¶J&RY1/5%)G
53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
53. Id.
54. Id. Of course, if the employer was motivated by the desire to assure that the
union solicitations would be on the prohibited side of the line, that would be unlawful.
55. 338 N.L.R.B. 192 (2001), enf. denied, 349 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 1995).
56. 313 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1994), enfd. in part, enf. denied in part, 49 F.3d 317 (7th
1995) 2Q UHYLHZ WKH '& &LUFXLW GHQLHG HQIRUFHPHQW RI WKH %RDUG¶V GHFLVLRQ in
Register-Guard on the ground that the employer did not actually show the distinctions
VXJJHVWHGE\WKH%RDUG*XDUG3XEO¶J&RY1/5%)G, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
57. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560, 560 (2004), enfd. in part, enf. denied
in part sub nom. Brewers and Maltsters, Local Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 36
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
58. See id. at 561.
59. See id. at 562 n.9 (stating that the discipline imposed on sixteen employees was
for unprotected conduct that was in clear violation of plant rules and regulations).
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unlawfully gathered.60 However, under conflicting precedent, the Board
had upheld the discipline on the ground that it was for cause.61 The Board
majority in Anheuser-Busch overruled Tocco62 and Great Western,63
applied Taracorp,64 and thereby upheld the discipline despite the fact that
the employee was not allowed to be accompanied by a union
representative.65
N. St. George Warehouse
In discriminatory discharge cases, the dischargee has the duty to mitigate
damages, i.e., to search for interim work and thereby reduce the back pay
award.66 Prior to St. George, the Board placed on the employer the burden
of going forward with evidence to show that there was substantially
equivalent work in the area and that the employee failed to seek it.67 In St.
George, the Board majority consisting of three Republicans placed on the
General Counsel the duty to show affirmatively that the employee searched
for relevant work.68
O. Dana Corp.
Under Keller Plastics, the Board held that where an employer has
voluntarily and legally recognized a union as the representative of
employees WKH XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\ VWDWXV FRXOG QRW EH TXHVWLRQHG IRU D

60. See Tocco, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 480, 480 (1997).
61. See Taracorp, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984) (overruling prior decisions such as
Kraft Foods, 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980) and refusing to award reinstatement and
backpay to an employee despite Weingarten violations, reasoning that doing so would
violate the policy of the Act and would constitute bad policy).
62. 323 N.L.R.B. 480.
63. Great Western Produce Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (1986), enfd. 839 F.2d 555
(9th Cir. 1988).
64. 273 N.L.R.B. 221.
65. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560, 561 (2004), ), enfd. in part, enf.
denied in part sub nom. Brewers and Maltsters, Local Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d
36 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
66. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 174 n.3 (2d Cir. 1965)
³,WLVDFFHSWHGE\WKH%RDUGDQGUHYLHZLQJFRXUWVWKDWDGLVFULPLQDWHe is not entitled to
back pay to the extent that he fails to remain in the labor market, refuses to accept
equivalent employment, fails diligently to search for alternative work, or voluntarily
quits alternative employment without good reason´), enf. 140 N.L.R.B. 1710 (1964).
67. E.g., Woonsocket Health Ctr., 263 N.L.R.B. 1367, 1370 (1982) (stating that the
³EXUGHQ LV RQ WKH UHVSRQGHQW WR GHPRQVWUDWH   EDFNSD\ OLDEOLW\´ ; Steve Aloi Ford,
Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 661, 662 (1971) (noting that even though the General Counsel was
not required to produce an employee for examination, the Trial Examiner should have
examined witnesses and reviewed evidence in order to render her decision).
68. St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. 961, 961 (2007).
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reasonable period of time.69 In Dana, the Board majority consisting of three
Republicans imposed additional requirements.70 The parties must give
notice to employees that recognition has occurred and that employees can
file petitions, within forty-five days, seeking an election to decertify the
recognized union or to select another union.71 If such a petition is filed, an
election will be held.72
P. Tru-Serv Corp.
Under prior law, an employer settlement of an unfair labor practice case
that contained a recognition clause would result in the dismissal of a
decertification petition, where the alleged unlawful conduct occurred prior
to the petition.73 In Tru-Serv, a Board majority consisting of three
Republicans held that the decertification petition and election could still be
held, absent an admission of a violation by the employer in the settlement
agreement.74 In so ruling, the Board returned to the rule of Passavant.75
Q. MV Transportation
Under prior law, where a successor employer recognized the union
UHSUHVHQWLQJ WKH SUHGHFHVVRU¶V HPSOR\HHV WKH XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\ VWDWXV
would not be challenged for a reasonable period of time.76 In MV
Transportation, a Board majority of three Republicans and two Democrats
ruled that the union was not entitled to such immunity.77 The reasonable
period of time was deemed to have expired under the predecessor.78 In so

69. Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586 (1966).
70. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 435 (2007) PRGLI\LQJ WKH %RDUG¶V H[WDQW
SUHFHGHQW ³>L@Q RUGHU WR DFKLHYH D µILQHU EDODQFH¶ RI LQWHUHVWV WKDW EHWWHU SURWHFWV
HPSOR\HHV¶IUHHFKRLFH´ .
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Douglas-Randall, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 431, 431 (1995) (affirming the
dismissal of a petition on the grounds that the showing of interest was tainted by the
employeU¶VXQIDLUODERUSUDFWLFHV 
74. Truserv Corp., 349 N.L.R.B. 227, 227 (2007).
75. See id. at 228 (returning to the rule of prior precedent²a settlement agreement
FDQQRWEHFRQVWUXHGDVDQDGPLVVLRQWKDWWKHHPSOR\HU¶VDFWLRQVFRQVWLWXWHGDQXQIDLU
labor practice, unless an admission is an express part of the agreement (citing Passavant
Health Ctr., 278 N.L.R.B. 483 (1986))).
76. See St. Elizabeth Manor, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 341, 341 (1996) (holding that once
a successor employer recognizes an incumbent union, ³the union is entitled to a
reasonable period of time for bargaining without challenge WRLWVPDMRULW\VWDWXV´).
77. See MV Transp., 337 N.L.R.B. 770, 770 (2002) (reverting to a standard where
WKHXQLRQ¶VSUHVXPSWLRQRIPDMRULW\VWDWXVZLWK the successor employer is rebuttable).
78. Id.
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ruling, the Board returned to the rule of Southern Moldings.79
R. Allegheny Ludlum II
Under prior law, an employer had to obtain explicit employee consent if
the employer wished to include images of the employee in an anti-union
campaign video.80 The Board applied this rule in Allegheny Ludlum I.81 The
D.C. Circuit denied enforcement because the act of seeking consent might
itself be unlawful interrogation under Section 8(1)(a).82 On remand, a
Board majority of three Republicans and two Democrats held that the
employer can make a general announcement which discloses that the
pictures will be used, that participation is voluntary, that participation will
not result in a benefit and that non-participation will not result in reprisal.83
The pictures can then be used in the video, provided that the atmosphere is
free from unfair labor practices.84
S.

BE & K Construction Co. II

In BE & K Construction I, the Board dealt with a completed lawsuit that
an employer had lost.85 The Board held that the lawsuit was unlawful if it
was filed for an illegal motive.86 On review, the Supreme Court remanded
for the Board to determine whether the lawsuit was nonetheless reasonably
based and, if so, whether that would preclude the finding of a violation.87
79. See id. (holding that unless the successor employer adopts the existing contract,
a union only has a rebuttable presumption of continuing majority status (citing S.
Moldings, 219 N.L.R.B. 119, 119±20 (1975))).
80. See Sony Corp. of Am., 313 N.L.R.B. 420, 420 (1993) (upholding the finding
of the Administrative Law Judge that photographing employees and including their
photographs in an anti-union video without their informed consent constitutes an unfair
labor practice under the Act).
81. See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. (Allegheny Ludlum I), 320 N.L.R.B. 484, 484
(1995), enf. denied in part, enfd. in part, 104 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
82. See Alleghany Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354, 1363±64 (D.C. Cir.
1997), denying enf. in part, enfg. in part, Allegheny Ludlum I, 320 N.L.R.B. 484
(1995).
83. See Alleghany Ludlum Corp. (Alleghany Ludlum II), 333 N.L.R.B. 743, 745
(2001) (clarifying when employers may lawfully include visual images of employees in
campaign presentations), enfd., 301 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2002).
84. See id. at 745 (specifying that an employer may not, however, lawfully include
HPSOR\HHLPDJHVZKHUHWKHYLGHRWHQGVWRLQGLFDWHWKDWHPSOR\HH¶VSRVLWLRQRQXQLRQ
representation, withouWWKHHPSOR\HH¶VFRQVHQW 
85. See BE & K Constr. Co. (BE & K I), 329 N.L.R.B. 717, 717±18 (1999), enfd.,
246 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2001), UHY¶G, 536 U.S. 516 (2002).
86. See id. at 726 (holding that the identical claims brought by the company lacked
merit and had a retaliatory motive in violation of Section 8(a)(1)).
87. See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 536 (2002) (invalidating the
%RDUG¶VVWDQGDUGIRULPSRVLQJOLDELOLW\XQGHUWKH$FWWRSHQDOL]HDQ\UHDVRQDEO\EDVHG
yet unsuccessful, suits filed with retaliatory purpose).
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On remand, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that the
suit was reasonably based and that a reasonable lawsuit could not be
condemned as unlawful, even if it was motivated by anti-union
considerations.88
T. Levitz Furniture Co.
In this case, the Board majority held that an employer could unilaterally
withdraw recognition from a union only upon a showing that the union had
actually lost majority status.89 Prior to that, the Board had said that the
employer could unilaterally withdraw recognition from a union upon a
showing that there was reasonable good-faith doubt of majority status.90
In LevitzWKH%RDUGZDVLQIOXHQFHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ
Allentown Mack v. NLRB.91 In that case, the Court had expressed
misgivings about the Board having a single standard for withdrawal of
recognition, the filing of a petition, and employer polling.92 However, the
&RXUWXSKHOGWKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQLQWKLVUHJDUG93
VI. CATEGORIZING THE REVERSALS: COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this Part, I will categorize the above reversals, and I will then make
comments and reach conclusions as to the propriety of reversal for each
category.

88. See BE & K Constr. Co. (BE & K II), 351 N.L.R.B. 451, 459 (2007) (adopting
a standard that requires more than just circumstantial proof of retaliatory motive
(quoting BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 451, 539 (2002) (Souter, J.,
concurring))).
89. See Levitz Furniture Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2001).
90. See, e.g., Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.R.L.B. 664, 674 (1951) (concluding
that in light of the totality of the circumstances, the employer was not required to avail
LWVHOI RI LWV ULJKW WR ILOH D SHWLWLRQ ZLWK WKH %RDUG WR DVFHUWDLQ WKH 8QLRQ¶V DFWXDO
representative status in order to demonstrate its good faith).
91. See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 717 (DFTXLHVFLQJWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
decision in Allentown Mack LQRUGHUWR³DYRLGWKHFRQIXVLRQRYHUWHUPLQRORJ\LQ
>DSSO\LQJ@ WKH JRRG IDLWK GRXEW VWDQGDUG´ (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v.
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 365±66, 373±74 (1998))).
92. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 365±66, 373±74
(1998) DOORZLQJ DQ HPSOR\HU WR DFW ZKHQ LW KDV ³UHDVRQDEOH XQFHUWDLQW\´ RI XQLRQ¶V
majority status).
93. See id. DW  REVHUYLQJ WKDW WKH %RDUG¶V VLQJOH VWDQGDUG IRU SROOLQJ DQG
withdrawals RI UHFRJQLWLRQ LV D ³puzzling policy,´ EXW not so puzzling as to be
³DUELWUDU\ RU FDSULFLRXV´  Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 717 (holding that an
employer may only withdraw recognition when the incumbent union has lost the
VXSSRUWRIDPDMRULW\RIHPSOR\HHVDQGSURSRVHVWKDW³DQHPSOR\HUFDQGefeat a postZLWKGUDZDOUHIXVDOWREDUJDLQDOOHJDWLRQLILWVKRZVDVDGHIHQVHWKHXQLRQ¶VDFWXDOORVV
RIPDMRULW\VWDWXV´ .
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A. Acquiescing to Adverse Court Precedent
As discussed above, some of the reversals are because of adverse court
precedent. In a situation where the Board loses before a circuit court, the
Board has three options: it can seek certiorari in that case;94 it can adhere to
the rejected precedent in another case and seek a favorable result in a
different circuit;95 or it can acquiesce to the view of the adverse court
decision and make that the new position of the Board. Only the latter
involves a reversal of precedent.
In cases where a circuit court has disagreed with Board precedent, it may
EH UHDVRQDEOH DQG SUXGHQW WR DGRSW WKH FRXUW¶V YLHZ SDUWLFXODUO\ LI WKH
court has a sound basis for its view. This becomes even more compelling if
the Board loses in circuit after circuit. Of course, it may also be reasonable
for the Board to stick to its guns. ,Q P\ YLHZ WKH %RDUG¶V FKRLFH VKRXOG
turn on the importance of the issues to national labor policy.
B. Sharing the Misgivings of a Court
As discussed above, there are cases where the reviewing court has
H[SUHVVHG PLVJLYLQJV DERXW WKH %RDUG¶V SRVLWLRQ EXW XOWLPDWHO\ XSKROGV
the position of the Board as within WKH%RDUG¶V discretion.96 In these cases
WKH%RDUGPD\FRPHWRVKDUHWKHFRXUW¶VPLVJLYLQJVDQGWKXVRYHUUXOHLWV
own precedent.97
In cases where a court has simply expressed misgivings about a Board
position, it would seem that the Board can reasonably adhere to its position
particularly when no other court has expressed such misgivings. However,
in doing so, the Board may wish to set forth its reasons for not sharing the
misgivings of the one court.

94. See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322, 326 (1974)
(reversing a Sixth Circuit decision and upholding the N/5%¶VLQLWLDOGHFLVLRQEHFDXVH
WKH%RDUG¶VUXOLQJZDVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKthe right of employees embodied in Section 7 of
the Act).
95. If the Board prevails in another circuit, there would be a conflict of circuits,
thereby enhancing the prospects for Supreme Court review. This is what occurred with
favorable results in NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
96. See Alleghany Ludlum v. N.L.R.B., 104 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(noting that the D.C. Circuit ZLOOVHWDVLGHWKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLon only when the Board
KDV³DFWHGDUELWUDULO\RURWKHUZLVHHUUHGLQDSSO\LQJHVWDEOLVKHGODZWRWKHIDFWV´ FLWLQJ
,QW¶O8QLRQRI(OHF (Electronic Workers) v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 1532, 1536±37 (D.C. Cir.
1994))), denying enf. in part, enfg. in part, Allegheny Ludlum I, 320 N.L.R.B. 484
(1995).
97. C.f. Oakwood Healthcare Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 687, 687±88 (2006)
(changing Board precedent to coincide with warnings received in two different cases
from the Supreme Court that the Board ZDV FRQVWUXLQJ ³VXSHUYLVRU\ VWDWXV´ WRR
narrowly).
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C. Conflict in Board Precedents
As also discussed above, there are some cases where there is a conflict in
WKH%RDUG¶VSUHFHGHQW98 In that situation, the Board can adopt one line of
cases and overrule the other or it can overrule both and adopt a third view.
:KHUH WKHUH LVD FRQIOLFW LQ WKH %RDUG¶V SUHFHGHQWV DQG WKH\ FDQQRWEH
reconciled, the Board has little choice but to overrule one line and adopt the
other, or overrule both and adopt a third line.
D. Restoring an Older Precedent
As discussed above, there are cases where the Board reverses precedent
in order to return to an even older precedent.99 In those cases, the Board can
claim that it is simply restoring the law to what it once was.100
If the original precedent lasted for many years without court disapproval,
it may be reasonable to reverse the recent precedent and return to the prior
one. However, in doing so, there is a danger that a subsequent Board may
reverse it again. The ping-pong match and the instability would continue.
7KHEHVWUHVXOWLVIRUWKH%RDUGWRIUDQNO\DFNQRZOHGJHWKHSUR¶VDQGFRQ¶V
of each approach, conclude, on balance, why one is better than the other,
and express the hope that this will finally settle the matter.
E. Opting for a Different Rule
Finally, as discussed above, there are cases where the Board simply
concludes, on its own, that the precedent does not make sense and opts for
a different rule.101 In these cases²where none of the elements set forth in
A through D above are present²the Board simply disagrees with the
precedent of a prior Board.102 As stated at the outset, changes like these
lead to instability, unpredictability, and disrespect for the law. Thus, in my
view, the burden is on the reversing Board to justify the change.
98. See, e.g., Alleghany Ludlum  )G DW  GHWHUPLQLQJ WKDW WKH %RDUG¶V
SUHFHGHQWV UHJDUGLQJ ³SROOLQJ´ YLGHRWDSLQJ, DQG IUHH VSHHFK FUHDWHG ³FRQIOLFWLQJ
PDQGDWHV´DQGUHPDQGLQJIRUUHVROXWLRQ 
99. E.g., Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 776, 776 (2004) (abandoning the
precedent of Springs Industries and adopting the prior precedent established in Kokomo
Tube Co. requiring that an objecting party must prove the impact on the election by
direct and circumstantial evidence).
The chain of reversals may go back even further. Trying to resolve who made the
ILUVWFKDQJHLVDELWOLNHWU\LQJWRGHWHUPLQH³ZKRVWDUWHGLW´LQDVFKRRO-yard fight.
100. See, e.g., Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 489±   VWDWLQJ WKDW ³WKH
concerns expressed by the Board in 6W &ODLUH¶V +RVSLWDO [twenty-five] years ago are
just as relevant today´ 
101. E.g., Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 228 (2007) (grounding WKH%RDUG¶V
decision in statutory policy).
102. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 644 (2007).

2011]

WHEN ONE BOARD REVERSES ANOTHER

83

Ideally, one would hope for empirical data showing that the precedent
has had undesirable economic consequences or has had results that are
inconsistent with the policies of the Act. However, under Section 4(a) of
WKH$FWWKH%RDUGLVIRUELGGHQWRKLUHVWDIISHUVRQVWRSHUIRUP³HFRQRPLF
DQDO\VLV´103 Notwithstanding this, there is nothing to preclude the Board
from relying on academic or other studies, or to receive and rely upon
Brandeis briefs. Absent such empirical support, it is my view that the
Board should be reluctant to reverse precedent in this situation.

103. See 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).

* * *
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I. INTRODUCTION
When President Barack Obama nominated Service Employees
International Union (³SEIU´) Associate General Counsel Craig Becker to
serve on the National Labor Relations Board (³NLRB´Rr ³Board´), some
commentators argued that he would impose a controversial method of
recognizing unions, known as card-check or majority sign-up, through the
administrative process.1 This method of recognizing unions was stalled in
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, American University, Washington College of Law;
M.A. Candidate, International Development, December 2011, American University,
School of International Service. A special thanks to Gwen and Bill Nutting for
supporting my education over the years.
1.
See Editorial, Back Door Card Check, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2010, at A20,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703597204575483882585485368.htm
l (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) (suggesting Becker will push the NLRB to implement the
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Congress in the Employee Free Choice Act (³EFCA´).2 The current Board
practice, in general LV WR UHFRJQL]H DQ HPSOR\HU¶V FROOHFWLYH EDUJDLQLQJ
obligation only if the union has won an NLRB-certified secret ballot
election.3 Although the Supreme Court has affirmed this interpretation of
the National Labor Relations Act (³NLRA´ RU ³$FW´),4 the Board retains
the discretion to change its interpretation under the Chevron doctrine.5
The NLRB could expand the methods by which a union may be
recognized as the representative of a bargaining unit with approval by a
majority of employees.6 It would be welOZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRIWKH%RDUG¶V
power to impose this change using its adjudication process, although it is
unlikely that the Board will move in this direction.7 Additionally, the nature
of the Board is such that its membership undergoes a complete turnover
during the course of a presidential term, and thus there is no guarantee that
the new rule would remain on the books for long.
Currently, the Employee Free Choice Act is pending in Congress, but its
FDUGFKHFNVLQFHWKH()&$IDLOHGWRSDVVLQ&RQJUHVV 5\DQ2¶'RQQHOOCraig Becker:
%LJ /DERU¶V %LJ $OO\, THE FOUNDRY (Mar. 26, 2010, 2:00 PM),
http://blog.heritage.org/2010/03/26/craig-becker-big-labor%E2%80%99s-big-ally/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (denouncing recess appointment of Becker because his past
reflects a bias against employers and support for the card check); Brad Peck, Craig
Becker±&DUG &KHFN¶V ,QVLGH 0DQ, THE CHAMBER POST (Jul. 25, 2009, 8:48 AM),
http://www.chamberpost.com/2009/07/craig-becker-card-checks-inside-man.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (seeking further scrutiny RI%HFNHU¶VSURXQLRQSDVWEHFDXVHLW
may lead Becker to eliminate the secret ballot through a position on the NLRB).
2.
See Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009) (providing an amendment to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
159(c) (2006), to enable the Board to designate a labor organization as the exclusive
EDUJDLQLQJ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RQ WKH SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI ³YDOLG DXWKRUL]Dtions designating the
individual or labor organization specified in the petition as their bargaining
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ 
3.
See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974)
(holding, absent evidence of unfair labor practices on the part of an employer, a union
in possession of authorization cards must commence to an NLRB-certified election).
4.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151±69 (2006).
5.
See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398±99, 402±03 (1996)
(apSO\LQJ GHIHUHQFH WR 1/5%¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI VHFRQGDU\ IDUPLQJ DQG IRFXVLQJ RQ
the reasonableness of the interpretation given the ambiguity of the statutory language
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)));
see generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
GHFODULQJ WKDW DQ DJHQF\¶V UHDVRQDEOH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI D VWDWXWH VKRXOG EH JLYHQ
GHIHUHQFHZKHUH&RQJUHVV¶VLQWHQWLVQRWIUHHIURPDPELJXLW\ 
6.
See Mark Schoeff Jr., NLRB Decisions Could Make Card Check a Reality,
MGMT.
(Jul.
2009),
available
at
WORKFORCE
http://www.workforce.com/section/03/feature/26/5/2/97/265299_printer.html
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (observing, as former NLRB Chairman William Gould, IV
stated, that the NLRB frequently reverses its interpretation of labor law).
7.
See id. (noting that the NLRB has other methods of ordering union recognition
through card-check short of reversing long-standing Board precedent).

2011] CAN CARD-CHECK BE UNILATERALLY IMPOSED BY THE NLRB?

87

future is uncertain at best.8 This legislation would provide card-check
recognition during union organization campaigns, rather than allowing
employers to demand a NLRB-certified secret-ballot election.9 The
measure is supported by labor because it will increase union membership.10
However, those who oppose this legislation cite its undemocratic nature
and the possibility that unions may use coercion to obtain signed cards.11
President Obama came under fire for ignoring labor issues during his
first year in office and his inability to navigate around Republican efforts to
block new labor legislation.12 A policy shift within the NLRB itself may be
RQHRIODERU¶VEHVWKRSHVIRURUJDQL]HGODERUUHIRUPVLQFHWKHEDODQFHRI
WKH%RDUG¶VPHPEHUVKLSLVLGHRORJLFDOO\SUR-labor.13 The controversy over
the EFCA makes it unlikely for the Board to wait for a statutory
amendment to implement card-check method.14
This Article will examine whether the NLRB has the power to make the
card-check method law through the administrative process. Part II explains
and defines card-check recognition.15 Part III discusses the statutory
8.
See Daniel Malloy, Labor-Business Class Shifts from Congress, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Jan.
17,
2011,
A-1,
available
at
http://www.postgazette.com/pg/11017/1118574-84.stm (observing, given backers of the EFCA were
XQDEOHWRREWDLQVL[W\YRWHVLQWKH6HQDWHWKHFXUUHQWGLYLGHG&RQJUHVVUHQGHUV³OLWWOH
FKDQFHRI()&$¶VUHVXVFLWDWLRQ´ 
9.
See Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009) (mandating, upon passage, the NLRB to determine the substance and procedure
of adjudicating authorization card validity).
10. See Sam Hananel, ABC NEWS, Organized LDERU¶V $JHQGD +LWV 5RDGEORFN
What Now? (Feb. 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9963922
ODVW YLVLWHG 1RY    GLVFXVVLQJ WKH ODERU PRYHPHQW¶V IUXVWUDWLRQ ZLWK LWV
inability to get its goals through the Democratic-controlled Congress).
11. See /HWWHUIURP5%UXFH-RVWHQ([HF9LFH3UHVLGHQW*RY¶W$IIDLUV&KDPEHU
of Commerce to S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions (Jul. 24, 2009)
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/hillletters/090724_becker.pdf H[SUHVVLQJ FRQFHUQ WKDW %HFNHU¶V SUR-labor views incline
him to implement portions of EFCA absent congressional passage²most notably
SROLFLHVWKDWXWLOL]H³TXHVWLRQDEOHSUHVVXUHWDFWLFV>RQ@HPSOR\HUVDQGZRUNHUV´DQG
³WKHHIIHFWLYHHOLPLQDWLRQRIVHFUHWEDOORWVLQRUJDQL]LQJFDPSDLJQV´ 
12. See Hananel, supra note 10 (discussing the AFL-&,2¶V IUXVWUDWLRQ ZLWK
3UHVLGHQW2EDPD¶VSXVKIRUKHDOWKFDUHUHIRUPWRWDNHSUHFHGHQFHEHIRUH()&$GXULQJ
the first year of his administration).
13. See Melanie Trottman & Kris Maher, /DERU%RDUG¶V5HFHQW'HFLVLRQV7LOWLQ
Favor of Unions, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2010, at A5, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704804504575606872095817474.htm
l (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (observing that Republican gains in Congress after the
November 2010 election effectively killed EFCA).
14. See id. (reviewing the Obama-HUD %RDUG¶V TXLFN UHYHUVDO RI VHYHUDO %XVK-era
NLRB decisions).
15. See infra Part II (defining card-check and its significance in relation to the
EFCA).
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framework for recognition of union representatives.16 Part IV provides a
historical overview of the development of the law surrounding the union
recognition process.17 Part V of this Article discusses whether and how the
administrative process could be used to make card-check the law despite
Congressional inaction.18 Additionally, Part V argues that although it is
possible under current administrative and labor law to do so, such a policy
would be short-lived.19 Part VI concludes that it in the best interest of
organized labor to pursue passage of the Employee Free Choice Act rather
than to encourage the NLRB to act on its own.20
II. WHAT IS THE CARD-CHECK METHOD?
Put simply, card-check is a way to document majority support for a
union through signed cards rather than going through a certification
election.21 Card-check is not an alien concept in American labor law,
because an employer may choose to recognize a union based on cards and
opt to never raise a challenge tR ZKHWKHU WKH XQLRQ¶V DXWKRUL]DWLRQ FDUGV
actually support the organizational will of employees.22 Once recognized,
the employer has many of the same legal obligations with respect to that
union as though the union had won certification after a secret ballot
election.23 If the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, then
16. See infra Part III (indentifying and explaining Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(c) in
UHODWLRQWRDQHPSOR\HU¶VREOLJDWLRQWRFROOHFWLYHO\EDUJDLQXQGHUWKH1/5$ 
17. See infra 3DUW,9 WUDFLQJWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVVXUURXQGLQJWKH%RDUG¶VVKLIW from
accepting a card-check method to a secret ballot election).
18. See infra Part V.A (exploring the possibility that the Board could adopt cardcheck through adjudication under a Chevron two-step process).
19. See infra Part V.B (discussing the problems with and administrative
adjudication accepting card-check).
20. See infra Part VI (stating that an adoption through the EFCA is favored over an
adjudication by the Board due to the potential political costs and negative
implications).
21. See Hananel, supra note 10 (noting that opponents fear Becker may try to
impose a policy that subverts majority-rule election with majority-rule authorization
cards carte blanche²without Congressional endorsement for such a complete shift).
22. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., NLRB Decisions Could Make Card Check a Reality,
MGMT.,
Jul.
2009,
available
at
WORKFORCE
http://www.workforce.com/section/03/feature/26/5/2/97/265299_printer.html
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (stating the policy regarding card-check authorization for union
representation is currently in the hands of the employer, who may request a NLRBsupervised and certified election prior to recognizing a union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for employees).
23. But cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 598±99 & n.14 (1969)
(allowing employers who have voluntarily recognized a union on the basis of
DXWKRUL]DWLRQFDUGVWRFDOOIRUDYRWHWRZLWKLQWZHOYHPRQWKVRIWKHXQLRQ¶VUHFRJQLWLRQ
to ascertain whether the union still retains a majority of employee support (citing
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 (1954))).
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the question of representation must be resolved through a secret ballot
election, and the cards become moot.24 The card-check measure included in
the EFCA would make recognition mandatory if a majority of employees
pronounce their support of the union by signing cards.25 This Article
DQDO\]HVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKH1/5%¶VDXWKRULW\WRUHTXLUHDQDXWRPDWLF
obligation to bargain through the use of card-check absent the statutory
amendments proposed in the EFCA.
III. THE STATUTORY BASIS OF AN EMPLOYER¶S OBLIGATION TO ENGAGE
IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The NLRA contains two provisions that are key to the discussion at
hand: Sections 9(c) and 8(a)(5).26 Currently, under Section 9(c), whenever
D³TXHVWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´LVUDLVHGRQO\WKHFHUWLILHGUHVXOWVRIDVHFUHW
EDOORWHOHFWLRQDUHGHWHUPLQDWLYHRIDXQLRQ¶VVWDWXV27 The Board possesses
DUJXDEO\ ZLGH GLVFUHWLRQ WR LQWHUSUHW ³TXHVWLRQ RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ XQGHU
Section 9(c)28 DQG ³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ XQGHU Section 8(a)(5).29 Hence, the
Board could potentially expand the applicability of card-check by adopting
DQDUURZGHILQLWLRQRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVD³TXHVWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´30
Sometimes a secret ballot election is impractical.31 Under Section
 D   DQ HPSOR\HU¶V IDLOXUH WR EDUJDLQ ZLWK WKH certified Section 9(a)
24. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation
Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 513±14 (1993) (observing
that employee signed authorization cards do not create a statutory duty to bargain with
DXQLRQRQWKHSDUWRIWKHHPSOR\HUDQGDQHPSOR\HU¶VUHIXVDOWREDUJDLQZLWKDXQLRQ
RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKH XQLRQ¶V DXWKRUL]DWLRQ FDUGV²in the absence of an NLRB secret
ballot election²is not an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA).
25. Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009) (proposing an amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006) to require certification
ZKHQ³DPDMRULW\RIWKHHPSOR\HHVLn a unit appropriate for bargaining has signed valid
authorizations designating the individual or labor organization specified in the petition
DVWKHLUEDUJDLQLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ 
26. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006) (making an
HPSOR\HU¶V³UHIXV>DO@WREDUJDLQFROOHFWLYHO\ZLWKWKHrepresentatives of his employees,
VXEMHFW WR > 86&  @´ DQ XQIDLU ODERU SUDFWLFH HPSKDVLV DGGHG   
(requiring the Board to investigate a petition presented by a union to the NLRB to
FHUWLI\ WKDW XQLRQ DV WKH FROOHFWLYH EDUJDLQLQJ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH IRU WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
HPSOR\HHV DQG ³LI >WKH %RDUG@ KDV UHDVRQDEOH FDXVH WR EHOLHYH WKDW D TXHVWLRQ RI
representation . . . exists [sic] shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice .
. . [and] if [the Board] finds that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct
an election by secret ballot DQGVKDOOFHUWLI\WKHUHVXOWVWKHUHRI´ HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
27. § 159(c)(1)(B).
28. Id.
29. § 158(a)(5).
30. § 159(c)(1)(B).
31. See Becker, supra note 24, at 515±18 (noting the difficulties with trying to
apply the political election process to the workplace environment).
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representative of its employees is an unfair labor practice.32 Section 8(a)(5)
has been used to establish a collective bargaining obligation where an
untainted secret ballot election is impossible and majority support can be
established on an alternative basis.33
IV. EVOLUTION OF BOARD PRACTICE
$IWHUWKH1/5$¶VSDVVDJHLQ, the NLRB initially allowed unions to
become certified based on a variety of evidence demonstrating majority
support.34 Due to political pressure, the Board shifted away from cardcheck and other evidence in favor of secret ballot elections,35 a move that
was codified in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.36
The original language of the National Labor Relations Act allowed
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQWREHGHWHUPLQHGHLWKHUE\³DVHFUHWEDOORWRIHPSOR\HHV, or
[the use of] any other suitable method to ascertain [sic] such
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV´37 7KH LQLWLDO %RDUG PHPEHUVKLS ORRNHG WR ³VLJQHG
authorization cards, membership applications, petitions, affidavits of
membership, signatures of employees receiving strike benefits from a
XQLRQSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDVWULNHFDOOHGE\DXQLRQDQGHPSOR\HHWHVWLPRQ\´
to resolve questions of representation.38
In 1939, the Board²under pressure from various actors on all sides of
the political spectrum²abandoned its practice of certifying unions without
a Board-supervised secret ballot election.39 The Taft-Hartley Act codified
32. § 158(a)(5).
33. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969) (stating that a
union ma\ XVH DQ ³DOWHUQDWH URXWH WR PDMRULW\ VWDWXV´ ZKHQ ³D IDLU HOHFWLRQ >LV@ DQ
XQOLNHO\SRVVLELOLW\´GXHWRXQIDLUODERUSUDFWLFHVRQWKHSDUWRIWKHHPSOR\HU 
34. See Becker, supra note 24 DW  UHFRXQWLQJ WKDW RI WKH DYDLODEOH ³GLYHUVH
forms of evidenFH´ WKDW WKH %RDUG RULJLQDOO\ XVHG WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHQ D XQLRQ KDG
majority support, signed authorization cards were primarily relied upon).
35. See Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 531-32 (1939) (endorsing secret
elections as the best way to effectuate the National Labor Relations Act). See also
Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078 (1966) (stating that secret elections are
³QRUPDOO\ D PRUH VDWLVIDFWRU\ PHDQV RI GHWHUPLQLQJ HPSOR\HHV¶ ZLVKHV´ DQG WKDW
HPSOR\HUV PD\ LQVLVW ³RQ HOHFWLRQ DV SURRI RI D XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\´ DV ORQJ DV WKH
HPSOR\HUKDVD³JRRG-IDLWKGRXEWRIWKHXQLRQ¶VPDMRULW\´ 
36. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9, Pub. L. No. 101, 61
Stat. 136, 144 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006)) (amending the
general language of Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 to limit
certification to secret ballot elections).
37. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 453
(1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-53, 157, 159±61, 163, 165-67 (2006)).
38. Becker, supra note 24, at 508.
39. See id. at 508±10 (lamenting that the first several years of the NLRB resulted in
universal criticism for the Board, including the President, Congress, the press,
employers, and unions). See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. at 531±32
(endorsing the use of the secret ballot to select the representative union).
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this restriction by changing the language of Section  F WRVD\³>L@Ia
question of representation exists, [the Board] shall direct an election by
VHFUHWEDOORWDQGVKDOOFHUWLI\WKHUHVXOWVWKHUHRI´40 In Aaron Bros., a case
decided by the Board in 1966, the Board held WKDWDQHPSOR\HU¶VUHIXVDOWR
bargain would not violate Section 8(a)(5) if the union had been selected in
the absence of an election.41 In 1969, the Supreme Court held, in NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., WKDW ³VHFUHW HOHFWLRQV DUH JHQHUDOO\ WKH PRVW
satisfactory²indeed the preferred²method of ascertaining whether a
XQLRQKDVPDMRULW\VXSSRUW´42
Specifically, in regard to authorization cards, the Board has an
inconsistent history.43 In 1949, the Board promulgated the Joy Silk
doctrine.44 ,QWKDWFDVHWKH%RDUGKHOGWKDWDQHPSOR\HU¶VJRRGIDLWKGRXEW
WKDW WKH XQLRQ¶V authorization cards did not adequately demonstrate its
majority status constituted a proper defense to a Section 8(5)(a) unfair labor
practice allegation.45 Good faith did not apply where, for example, other
unfair labor practices occurred or the employer failed to provide a reason
for her doubt.46
TKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVVXUURXQGLQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶VGRXEWDUHYHU\LPSRUWDQW
For instance, in Aaron Bros., an employer that had no prior bargaining
relationship with the union was found not to be acting in bad faith when it
GHPDQGHG DQ HOHFWLRQ WR SURYH WKH XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\; despite not offering
compelling reasons.47 In that case, the Board held that to find bad faith, the
40. § 159(c).
41. See $DURQ%URV1/5%   KROGLQJWKDWWKH(PSOR\HU¶V
refusal to bargain must also be in good faith and without other indicia of misconduct).
42. 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969).
43. See id DW  ³>7R@ WUDFH WKH HYROXWLRQ RI WKH %RDUG¶V DSSURDFK WR
DXWKRUL]DWLRQFDUGVUHTXLUHVYLHZLQJWKH%RDUG¶VWUHDWPHQWRIDXWKRUL]DWLRQFDUGVLQ
three separate phases: (1) under the Joy Silk doctrine, (2) under the rules of the Aaron
Bros. FDVHDQG  XQGHUWKHDSSURDFKDQQRXQFHGDWRUDODUJXPHQWEHIRUHWKLV&RXUW´ 
44. See Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949) (holding that an
emSOR\HU¶V EDG IDLWK LQVLVWHQFH RQ D %RDUG HOHFWLRQ DV SURRI RI WKH XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\
status and in conjunction with a refusal to bargain until such an election happens is a
violation of Section 8(a)(5)), enfd. as modified, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
45. See id. VWDWLQJ WKDW D YLRODWLRQ ZLOO RFFXU LI WKH HPSOR\HU LV PRWLYDWHG E\ ³D
rejection of the collective barraging principle or by desire to gain time within which to
XQGHUPLQH WKH XQLRQ´ LQWHUQDO TXRWDWLRQ PDUNV RPLWWHG  see also NLRB v. Gissel
PaFNLQJ &R  86     ³8QGHU >WKH Joy Silk doctrine], an employer
could lawfully refuse to bargain with a union claiming representative status through
SRVVHVVLRQ RI DXWKRUL]DWLRQ FDUGV LI KH KDG D µJRRG IDLWK GRXEW¶ DV WR WKH XQLRQ¶V
majorit\VWDWXV´ 
46. See Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 592±93 (observing that the Joy Silk doctrine
did not apply where the employer committed independent unfair labor practices
indicative of bad faith).
47. See Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078±80 (1966) KROGLQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
LQDELOLW\ WR SURYH JRRG IDLWK GLG QRW VDWLVI\ WKH *HQHUDO &RXQVHO¶V EXUGHQ RI
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XQIDLUODERUSUDFWLFHPXVWKDYHEHHQ³FDOFXODWHGWRGLVVLSDWHXQLRQVXSSRUW´
among workers.48 The Board elaborated that a failure to state a reason
when questioning a majority status is not evidence of bad faith, unless the
facts and circumstances of the case support that conclusion.49
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., several unions filed unfair labor practice
charges against employers although, in some cases, secret ballot elections
had not taken place.50 The unions argued that employers had violated
Section 8(a)(5) when a majority of employees, in an appropriate unit,
signed authorization cards and the employers had committed other unfair
labor practices that eliminated the possibility of a fair secret ballot
election.51 The employers argued that their refusal to bargain was
legitimate, because the authorization cards did not settle the question of
representation.52 The NLRB issued bargaining orders and reasoned that the
authorization cards were sufficient to establish that a majority of employees
in the bargaining unit supported the union as their representative and that
the employers had ulterior motives rather than good faith doubt in regard to
WKHXQLRQ¶V majority status.53 Additionally, the NLRB determined that the
employers had committed unfair labor practices in violation of Sections
8(a)(1) and (3).54 7KH )RXUWK &LUFXLW KRZHYHU UHYHUVHG WKH %RDUG¶V
decision and bargaining orders with respect to the Section 8(a)(5) claim,
EXW XSKHOG WKH %RDUG¶V GHFLVLRQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
claims.55 7KH )LUVW &LUFXLW XSKHOG WKH %RDUG¶V interpretation of Section
GHPRQVWUDWLQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶VEDGIDLWK 
48. Id. at 1079.
49. See id. at 1079 (³:KHWKHU DQ HPSOR\HU LV DFWLQJ LQ JRRG RU EDG IDLWK LQ
questioning the union's majority is a determination which of necessity must be made in
the light of all the relevant facts of the case, including any unlawful conduct of the
employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the
unlawfuOFRQGXFW´ ; see also Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 593 (noting that after Aaron
Bros ³DQ HPSOR\HU QR ORQJHU QHHGHG WR FRPH IRUZDUG ZLWK UHDVRQV IRU UHMHFWLQJ D
EDUJDLQLQJGHPDQG´ .
50. See 395 U.S. at 580 (recounting the various allegations of coercion and
intimidation that the employers utilized against the unions and their supporters).
51. See id. at 580±82 (observing that elections, subsequent to the signed
authorization cards and the alleged unfair labor practices, either never occurred or
resulted in victory for the employers).
52. Id. at 580.
53. See id. at 582± GLVFXVVLQJ WKH %RDUG¶V XVH RI HPSOR\HUV¶ ³GHVLUH WR JDLQ
WLPH WR GLVVLSDWH WKH >XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\@ VWDWXV    >LQ RUGHU WR ZDJH@ WKHLU DQWLXQLRQ
FDPSDLJQHIIRUWV´DVHYLGHQFHRIWKeir violation of Section 8(a)(5)).
54. See id. PHQWLRQLQJ WKH %RDUG¶V ILQGLQJV WKDW WKH HPSOR\HUV¶ KDG HQJDJHG LQ
unlawful interrogations, surveillance, promised benefits, and terminations of unionsupporting employees).
55. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336, 337 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam)
UHY¶GLQSDUWDII¶GLQSDUW86  1/5%Y+HFN¶V,QF)G
338±39 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) UHY¶G LQ SDUW DII¶G LQ SDUW VXE QRP NLRB v.
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8(a)(5) and fully enforced the bargaining order56²creating a circuit split.57
In order to resolve the issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to all
four cDVHVDQGXOWLPDWHO\XSKHOGWKH%RDUG¶VEDUJDLQLQJRUGHUV58
At oral argument before the Supreme Court in Gissel, the Board
abandoned the good faith standard and instead relied upon the existence of
other unfair labor practices to establish an Section 8(a)(5) violation.59 The
6XSUHPH &RXUW VXPPDUL]HG WKH %RDUG¶V QHZ SROLF\ LQ WKH IROORZLQJ
PDQQHU³DQHPSOR\HUFDQLQVLVWWKDWDXQLRQJRWRDQHOHFWLRn, regardless
of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not guilty of misconduct; he
need give no affirmative reasons for rejecting a recognition request, and he
FDQ GHPDQG DQ HOHFWLRQ ZLWK D VLPSOH µQR FRPPHQW¶ WR WKH XQLRQ´60
However, the Court addeG³WKDWDQHPSOR\HUFRXOGQRWUHIXVHWREDUJDLQLI
he knew, through a personal poll for instance, that a majority of his
HPSOR\HHV VXSSRUWHG WKH XQLRQ´61 Because the employers had committed
unfair labor practices that prevented a fair election, the Supreme Court
QRWHGWKDWWKHLUGHFLVLRQGLGQRWDGGUHVV³ZKHWKHUDEDUJDLQLQJRUGHULVHYHU
appropriate in cases where there is no interference with the election
processes´62 Thus, WKH VFRSH RI WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Gissel Packing
does not include cases where a union collects authorization cards from a
majority of employees without employer interference.
The NLRB and the Supreme Court addressed that question in Linden
Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB in 1974.63 In Linden Lumber, the
union had obtained authorization cards from a majority of employees, but
the employer refused to recognize the union.64 The union filed for an
election pursuant to Section 9(c), to which the employer stated that it would
refuse to abide by the result. This prompted the union to withdraw its
petition. Linden argued that two of the employees were actually

Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Gen. Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d
339, 340 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) UHY¶G LQ SDUW DII¶G LQ SDUW VXE QRP NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
56. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157, 161±62 (1st Cir. 1968), DII¶G VXE QRP
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
57. See id. at 585, 589± UHFRXQWLQJ WKH FRQIOLFWLQJ RSLQLRQV RQ WKH 1/5%¶V
interpretation of Section 8(a)(5) in the First and Fourth Circuits).
58. See Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 579.
59. Id. at 594.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 595.
63. See 419 U.S. 301, 302 (1974) (couching that the question presented in Linden
Lumber ZDV SUHFLVHO\ WKH TXHVWLRQ WKH &RXUW KDG ³H[SUHVVO\ UHVHUYHG´ LQ Gissel
Packing).
64. Id.
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supervisors, and their participation in organizing a recognitional strike had
compromised the reliability of the authorization cards. The only unfair
labor practice that Linden was charged with was failing to bargain with the
HPSOR\HHV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH²in violation of Section 8(a)(5).65 The Board
KHOG WKDW /LQGHQ¶V ³UHIXVDO WR DFFHSW HYLGHQFH RI PDMRULW\ VXSSRUW RWKHU
WKDQ WKH UHVXOWV RI D %RDUG HOHFWLRQ´ GLG QRW FRQVWLWXWH DQ XQIDLU ODbor
practice,66 and the Supreme Court subsequently upheld this policy as a
SURSHUXVHRIWKH%RDUG¶VSRZHUWRLQWHUSUHWWKH1/5$67
Since Linden Lumber WKH %RDUG KDV LQWHUSUHWHG WKH ³TXHVWLRQ RI
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ EURDGO\ HQFRPSDVVLQJ YLUWXDOO\ DOOVLWXDWLRQs in which an
employer denies a demand for recognition.68 It is so broad that Board
policy essentially always calls for an election as a prerequisite for
recognition, unless the employer recognizes the union voluntarily or
commits an unfair labor practice that would taint any election results.69 The
6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV XSKHOG WKLV SROLF\ DV D SURSHU XVH RI WKH %RDUG¶V
discretion.70
V. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
The NLRB is composed of five members, appointed by the President and
charged with the administration of the NLRA.71 Typically, the Board
announces rules through adjudication rather than rulemaking. 72 As such, if
the Board is presented with an ideal set of facts for it to re-examine the

65. Id.
66. Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 721 (1971), enf.
denied sub nom. Truck Drivers Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir.
1973), UHY¶G VXE QRP Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S.
301 (1974).
67. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309±10 (holdiQJWKDWWKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQZDV
QHLWKHU³DUELWUDU\DQGFDSULFLRXVRUDQDEXVHRIGLVFUHWLRQ 
68. See id. at 310 (placing the burden on unions to follow through with their
election petitions before the NLRB prior to claiming authorization cards to resolve
questions of representation).
69. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW UNDER THE STATUTE AND
PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 9 (1997).
70. See, e.g., John Cueno, Inc. v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 1178, 1183 (1983) (applying
Linden Lumber to require a union to demonstrate majority status through an NLRB
certified election).
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006).
72. Cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative
Law Exile: Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58
DUKE L.J. 2013, 2017   ³7KHIDFWWKDWWKH1/5%HVFKHZVQRWLFH-and-comment
rulemaking makes it immune to the frequent post-Administrative Procedure Act waves
of regulatory reform that have focused on the rationalization and coordination of
LQIRUPDOUXOHPDNLQJ´ 
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question, it can announce a new rule via adjudication.73 To present an
opportunity to change the current rule, a dispute must arise from an
HPSOR\HU¶VUHIXVDOWRHQWHUFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJZLWKDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHWKDW
has demonstrated, through signed authorization cards, that a majority of
employees within an appropriate bargaining unit have requested
representation. The representative would have to file an unfair labor
practice charge against the employer for violating Section 8(a)(5).74 Then,
the Board could rule on the question of what is required to show that a
union has been selected as the representative under Section 8(a)(5).
The Board could then announce a new interpretation of Section
8(a)(5)²WKDW WKH VWDWXV RI ³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ FDQ EH DFKLHYHG WKURXJK
collecting signed authorization cards from a majority of employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit, even if there are no other allegations of unfair
labor practices and a fair election would be possible. In doing so, the
NLRB could change the policy of ILQGLQJ D ³TXHVWLRQ RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´
under Section 9(c) wherever the employer disputes such representation, and
implement a more restrictive approach that would require the employer to
show cause WRTXHVWLRQWKHXQLRQ¶VPDMRULW\VWDWXV²an allegation that the
cards were invalid because they were collected over too long of a time
period or some evidence of fraud²rather than just the absence of an
election. Representation could exist where a union has demonstrated that a
majority of employees have signed union cards, and the union could avoid
a secret ballot election.
An employer would probably appeal such a sweeping change in Board
policy.75 Upon ultimate review, the Supreme Court might uphold the policy
FKDQJH DV D YDOLG H[HUFLVH RI WKH %RDUG¶V DGMXGLFDWLYH UXOHPDNLQJ
authority. The only insurmountable legal restraints on the BoaUG¶V
rulemaking authority are embodied in statutes enacted by Congress and
from rulings of the Supreme Court.76 Indeed, the traditionally preferred
method of rulemaking by the Board²rules made through adjudication²
73. See, e.g., Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 225±25 (2007) (changing the
%RDUG¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLQ³VDOWLQJFDPSDLJQ´6HFWLRQ D   GLVFKDUJHFDVHV²when a
XQLRQ SODQWV D XQLRQ RUJDQL]HU DV DQ HPSOR\HH DW DQ HPSOR\HU¶V ZRUNSODFH WR VSXU
union support²WR UHTXLUH WKH *HQHUDO &RXQVHO WR SURYH WKH ³VDOWV´ KDYH D ³JHQXLQH
LQWHUHVWLQVHFXULQJHPSOR\PHQW´ 
74. 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (2006).
75. See  86&   I    SURYLGLQJ WKDW ³>D@Q\ SHUVRQ DJJULHYHG E\ D
final order of the Board . . . may obtain a review of such order in any Unites States
court of appeals in the circuit [where personal jurisdiction exists over a party] . . . or, in
WKH8QLWHV6WDWHV&RXUWRI$SSHDOVIRUWKH'LVWULFWRI&ROXPELD´ 
76. Cf. Michael C. Harper, -XGLFLDO&RQWURORIWKH1/5%¶V/DZPDNLQJLQWKH$JH
of Chevron and Brand X, 80 B.U. L. REV. 189, 191±92 (2009) (arguing that courts can
UHJXODWH WKH %RDUG¶V IUHTXHQWO\ VKLIWLQJ SUHFHGHQWV HYHQ RXWVLGH WKH %RDUG XVLQJ LWV
rulemaking power).
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are rightly subject to challenge in subsequent adjudications²even if the
rules are of general applicability.77 On the other hand, because the Board
has complete turnover every five years and it is not required to rely on
principles of stare decisis, it is often criticized for the uncertainty
surrounding the policies that it promulgates.78 The next section will discuss
whether such a policy change should survive judicial review.
A. Argument to Uphold Card-Check Unilaterally Imposed by the NLRB
Under Chevron, judicial review of agency decision-making is a two-step
process.79 First, the Court must ask whether the statute in question has a
clear meaning.80 If the relevant statute is ambiguous, then step two requires
WKDW WKH &RXUW GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU WKH DJHQF\¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV
reasonable.81 From the current language of Section 9(c), there is no
ambiguity under Chevron step one as to whether a secret ballot is necessary
to certify a bargaining representative ZKHQ WKHUH LV ³D TXHVWLRQ RI
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´.82 +RZHYHULWLVZHOOZLWKLQWKH%RDUG¶VSRZHUWRLQWHUSret
ambiguous provisions of the Act either broadly or narrowly.83 Therefore,
what constitutes a question of representation may be validly subject to the
Board¶V interpretation under Chevron step one because the NLRA is
ambiguous as to what constitutes a question of representation.84 In Linden
77. See Claire Tuck, Note, Policy Formulation at the NLRB: A Viable Alternative
to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2005) (noting
WKDW %RDUG ZLOO XVXDOO\ RYHUWXUQ LWV PRUH ³FRQWURYHUVLDO GHFLVLRQV DIWHU D FKDQJH LQ D
SUHVLGHQWLDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQ´ 
78. See id. at 1118, 1120 (observing that both employers and unions are sometimes
reluctant to comply with Board decisions if the decision is controversial and may be
overturn by a later Board).
79. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
80. See id. at 842± RXWOLQLQJ WKDW WKH ³TXHVWLRQ >LV@ ZKHWKHU &RQJUHVV KDV
direFWO\VSRNHQWRWKHSUHFLVHLVVXH´ 
81. See id. at 843 (holding that a reviewing court must not supplant its own
statutory construction, but²DVVXPLQJ WKH VWDWXWRU\ ODQJXDJH LV HLWKHU ³VLOHQW RU
DPELJXRXV´²PXVWH[DPLQHZKHWKHUWKHDJHQF\¶VFRQVWUXFWLRQLV ³SHUPLVVLEOH´ 
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (2006).
83. See, e.g. 1/5% Y +HDUVW 3XEO¶QV ,QF  86   ±32 (1944)
XSKROGLQJ WKDW WKH %RDUG¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI ³HPSOR\HH´ WR FRYHU D ZLGH UDQJH RI
workers to help effectuate the policies of the NLRA), superseded by statute, Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), as
recognized in NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968); see also Jamison
F. Grella, Comment, From Corporate Express to FedEx Home Delivery: A New Hurdle
for Employees Seeking the Protections of the National Labor Relations Act in the D.C.
Circuit, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL¶Y & Law 877, 901±02 (2010) (arguing that
courts should give the NLRB the most deference when it is interpreting the scope of the
NLRA).
84. See  F  %  VWDWLQJ WKDW ³LI WKH %RDUG ILQGV XSRQ WKH UHFRUG >WKDW D@
question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall
FHUWLI\WKHUHVXOWVWKHUHRI´ 
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Lumber, the Supreme Court did not determine that the Gissel Packing
approach²requiring an election in the absence of voluntary recognition or
substantial unfair labor practices²was the only acceptable approach.85
Rather, Justice Douglas explained,
In light of the statutory scheme [of the NLRA] and the practical
administrative procedural questions involved, we cannot say that
WKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQWKDWWKHXQLRQVKRXOGJRIRUZDUGDQGDVNIRU
DQ HOHFWLRQ RQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V UHfusal to recognize the
authorization cards was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion.86
This decision occurred before Chevron, but the Court understood its role
was not to mandate an interpretation, but to oversee the process used to
reach that interpretation.87
Having satisfied the first step, the next question is whether a narrower
interpretation would be reasonable under Chevron step two.88 A narrow
construction of what constitutes a question of representation neither need
be confined within the statutory language, nor would it be arbitrary and
capricious.89 The current policy is very broad, and allows an employer to
question representation without cause.90 It need not be so extreme²indeed,
a policy limiting the reach of this provision to situations in which there is a
legitimate question of representation may be more reasonable than its
predecessor. By limiting the application of Section 9(c), Section 8(a)(5)
would apply only when QR ³TXHVWLRQ RIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ H[LVWV7KH VFRSH
of Section 8(a  LVQRWOLPLWHGWRD³FHUWLILHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYH´²unions can
obtain the status as the representative independent of their certification
through secret ballot election.91 Congress easily could have changed the
ODQJXDJHIURP³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´WR³FHUWLILHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYH´KDGLWGHVLUHGD

85. See Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309±10
  H[SODLQLQJWKHVWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZIRUWKH1/5%¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH$FWLV
ZKHWKHU WKH %RDUG¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ ZDV HLWKHU DUELWUDU\ DQG FDSULFLRXV RU DQ DEXVHRI
discretion²not a search for the best policy).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 310.
88. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
89. See, e.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144±46 (1981) (holding that the
&RXUW RI $SSHDOV KDG ³LPSURYLGHQWly encroached on the authority which the
[Immigration and Nationality] Act confers on the Attorney General . . . [to determine]
ZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVµH[WUHPHKDUGVKLS¶´XQGHU86&§ 1254(a)(1)).
90. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 310.
91. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575, 599±600 (1969) (declaring that
Section 9(c)(1)(B) does nothing to relieve the bargaining obligation on employers
XQGHU 6HFWLRQ  D   RI WKH $FW ZKHQ WKH HPSOR\HU KDV ³HQJDJHG LQ XQIDLU ODERU
practices disruptive of the Board¶VHOHFWLRQPDFKLQHU\´ 
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contrary result. Section 8(a)(5) stands on its own as an unfair labor
practice, and nothing in the statutory context implies that it must be
accompanied by another unfair labor practice for an uncertified, but
majority-supported, union to invoke it.92 Thus, it is permissible to define
these labels²³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ DQG ³FHUWLILHG UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´²differently,
enabling unions to establish representative status through card-check rather
than secret ballot elections. Card-check is already a legitimate means to
establish majority support where the employer consents, and if the NLRA
extended that to situations where the employer does not raise a legitimate
³TXHVWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´LWLVOLNHO\WKDWFRXUWVZRXOGILQGWKDWUXOHWo
be a reasonable interpretation of the NLRA.
B. Argument to Reverse Card-Check Unilaterally Imposed by the NLRB
Proponents of reversal could first argue that the statute is not ambiguous
under step one of Chevron.93 If a statute is not ambiguous, and the Supreme
&RXUW KDV DIILUPHG DQ DJHQF\¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKHQ WKHUH LV QR URRP IRU
agency discretion in changing the rule.94 Since the Supreme Court has
already ruled on Section 8(a)(5)¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ²specifically where
unions, supported by authorization cards where no other unfair labor
practices occurred that prevent a fair election, cannot claim there is a
Section 8(a)(5) bargaining obligation²the Board¶VDELOLW\WRFKDQJHFRXUVH
is curtailed.95
If the Court, however, finds that the statute is ambiguous, then it will
proceed to step two of Chevron.96 Here, opponents can argue that the
proposed new interpretation is unreasonable in light of congressional
intent. For instance, they could argue that the Taft-Hartley amendments to
the NLRA intentionally excluded the card-check as a means to become a
³FHUWLILHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYH´7KHWH[WRIWKHVWDWXWHSULRUWRLWVDPHQGPHQWE\
the Taft-+DUWOH\ $FW DOORZHG ³WKH 1/5% WR UHVROYH TXHVWLRQV RI
representation either WKURXJKDµVHFUHWEDOORWRIWKHHPSOR\HHV¶or through
µDQ\ RWKHUVXLWDEOH PHWKRG WR DVFHUWDLQ>VLF@ VXFK UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶´97 The
92. See id. at 597±98 (stating that unions may establish their majority status, for
SXUSRVHV RI 6HFWLRQ  D   WKURXJK HLWKHU ³XQLRQ-called strike or a strike vote[,]´ in
addition to possession of authorization cards).
93. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842±43.
94. See id. at 843 Q ³7KH MXGLFLDU\ LV WKH ILQDO DXWKRULW\ RQ LVVXHV RI VWDWXWRU\
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
FRQJUHVVLRQDOLQWHQW´ 
95. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309±10.
96. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842±43.
97. See Becker, supra note 24, at 505±06 & n.39 (alteration in original) (quoting
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 9(c), Pub. L. No. 198, 29 Stat. 449, 453
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 9(c) (2006))).
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Taft-Hartley Act amended this language and omitted the language
permitting other suitable methods in favor of secret ballot elections.98 In
light of the statutory revisions, no permissible interpretation of the statute
allows using authorization cards to determine a question of representation.
The fact that a representative is not certified or voluntarily recognized is
sufficient to raise a question of representation, and it would be counter to
congressional intent if the Board promulgated such a rule through a back
channel²such as adjudication.
&RQJUHVV¶ GHFLVLRQ WR QRW FKDQJH WKH ODQJXDJH LQ Section 8(a)(5) from
³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´WRDUHSUHVHQWDWLYH³FXUUHQWO\UHFRJQL]HGE\WKHHPployer
or certified as such [(through an election)] under [Section 9(a)]´99 was
intended to extend protection to representatives whose majority support
could not be determined in a fair election as a result of unfair labor
practices.100 It was not meant to provide to unions²where the only proof
of their majority support is authorization cards signed by employees²the
statutory right to bargain with employers mandated by Section 8(a)(5).
VI. CONCLUSION
Both sides have strong legal arguments in their favor. As a legal matter,
if the NLRB maneuvered the card-check method into the regulatory
scheme regulating labor relations, that decision would likely survive
judicial review. Congress intended that the NLRB determine what raises a
question of representation, who is WKH HPSOR\HHV¶ FKRVHQ representative,
and how majority support can be demonstrated where no question of
representation exists.101 The NLRB is supposed to interpret the Act,
including Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(c), even if the issue has previously been
decided.102 Allowing the card-check method to suffice as evidence that an
employer has an obligation to enter into collective bargaining is a
reasonable reading of Section 8(a)(5), and limiting the scope of questions
of representation that have legitimate bases in fact is a reasonable reading
of Section 9(c).
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006).
See H.R. 3020, at 21 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 31, 51 (1959, 1985 prtg.)
(emphasis added). But cf. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(5),
Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) (2006)) (stating, for purposes of Section 8(a)(5), that employers must bargain
ZLWKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV³VXEMHFWWRWKHSURYLVLRQVRIVHFWLRQ D RIWKLVWLWOH´ 
100. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575, 599±600 (1969).
101. § 159(c)(1)(B).
102. See § 156 (giving the Board the power to engage in any rule or decisionmaking activities permitted by the Administrative Procedures Act in order to effectuate
the NLRA).
98.
99.
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While legally sound, such a policy shift may have too many political
costs and long-run negative implications for the Board and the labor
movement. These implications may be far-reaching. For one, the debate
over the EFCA has been abandoned, thus preventing card-check from
EHFRPLQJ SDUW RI WKH %RDUG¶V VWDWXWRU\ IUDPHZRUN DQG VXEMHFW WR WKH
whims of subsequent Boards. Additionally, if commentators who opposed
%HFNHU¶VQRPLQDWLRQRXWRIIHDUWKDWFDUG-check would be approved by the
%RDUGDUHDEOHWRVD\³,WROG\RXVR´WKHQIXWXUHDSSRLQWHHVWRWKH%RDUG
may have an even more difficult and prolonged confirmation process than
Becker, who was ultimately given a recess appointment. Memories of a
short-lived card-check measure may compel a future more-conservative
&RQJUHVVWRSDVVOHJLVODWLRQIXUWKHUUHVWULFWLQJWKH%RDUG¶VGLVFUHWLRQ7KH
Board should not pursue this measure through the administrative process
despite their legal ability to do so, because the long-term outcome may be
less desirable than the status quo.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict resolution is a crucial part of any country¶s sustainable
industrial relations system.1 It is essential to find a balance between core
labor rights and employment market flexibility, because both are necessary
ingredients for healthy economic and social development.2 One important
tool in promoting the amicable development of these interests is effective
dispute resolution. It is necessary to settle labor disputes through
framework procedures designed to bring about effective, efficient, and
equitable resolutions for the benefit of involved parties and the greater
economy.3 Without the use of effective dispute resolution methodologies,
disputes will increase and ultimately undermine national workplace
productivity.4 This possibility is especially troubling, because a changing
economy threatens to make relied upon and originally effective
methodologies obsolete.5
The world is becoming increasingly intercontinental. Companies are
transforming into multinational operations, which execute work in different
cities, countries, and continents. There is now a global economy that
functions to internationalize many aspects of the traditional employment
relationship.6
1. See Paul Teague, Path Dependency and Comparative Industrial Relations: The
Case of Conflict Resolution Systems in Ireland and Sweden, 47 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL.
   GHILQLQJFRQIOLFWUHVROXWLRQDVDV\VWHP³PDGHXSRI the institutions
and practices used to help solve workplace and other industrial relations problems and
GLVSXWHV´ 
2. See, e.g., Mark Anner & Teri Caraway, International Labor Standards and
:RUNHUV¶ 5LJKWV %HWZHHQ /DERU 6WDQGDUGV DQG 0DUNHW )OH[LELOLW\, 45 STUD. COMP.
INT¶L DEV. 151, 152 (2010) (juxtaposing how the IMF and World Bank favor labor
market flexibility with how labor rights advocates instead favor greater protection for
worker benefits and union rights).
3. See, e.g., John Budd & Alexander Colvin, Improved Metrics for Workplace
Dispute Resolution Procedures: Efficiency, Equity, and Voice, 47 INDUS. REL. 460,
461-63 (2008) (arguing that instead of measuring the success of dispute resolution
techniques through the traditional criteria of speed and subjective party satisfaction,
evaluations should focus on efficiency, equity, and party participation).
4. Cf. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (acknowledging
WKH QHHG IRU GLVSXWH UHVROXWLRQ V\VWHPV LQ RUGHU WR ³HOLPLQDWH WKH FDXVHV    >RI@
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
REVWUXFWLRQV´ 
5.
See generally Matthew Bartmes, Interest Arbitration in the New Economy
(2009)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/plel/Interest-Arbitration-in-the-New%20EconomyMatthew-Bartmes.pdf) (discussing how the shock of the 2008 U.S. economic collapse
has affected arbitration awards).
6. See James B. Boskey, The Resolution of Disputes in Transnational
Employment: Arbitration and its Discontents, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 189,
192 (1999) (explaining that transnational employment agreements often limit the role
of national courts); Eric D. Green, International Commercial Dispute Resolution:
Courts, Arbitration and Mediation - Introduction, 15 B.U. INT¶L L.J. 175, 178 (1997)
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Employees, many represented by unions that continue to act as their
exclusive representatives for collective bargaining purposes, are
increasingly entering into agreements with employers located in different
legal jurisdictions.7 Collective bargaining is the process by which unions
meet, discuss, and negotiate work conditions with employers.8 Such
bargaining normally results in a written contract called a collective
bargaining agreement, which sets wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment for a stipulated period.9 While such contracts usually include a
dispute resolution provision that describes which kind of dispute resolution
method the parties will use in case of conflict, the expansion of global
economic borders sometimes challenges the efficiency and effectiveness of
relying on these provisions.10
This Article first defines labor disputes in the context of a global realm.11
It considers the history of labor arbitration and mediation methodologies in
the United States and compares them to those utilized by countries
affiliated with the European Union.12 Next, this Article seeks to evaluate
QRWLQJ WKDW ³PHGLDWLRQ     KDV \HW WR PDNH     DQ LPSDFW RQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO >DQG
transnational] disputes´).
7. See Reynald Bourque, International Framework Agreements and the Future of
Collective Bargaining in Multinational Companies, 12 JUST LABOUR 30 (2008)
(studying the emergence of negotiated International Framework Agreements between
international labor and multinational companies).
8. See, e.g., BLACK¶S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (9th ed. 2009) (defining collective
bargaining DV³>Q@HJRWLDWLRQVEHWZHHQDQHPSOR\HUDQGWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIRUJDQL]HG
employees to determine the conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline
and fringe benefits.´ 
9. See e.g., id. (noting that collective bargaining agreements are ³>D@ FRQWUDFW
between an employer and a labor union regulating employment conditions, wages,
benefits, and grievances.´ 
10. See Rosetta Ellis, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Collective
Bargaining Agreements: The Case Against Barring Statutory Discrimination Claims
from Federal Court Jurisdiction, 86 VA. L. REV. 307, 308 (2000) (observing that it is
estimated that over ninety-five percent of private-sector collective bargain agreements
negotiated in the United States in 1990 contained mandatory arbitration provisions);
Jeff Faux, Founding President & Distinguished Fellow, Econ. Policy Institute,
Rethinking the Global Political Economy, Address at the Asia-Europe-U.S. Progressive
6FKRODU¶V)RUXP*OREDOL]DWLRQDQG,QQRYDWLRQRI3ROLWLFV $SU, 2002), available at
http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/webfeatures_viewpoints_global_polit_econ/
DUJXLQJWKDW³WKHQHWLPSDFWRIQHR-OLEHUDOLVPKDVEHHQQHJDWLYH´EHFDXVHWKHJRDOVRI
WKH³ILQDQFLDOOLEHUDOL]DWLRQRIWKHV´VXFKDVDQ³LQFUHDVH LQHFRQRPLFJURZWK´
remain unachieved).
11. See infra 3DUW ,, IDVKLRQLQJ D GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH WHUP ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODERU
GLVSXWH´ )RUDFRQWUDVWLQJJHQHULFGHILQLWLRQRIODERUGLVSXWHVLQWKH86GRPHVWLF
realm, see, for example, 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2006), defining D³ODERUGLVSXWH´DV³DQ\
controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
GLVSXWDQWVVWDQGLQWKHSUR[LPDWHUHODWLRQRIHPSOR\HUDQGHPSOR\HH´
12. See infra Part IV±V (studying alternative dispute resolution forms in the United
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the use of these methodologies in resolving labor disputes.13 Finally, this
Article concludes with a description of potential ways to make these
methodologies more effective and efficient at addressing international labor
disputes.14
It is certain that national legal regimes must provide for the effective
resolution of transnational labor disputes, in order to promote global
economic stability.15 Otherwise, an ineffective legal regime risks
undermining the ability of companies to remain competitive and viable in
an increasingly cutthroat, international marketplace, and any nation
fostering such an ineffective legal regime risks a downward economic
spiral.16
II. DEFINING INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTES
$7KH'HILQLWLRQRI³,QWHUQDWLRQDO´
The first step toward defining international labor relations is to define the
VFRSHRI³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´ODERUGLVSXWHV Practitioners and scholars currently
lack a common definition.17 Bob Hepple, a prominent professor in the
realm of law, politics, and sociology, states that the definition of the word
³international´ varies from state to state and even among different
international institutions.18
Professor William W. Park provides more clarity. He asserts that there
States and the European Union).
13. See infra Part VI (arguing for negotiated international legal uniformity).
14. See infra Part VII (concluding that flexibility remains an important supplement
to uniformity).
15. See, e.g., Kerry Rittich, %HWZHHQ:RUNHUV¶Rights and Flexibility: Labor Law in
an Uncertain World, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 565, 567 (2010) (asserting that, to be
successful, any revised understanding of the social contract must preserve certain basic
values such as collective action, shared workplace governance, and a guarantee of some
basic economic security and prosperity for workers).
16. See id. (warning that a failure to incorporate certain essential social contract
values would consign any new or transitional legal regime to short-lived instability).
17. Cf. BUREAU FOR WORKERS¶ ACTIVITIES, INT¶L LABOUR ORG., Definition of
International
Law,
http://actrav.itcilo.org/actravenglish/telearn/global/ilo/law/lablaw.htm#Definition_of_international_law (last visited
Oct. 17, 2010) (explaining international labor law in terms of its history and general
international law concepts, instead of directly defining it).
18. See Bob Hepple, Mapping International Labor Disputes: An Overview, in
LABOR LAW BEYOND BORDERS: ADR AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LABOR
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 35, 45± ,QW¶O %XUHDX RI Whe Permanent Court of Arbitration
HG   DGPLWWLQJ WKDW WKH ZRUG ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´ PD\ GLVWLQJXLVK GLVSXWHV WKDW DUH
³WUXO\ QDWLRQDO DQG WKRVH ZKLFK LQ VRPH ZD\ FURVV QDWLRQDO ERXQGDULHV´ EXW DOVR
DUJXLQJ WKDW ³WKH VSHFLDO IHDWXUH RI SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDl labor law is that it applies
international labor standards and dispute mechanisms not only to transnational
HPSOR\PHQWEXWDOVRWRSXUHO\GRPHVWLFHPSOR\PHQWDQGODERUUHODWLRQV´ 
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are two possible principal factors to take into account: the residence of the
parties to a transaction and the nature of the transaction.19 Generally, when
parties are citizens of two different nations and their transaction relates
either to the sale of goods and services across national borders, or to some
contractual agreement concerning the rights of those providing such
transnational goods or services, the dispute is international in scope.20
%7KH'HILQLWLRQRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO³/DERU'LVSXWHV´
The definition of ³labor disputes´ is far less varied. According to %ODFN¶V
Law Dictionary, labor disputes are ³controvers[ies] between an employer
and its employees concerning the terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of those who negotiate or seek
to negotiate the terms or conditions of employment.´21 A collective
bargaining agreement often dictates the terms of employment. These
disputes often center on the conditions of employment and whether
discipline was progressive and imposed for just cause.22 In Comparative
Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies,
Roger Blanplain defines international labor relations as those relations that
exist ³between [employers with] headquarters in one country and
employees in one or more other countries.´23
Thus, international labor disputes arise in an internationalizing
marketplace when an employer has its headquarters in one country and
oversees employees residing in another country. These disputes, much like
domestic labor disputes, also focus on the terms and conditions of
employment.24

19. See William W. Park, Why Courts Review Arbitral Awards, 16 MEALEY¶S
INT'L. ARB. REP. 5 (2001).
20. But see id. IDYRULQJXVLQJRQO\D³UHVLGHQFH-EDVHG´DSSURDFKLQVWHDGRIXVLQJ
D³QDWXUHRIWKHWUDQVDFWLRQ´DSSURDFK 
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (9th ed. 2009).
22. Cf. Roger Blanpain, Comparativism in Labour Law and Industrial Relations, in
COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET
ECONOMIES 3, 5 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 8th rev. ed. 2004) [hereinafter Blanpain]
H[SODLQLQJ WKDW ³WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI HPSOR\HHV LQYROYLQJ GLIIHrent national
jurisdictions has become a normal fact of life.´ 
23. Id.
24. See INT¶L LABOUR ORG., HIGH-LEVEL TRIPARTITE SEMINAR ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF LABOUR DISPUTES THROUGH MEDIATION, CONCILIATION,
ARBITRATION AND LABOUR COURT 2 (2007) [hereinafter ILO SEMINAR ON
SETTLEMENT],
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/geneva/download/events/cyprus2007/c
\SUXVBGLDORJXHSGI GLVFXVVLQJ WKH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ ³ULJKWV´ DQG ³LQWHUHVW´
disputes).
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III. THE CONTEXTS IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTES OCCUR
Global markets permit greater access to economic opportunity for both
multinational employers and international workers to take advantage of
more and larger markets around the world. Because they exercise greater
geographic flexibility in hiring their workforce, employers may now face
labor disputes that are both domestic and international, even if both
ultimately involve the same issues found in domestic labor disputes
including²wages; benefits; leave; and other terms, conditions, and/or
benefits of employment.25
To address the growing global economy, unions are transforming into
international forces with a presence on multiple continents.26 As a
condition of obtaining employees, an employer may have entered into a
labor contract with a group of unionized workers and may have vowed that
they will provide an agreed amount of wages and healthcare and that she
will discipline only for just cause. Thus, disputes may mirror traditional
domestic labor disputes and relate to disciplinary issues or conditions of
employment like wages, hours, and health and pension benefits.27 Such
agreements deal with ³individual rights´28
For instance, the United Steelworkers of America (USW), an American
union headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, affiliates with the
International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers¶
Unions (ICEM), which represents twenty million workers on a wide variety
of continents.29 Both of the unions represent Goodyear workers. This
structure is premised on the understanding that deteriorating labor relations
in one locale could affect Goodyear¶s negotiations with unions representing
workers in all corners of the globe.30
25. Cf. id. at 4±5 (providing a case study example in which conflict concerned
HPSOR\HHV¶EXOO\LQJGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGRWKHUKDUDVVPHQWFRQFHUQV 
26. See The ICEM ± Who We Are, What We Do, INT¶L FEDERATION OF CHEM.,
ENERGY,
MINE
&
GEN.
WORKERS¶
UNIONS
(Sept.
22,
2010),
http://www.icem.org/?id=12&doc=1225 [hereinafter ICEM ± Who We Are] (revealing
WKDW ³PRUH WKDQ  PLOOLRQ ZRUNHUV ZRUOGZLGH DUH DOUHDG\ PHPEHUV´ RI WKH
,QWHUQDWLRQDO)HGHUDWLRQRI&KHPLFDO(QHUJ\0LQHDQG*HQHUDO:RUNHUV¶8QLRQV 
27. Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/810 Art. 23 (Dec. 10, 1948) (promulgating aspirations for universal working
rights).
28. Cf. id. XVLQJWKHZRUG³HYHU\RQH´ 
29. ICEM ± Who We Are, supra note 26; see ICEM Calls for Support of Striking
PLANT
MAG.,
USW
Goodyear
Workers,
RELIABLE
http://www.reliableplant.com/Read/2926/icem-calls-for-support-of-striking-uswgoodyear-workers (last visited Dec. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Goodyear Workers]; Who
We Are, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AM., http://www.usw.org/our_union/who_we_are
(last visited Nov 16, 2010).
30. See Goodyear Workers, supra note 29; see also Global Agreements, INT¶L
FEDERATION OF CHEM., ENERGY, MINE & GEN. WORKERS' UNIONS,
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Unions, like the ICEM, focus on negotiating and monitoring
multinational compliance with global agreements on workers¶ rights;
equality at work; and the promotion of high standards of health, safety, and
environmental protection worldwide.31 They also network with trade union
representatives within global corporations and coordinate solidarity and
support for members during labor disputes.32 They seek to actively
organize strong unions in countries where unions are weak or non-existent
in order to provide strength to all international workers employed by a
particular employer.33 In 1999, at the ICEM¶s Durban Congress in South
Africa, the ICEM made it ³a priority to achieve negotiated Global
Framework Agreements with multinational companies.´34
Similar to the ICEM, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
has adopted a global approach. SEIU is in the process of constructing a
³21st-century global union to help ensure that workers, not just
corporations and CEOs, benefit from today¶s global economy.´35 Like the
ICEM, ³SEIU is working with unions in similar industries across the globe
to challenge multinational employers to provide comparable wages and
benefits and to allow workers in every country the freedom to form
unions.´36 School bus drivers in the United States, with the help of SEIU,
have formed a transatlantic partnership with the Transport and General
Workers Union in the United Kingdom in order to hold accountable their
common employer²FirstGroup and its U.S. subsidiary, First Student²on
both sides of the Atlantic.37
Global unions also act to provide information and expertise on topics
ranging from collective bargaining to health and safety standards. They
function to represent workers¶ interests within similar sectors of the global

http://www.icem.org/en/69-Global-Framework-Agreements (last visited Oct. 5, 2010)
[hereinafter ICEM ± Global Agreements] (discussing how ICEM creates global
agreements with local affiliates in order to supplement local collective bargaining by
HVWDEOLVKLQJ ³D VHW RI SULQFLSOHV LQ DOO RSHUDWLRQV RI D PXOWLQDWLRQDO UHJDUGOHVV RI
whether or not those stDQGDUGVH[LVWLQDQLQGLYLGXDOFRXQWU\¶VOHJDOVWDWXWHV´ 
31. See, e.g., ICEM ± Who We Are, supra note 26.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. ICEM ± Global Agreements, supra note 30.
35. $ &ORVHU /RRN ,QVLGH /DERU¶V )DVWHVW-Growing Union, SERV. EMPS. INT¶L
UNION,
http://www.seiu.org/a/ourunion/a-closer-look-inside-labors-fastest-growingunion.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
36. Id.
37. See Mike Link, SERV. EMPS. INT¶L UNION, Skilled Bus Drivers Keep Kids Safe,
http://www.seiu.org/2008/09/skilled-bus-drivers-keep-kids-safe.php (last visited
Nov.
5,
2010);
see
also
Our
Company,
FIRSTAMERICA,
http://www.firstgroup.com/north_america/our_company/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2010)
OLVWLQJ)LUVW*URXS¶V86EXVLQHVVHVZKLFKLQFOXGH)LUVW6WXGHQWDQG*Ueyhound).
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economy and to promote a global economy that is sustainable in its focus
and works for all international laborers.
As a result of the growing international presence of labor unions, it is
increasingly common to have employers in one country and unionrepresented employees in another country. Disputes over the terms codified
in collective bargaining agreements, therefore, lead to strikes with greater
frequency than they have ever before.38
Still, methods for resolving labor disputes vary greatly across the United
States and the countries belonging to the European Union; these methods,
however, may fail to sufficiently address the changing times.39
IV. RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTES IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, there are two primary methods of resolving labor
disputes: labor arbitration and labor mediation.40 Use of these methods
applies for disputes with ties to the United States, regardless of whether the
dispute is international in scope.41 In practice, parties often use labor
arbitration to resolve labor disputes.42 The American court system favors
38. See generally Economic News Release, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.t01.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2010) (accounting
for all work stoppages, also called strikes, involving more than 1,000 workers from
1947-2009); Strike and Lockout Statistics, FED¶N OF EUROPEAN EMP¶RS,
http://www.fedee.com/strikes.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2010) (detailing strikes and
lockouts among major European Union countries, on average, for the past three years).
39. See generally Richard Block et al., Comparing and Quantifying Labor
Standards in the United States and the European Union, 19 INT¶L J. COMP. LAB. L. &
INDUS. RELATIONS 441 (2003) (quantifying labor standards in both the United States
and the European Union and concluding that the European Union has much higher
labor standards).
40. Cf. Julius Getman, Was Harry Shulman Right?: The Development of
Arbitration in Labor Disputes, 81 ST. JOHN¶S L. REV. 15, 16 (2007) (restating Dean
6FKXOPDQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDWDUELWUDWLRQLs preferable to litigation, because an arbitrator
is more familiar with the disputing parties and can therefore more easily foresee the
consequences of their decision); Arbitration and Mediation, REFERENCE BUS.,
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/A-Ar/Arbitration-andMediation.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2010) (differentiating between labor mediation and
DUELWUDWLRQ E\ H[SODLQLQJ WKDW ³DUELWUDWLRQ LV WKH SURFHGXUH E\ ZKLFK SDUWLHV DJUHH WR
submit their disputes to an independent neutral third party, known as an aUELWUDWRU´DQG
WKDW³PHGLDWLRQ involves the active participation of a neutral third party whose role
is to facilitate the dispute resolution process and to suggest solutions to resolve
GLVSXWHV´DQGWKDW³LQFRQWUDVWWRDUbitration, mediation is a process whereby the parties
involved have to solve the dispute, although the mediator does suggest various
proposals to help the parties find solutions).
41. See generally Getman, supra note 40, at 16 (proffering that labor arbitration has
increased due to the fact that arbitrators are able to understand the common goal of
uninterrupted production and understand the particular needs of an organization or
challenges in a dispute).
42. Cf. Ann Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American Labor
Unions, 69 MO. L. REV.    ³$OPRVWDOOFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQWV
contain grievance and arbitration procedures designed to resolve disputes about the
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labor arbitration.43 On the other hand, parties also use labor mediation, and
in some employment industries, mediation is a becoming more common. 44
Still, the overall objective of national labor law alike is to promote
industrial peace among employers and unions and to punish party actions
that jeopardize and work to thwart collective bargaining.45 The settlement
of industrial disputes through peaceful means is both an end in itself and a
basic means for achieving industrial peace.46
A. Arbitration
LDERUDUELWUDWLRQLV³DFRQWUDFWXDOSURFHHGLQJZKHUHE\WKHSDUWLHVWRDny
controversy or dispute . . . select [a third party decision maker] of their own
FKRLFH DQG E\ FRQVHQW VXEPLW WKHLU FRQWURYHUV\ WR >KLP RU KHU@´ IRU D
ELQGLQJ ³VSHHG\´ DQG ³LQH[SHQVLYH´ GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI WKH PDWWHU
involved.47 Labor arbitration usually involves a sole arbitrator instead of a
panel.48 If the parties decide that the arbitrator should follow precedent, the
arbitrator may apply the law of the jurisdiction in which they sit or
whatever law the parties agree is applicable.49 But the arbitrator does not
have to follow established law, and rules of evidence typically do not apply

LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHDJUHHPHQW´ 
43. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 09-497, slip op. at 2 (U.S.
June 21, 2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissent separately paginated),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/09-497.pdf (explaining, under the
Federal Arbitration Act, arbiWUDWLRQ LV D FRQWUDFWXDO PDWWHU DQG WKH $FW ³HQYLVLRQV D
limited role for courts asked to stay litigation DQGUHIHUGLVSXWHVWRDUELWUDWLRQ´ 
44. See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 42, at 384 (observing that, in the past twenty
years, there has been a resurgence in mediation because it resolved disputes with far
less cost and resources and has seemed to increase party satisfaction).
45. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (stating that
friendly methods of organization and collective bargaining promote and encourage the
flow of commerce).
46. See id. HQFRXUDJLQJ ³SUDFWLFHV IXQGDPHQWDO WR WKH IULHQGO\ DGMXVWPHQW RI
industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
HPSOR\HHV´ 
47. Gates v. Ariz. Brewing Co., 95 P.2d 49, 50 (Ariz. 1939).
48. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Internationalization of Labor Disputes: Can ADR
Mechanisms Help?, in LABOR LAW BEYOND BORDERS: ADR AND THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LABOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT   ,QW¶O %XUHDX RI WKH
Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003) (³,QWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKHVLQJOHDUELWUDWRU
KDVEHFRPHWKHQRUPLQODERUGLVSXWHV´ see also FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI,
HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 3±5 (Alan M. Rubin et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003) (providing
some historical examples of famous arbitrators).
49. See generally Jessica Thorpe, A Question of Intent: Choice of Law and the
International Arbitration Agreement, 54 DISPUTE RESOLUTION J. 16 (1999) (discussing
the power of parties to select their applicable choice of law for purposes of arbitration
and studying how far such a power can extend to procedural issues).

110

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:1

in full.50
Arguably the biggest stimulus toward using arbitration to resolve labor
disputes and industrial grievances occurred during World War II, and was
instigated by the National War Labor Board.51 This entity had the power to
resolve labor disputes and regularly ordered that arbitration clauses be
included in new collective bargaining agreements when the parties were
not able to agree upon their own grievance procedures.52 While fewer than
ten percent of collective bargaining agreements in the 1930s provided for
arbitration, seventy-seven percent of labor contracts included arbitration
provisions by 1944.53
In many U.S. states, either statutory or common law rules permit
voluntary arbitration.54 State arbitration statutes fit into three categories: (1)
general statutes used in commercial disputes but often adaptable to labor
disputes; (2) statutes designed specifically for labor disputes; and (3)
statutes that promote arbitration by directing state officials to encourage its
use.55
In 1955 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated a proposed Uniform Arbitration Act, based on the New
York Act, which itself applied contractual arbitration provisions to labormanagement agreements.56 By 2003, thirty-five jurisdictions adopted the
Uniform Arbitration Act.57
50. See id.; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 48, at 2±3 (distinguishing between
arbitration and judicial proceedings).
51. See Calvin W. Sharpe, Introduction to Symposium, An Oral History of the
National War Labor Board and Critical Issues in the Development of Modern
Grievance Arbitration, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 505, 508±09 (1989) (pointing out that
although some believe the National War Labor Board instigated modern grievance
arbitration, modern grievance arbitration actually began as early as 1871).
52. See generally id. (discussing the evolution of arbitration brought about by the
National War Labor Board).
53. See SUMNER S. SLICHTER ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 739 (1960); see also Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American
Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557, 576 (1983) (noting
that because of the lack of recordkeeping prior to World War II, it is unclear as to how
many contracts contained arbitration clauses, but it is estimated that between sixty-two
percent to seventy-six percent of agreements before World War II contained these
clauses).
54. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 48, at 95-101 (explaining the relationship
between statutes and common law in the arbitration process); see also CLARENCE M.
UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 23-26 (3d ed. 1972) (analyzing how
arbitration works under the common law and state statutes).
55. See OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, DEP¶T OF LABOR, LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER
STATE STATUTES 3, 6 (May 29, 1943).
56. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT., 7 U.L.A. 1A, 2 (2000) (³[T]he primary purpose of
the 1955 Act was to insure the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in the face of
RIWHQWLPHVKRVWLOHVWDWHODZ´ .
57. See id. (stating that as of 2000 forty-nine of the states have arbitration statutes,
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Since state arbitration statutes tend to be general, common law rules fill
in the gaps.58 The United States Department of Labor summarized these
principles:
Common law arbitration rests upon the voluntary agreement of the
parties to submit their dispute to an outsider. The submission
agreement may be oral and may be revoked at any time before the
rendering of the award. The tribunal, permanent or temporary . . .
must be free from bias and interest in the subject matter, and may
not be related by affinity or consanguinity to either party.59
Further, ³[t]he parties must be given notice of hearings and are entitled
to be present when all evidence is received´ but the ³arbitrators have no
power to subpoena witnesses or records.´60 An award can either be oral or
written; but if it is written, all of the arbitrators must sign it and such an
award must dispose of all relevant issues.61
Even the United States Supreme Court has recommended the use of
labor arbitration to resolve labor disputes and has stated that while
FRPPHUFLDODUELWUDWLRQLVD³VXEVWLWXWHIRUOLWLJDWLRQ . . . [labor] arbitration is
the substitute for industrial strife.´62 Despite judicial recognition of the
rights of employers and unions under collective bargaining agreements,
court procedures are often prolonged, technical, and costly, and are not
necessarily the best vehicle to rectify labor disputes.63 Arbitration saves
time and expense.
Unsurprisingly, parties rely on arbitration more often than upon court
proceedings to resolve labor disputes. Arbitration clauses dominate
American collective bargaining agreements. In fact, one study led by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revealed that within over 1,500 collective
bargaining agreements, ninety-seven percent provided for arbitration of
disputes, particularly for grievances occurring during the duration of the

and of these forty-nine states, thirty-five have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act and
the other fourteen have adopted similar legislation).
58. See OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, supra note 55, at 3 (articulating that the common
law rests on a principle that the parties submit voluntarily to resolution of their dispute
by an arbitrator, who must be neutral and free from bias).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960).
63. See generally Charles B. Craver, Symposium on Labor Arbitration Thirty Years
After the Steelworkers Trilogy: Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective
Bargaining Process, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (1990) (arguing that the grievance
arbitration process is a superior dispute resolution strategy compared to judicial
proceedings or strikes).
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union contract.64 Today, thousands of labor disputes settle in binding,
voluntary arbitration without either party resorting to the use of economic
pressure or appeals to the public.65 Arbitration allows employers and
unions to have greater self-regulation because it is a private rather than a
governmental proceeding.66
There are two basic categories of labor arbitration. First, arbitration can
settle labor disputes over the substantive terms and language used in a
collective bargaining agreement.67 This type of arbitration is an arbitration
of interests and is primarily a public sector tool to help parties resolve
questions over collective bargaining agreements.68
The other main category of labor arbitration, ³grievance´ arbitration, is
an arbitration of rights that deals with labor disputes arising over the
duration of a contract.69 The arbitrator acts in such proceedings as a quasiMXGJH DQG LQWHUSUHWV DQG DSSOLHV WKH SURYLVLRQV RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ FRQWDFW
without adding to or deleting from its terms.70 The decision of an arbitrator
is binding unless it does not derive its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement; the arbitrator acts outside of the scope of her
contractual authority, or the award runs contrary to public policy.71
64. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 1957,
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 94 (1981)
(demonstrating that of the 1,514 agreements of 1,000 workers or more as of July 1,
1975, 1,496 of them provided grievance and arbitration provisions, equaling
approximately ninety-seven percent).
65. See CLARENCE M. UPDEGRAFF & WHITLEY P. MCCOY, ARBITRATION OF LABOR
DISPUTES 149±150 (2d ed. 1961) (explaining how union and employer arbitration
interactions avoid strikes and economic pressures in the public utility sector).
66. See Craver, supra note 63, at 573 (positing that both unions and management
can avoid costly and time-consuming procedures by participating in arbitration).
67. Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119±20 (9th ed. 2009) (classifying labor
arbitration as including ³DUELWUDWLRQRIDQHPSOR\HH¶VJULHYDQFHXVX>DOO\@UHODWLQJWRDQ
DOOHJHGYLRODWLRQRIWKHHPSOR\HH¶VULJKWVXQGHUDFRllective-EDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQW´ 
68. See id. (specifying that interest arbitration is a separate entity from grievance
arbitration because it involves settling the terms of a contract while the contract itself is
being negotiated).
69. See Charles C. Killingsworth, Standards of Arbitral Decision, in THE LAW AND
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 228, 230-31 (Univ. of Mich. ed., 1951) (providing
WKDWWKHDUELWUDWRU¶VSRZHUVDUHJURXQGHGLQWKHFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJDJUHHPHQWDQGWKH
provisions that provide her with the authority to interpret the agreement).
70. See id. DW ³>$@QDUELWUDWRUKDVRQO\WKRVHSRZHUVZKLFKWKHSDUWLHVJUDQWWR
[her]. In grievance arbitration . . . the arbitrator must turn to the agreement for
GHILQLWLRQRI>KHU@MXULVGLFWLRQ´ 
71. See 0DMRU/HDJXH%DVHEDOO3OD\HUV$VV¶QY*DUYH\86
(2001) (per curiam) (expressing doubts about the permissibility of an arbitrator to
³VWUD\>@ IURP LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG DSSOLFDWLRQ RI >DQ@ DJUHHPHQW´ WR WKH SRLQW RI
effectively ³µGLVSHQV>LQJ@ KLV RZQ EUDQG RI LQGXVWULDO MXVWLFH¶´ TXRWLQJ United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960))); see also
E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)
(observing that a collective bargaining agreement can be contrary to public policy and
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Arbitration proceedings in the United States work in this way regardless
of whether the union-represented employees and employer are both
residents of the United States.
B. Mediation
In America, labor mediation is different from labor arbitration because it
allows for more procedural control by the parties.72 Mediation creates a
larger forum that allows the parties to discuss everything affecting their
relationship, instead of resolving a particular dispute.73
Thus, mediation focuses on evaluating all of the wants of the parties²
including what is important to them in their lives and business operations.
Mediation encourages the parties engaging in a labor dispute to reach an
agreement through their own initiative with the facilitation of a neutral
third party.74
Mediators function as intermediaries between the parties.75 They lead the
parties through an exploration of the issues.76 The process opens with both
parties first seeking to understand the issue or problem.77 Next, they
identify their underlying interests and positions.78 Then, they can generate
options to determine solutions together; they become, in essence, joint
problem solvers.79 Mediators probe and challenge the parties to assess the
durability of their agreement, with the underlying assumption that the
partnership should focus on creating a stable, viable work environment.80
therefore unenforceable RQO\ LI WKH SXEOLF SROLF\ LV ³µH[SOLFLW¶ µZHOO GHILQHG¶ DQG
µGRPLQDQW¶´ TXRWLQJ :5 *UDFH  &R Y 5XEEHU :RUNHUV  86  
(1983))).
72. See MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 25
fig.1- 1DW¶O ,QVW RI 7ULDO $GYRFDF\ HG G HG   (detailing the stages of the
mediation process to include intake; contracting; information gathering and issue
identification; agenda setting; resolving each issue; reaching and drafting the
agreement).
73. See id. at 25±27 (examining and describing the steps involved in the mediation
process).
74. See id. at 26 (providing that mediators help assist the parties in gathering
information, identifying the issues in the dispute and agenda setting for mediations).
75. See id. at 27 (³[M]ediators frame the issues in neutral terms which define the
SUREOHPVWKDWWKHSDUWLHVEULQJWRPHGLDWLRQIRUUHVROXWLRQ´ 
76. See id. (noting that mediators seek to obtain a full description of the issues,
based on statements from the parties themselves).
77. See id. (identifying the issue and framing the issue in neutral terms allows for
the mediator to present the issue to the parties in dispute).
78. See id. (describing the facts, perceptions, feelings and reactions from the parties
allows for the mediator to fully understand all aspects of the issue at hand).
79. See id. (organizing and prioritizing the issues in dispute between the parties).
80. See id. at 29 (questioning whether or not tentative agreement would be
realistic).
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Labor mediation often resolves impasses reached in the process of
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. However labor mediation
may directly resolve grievances as well.81 Most collective bargaining
agreements provide for grievance procedures, traditionally culminating in
arbitration²should more informal procedures fail.82 Grievance mediation
is a voluntary step, often taken prior to arbitration, and provides an
opportunity for a neutral third-party to assist the parties in reaching a
resolution of the dispute, before an arbitrator decides for them.83
In grievance mediation, the parties create their own solution.84 The
mediator does not make a binding decision but instead helps them to
determine a mutually acceptable solution. While grievance mediation is not
a substitute for a contractual grievance procedure in a collective bargaining
agreement, it can function to supplement such procedures, or it can act as
part of a larger program to help the parties focus on their joint interests.85
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) is an
independent agency of the United States government which was founded in
1947. FMCS helps mediate labor disputes around the country.86 FMCS
offers its services upon request or in disputes affecting interstate
commerce, and parties must notify FMCS within thirty days of the
expiration of a contract when either side proposes modification or
termination of their existing collective bargaining agreement.87
Through their direct knowledge and experience with labor disputes,
FMCS mediators supplement their skills by enhancing communication
between the parties and by building confidence that an agreement is

81. See 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 19:16 (3d ed.
2010) (suggesting that unions and employers could utilize a mediator in order to
resolve disputes and grievances), available at Westlaw ADR.
82. See What is Grievance Mediation?, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV.,
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=46&itemID=15885
(last
visited Oct. 5, 2010) (³[G]rievance mediation is a completely voluntary step, prior to
arbitration, which provides an opportunity for a third-party neutral, such as an FMCS
PHGLDWRUWRDVVLVWWKHSDUWLHVLQUHDFKLQJWKHLURZQUHVROXWLRQRIWKHGLVSXWH´ 
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. FMCS: Who We Are, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV.,
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=21&itemID=15810
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2011) .
87. See Filing a Notice to Mediation Agencies (F-7) with FMCS, FED. MEDIATION
&
CONCILIATION
SERV.,
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=127&itemID=19661
(last
visited Dec. 14, 2010) (explaining that the National Labor Relations Act also requires
written notice to the other party covered by a collective bargaining agreement within
VL[W\GD\V³SULRUWRWKe expiration date of a proposed termination or modification of a
collective bargaining agreement´ 
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SRVVLEOHWKURXJKWKHSDUWLHV¶ diligence.88 Mediators, however, usually lack
the authority to impose binding settlements in labor mediation and instead
operate to facilitate the parties to arrive at a resolution.89
The FMCS is not the only governmental branch created to help facilitate
labor disputes through mediation. The Railway Labor Act (RLA) is a U.S.
federal labor law that governs labor relations in the railway and airline
industries.90 The RLA also created the National Mediation Board (NMB),
which operates as a mediating agency dealing primarily with interestsrelated disputes.91
The NMB has three ultimate goals: ³7KHUHVROXWLRQRIGLVSXWes arising
out of the negotiation of new or revised collective bargaining agreements;
2. The effectuation of employee rights of self-organization where a
representation dispute exists; and 3. The resolution of disputes over the
interpretation or applicatioQRIH[LVWLQJDJUHHPHQWV´92
Mediation might not work in every circumstance. Typically, if informal
negotiations do not culminate in an agreement, before either party can
exercise self-help, the law requires the parties to submit their dispute to
the NMB for mediation.93
V. RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTES IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Members of the European Union frequently have their own, unique
legislative rules or policies that provide for labor dispute resolution.94 In
88. See Who We Are: What Can a Mediator Add to Collective Bargaining
MEDIATION
&
CONCILIATION
SERV.,
Negotiations,
FED.
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=22&itemID=16485
(last
visited Oct 15, 2010) (describing improvement of communication between parties as
rephrasing statements, to mediator supposals and meeting off of the record to
HQFRXUDJH³VKXWWOHGLSORPDF\´ 
89. See What is Grievance Mediation?, supra note 82 (stating that the parties are
ultimately responsible for coming to a resolution of the issue and that the mediator
merely assists in guiding them to a resolution).
90. See Frequently Asked Questions: Mediation, NAT¶L MEDIATION BD.,
http://www.nmb.gov/mediation/faq-mediation.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) (noting
that the RLA only governs collective bargaining agreements in the airline and railroad
industries).
91. See NMB and RLA Fact Sheet, NAT¶L MEDIATION BD.,
http://www.nmb.gov/mediation/factsheet_thru-fy10.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2011)
(detailing that the NMB was created in 1934 as an amendment to the 1926 RLA in
order to minimize work stoppages in the railway and airlines industries).
92. FY 06 National Mediation Board Annual Performance and Accountability
MEDIATION
BD.,
4,
available
at
Report,
NAT¶L
http://www.nmb.gov/documents/nmb_ar06_web.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
93. NMB and RLA Fact Sheet, supra note 91, at 1.
94. Cf. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 9 (detailing the differences
between individual EU countries that legislate dispute resolution methods).
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Hungary, the framework is incorporated in the FRXQWU\¶V ODERU ODZ95
Meanwhile, in Lithuania and Slovenia, the rules are ³scattered across a host
of different statutes, regulations or decrees governing labor relations.´96
Still other countries, which include Bulgaria, Latvia, and Poland, adopt a
sole piece of legislation that governs their labor dispute resolutions.97 And
while some European countries have extensive legal rules on the subject,
other countries like the Netherlands have no specific provisions pertaining
to labor dispute resolution.98
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a specialized agency of
the United Nations that deals with labor issues; its main objectives are to
³promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities,
enhance social protection, and strengthen dialogue on work-related
issues.´99 Its main instrument to aid dispute prevention and settlement is the
Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92),
ZKLFKUHFRPPHQGVWKDWYROXQWDU\SURFHGXUHV³VKRXOGEHPDGHDYDLODEOHWR
assist in the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes between
HPSOR\HUVDQGZRUNHUV´100 It also recommends the equal representation of
workers and employers and indicates that parties should not engage in
strikes or lockouts while conciliation procedures are underway, although
the Recommendation does not limit the right to strike.101 The ILO also runs
an Administrative Tribunal, which meets twice a year at the headquarters
of the ILO in Geneva.102
Despite differences in legislative procedure across the countries of the
European Union, the ILO attempts to bring uniformity to the approaches
E.U. countries take to resolve labor disputes. In the international forum,
there are essentially three common extra-judicial options: conciliation,
mediation, and arbitration.103 ³$OO WKUHH DOWHUQDWLYHV LQYROYH WKH
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 10.
99. About
the
ILO,
INT¶L
LABOUR
ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Dec. 14,
2010).
100. INT¶L LABOUR ORG., Recommendation No. 92, Voluntary Conciliation and
Arbitration Recommendation, ¶ 1 (Apr. 29, 1951) [hereinafter ILO Recommendation
No. 92], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R092 (last visited
Oct. 5, 2010).
101. See id. at ¶ 6 (suggesting that the parties engaged in a dispute should refrain
from strikes and lockouts while the matter has been submitted to arbitration).
102. The
Tribunal,
INT¶L
LABOUR
ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/about/index.htm (last updated Oct. 28,
2010).
103. See ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 2, 17 (noting, however,
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intervention of a third party; it is the degree of intervention that
GLIIHUHQWLDWHVRQHIURPDQRWKHU´104
A. Arbitration
In the European Union, labor arbitration largely resolves labor disputes
that fall into the same two categories confronted in American labor
arbitration²interests and rights.105 An interest dispute occurs when a
collective bargaining agreement does not exist or the agreement is being
renegotiated, and there is disagreement over the contractual obligations that
a collective bargaining agreement should impose or when there is a
disagreement over modification of such obligations during a renegotiation
of an agreement. To the contrary, a rights dispute occurs when there is a
disagreement between the parties over the implementation or interpretation
of statutory rights or the rights in an existing collective agreement.106 The
European Foundation notes that many countries only associate arbitration
with rights disputes, even though arbitration is also relevant, if not always
suitable, in resolving interest disputes.107
Many countries provide procedures for resolving labor disputes through
arbitration. For instance, arbitration exists in at least twenty-four of the
twenty-six E.U. member states, although it is not widely used.108
Conciliation and mediation are the more popular means for resolving
collective disputes.109 Indeed, arbitration is generally an option of last
resort.
The ILO supervisory bodies, through the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations and the Committee on
Freedom of Association, have established specific principles for arbitration
in the context of collective bargaining.110 The ILO Committee of Experts
WKDW³>D@UELWUDWLRQLVQRWZLGHO\SUDFWLFHG´ 
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 10 n.18 (citing András Tóth & László Neumann, EIRO Thematic Feature
on Collective Dispute Resolutions in an Enlarged European Union-Case of Hungary,
EUROPEAN FOUND. FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING & WORKING CONDITIONS,
(2005), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/08/word/hu0508102t.doc (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010)).
108. Id. at 17.
109. See id. ³0RUH VSHFLILFDOO\ DUELWUDWLRQ typically follows after attempts at
mediation between the parties have proven unsuccessful.´).
110. See generally Eric Gravel and Chloé Charbonneau-Jobin, The Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations: Its Dynamic and
LABOUR
ORG.
(Jan.
1,
2003),
Impact,
INT¶L
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-andpublications/publications/WCMS_087808/lang--en/index.htm (providing an analysis of
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has said that arbitration should be optional but that, if chosen, an
DUELWUDWRU¶VILQDOGHFLVLRQ should bind parties.111 Compulsory arbitration is
³JHQHUDOO\ FRQWUDU\ WR WKH SULQFLSOH RI YROXQWDU\ QHJRWLDWLRQ RI FROOHFWLYH
agreements established in Convention No. 98, and thus the autonomy of
EDUJDLQLQJSDUWQHUV´112 There is an exception for its imposition, however,
in cases involving essential public services, when their interruption would
endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the public.113
Some E.U. countries do not allow for arbitration to resolve labor disputes
in whole or in part. For instance, Danish law fails to provide for the
resolution of collective interest disputes through arbitration.114 Rather, the
ruling principle is that interest disputes should be resolved by negotiation
and bargaining between employers and unions only.115 Where these efforts
do not succeed, an interest dispute can then serve as a legitimate basis for
industrial action, and arbitration can be used where the parties are unable to
resolve their differences after a prolonged strike or lockout.116
On the other hand, rights disputes, arising where parties have a collective
agreement and have a dispute over its implementation or interpretation, are
perceived differently.117 'DQLVKFXVWRPVLQGLFDWHWKDWD³SHDFHREOLJDWLRQ´
the Committee of Expert on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
since 1977).
111. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 8.
112. ILO, 1994, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: Promotion of
Collective Bargaining, ¶ 256±57 (1994), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=11&chapter=25&query=%2
8%23docno%3D251994G*%29+%40ref&hightlight=&querytype=bool&context=0
(last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
113. See, e.g., Freedom of Association, Digest of Decisions and Principles of the
Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, at ¶ 570-71 (5th
ed. 2006), available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/23e2006.pdf (allowing a
gHQHUDOSURKLELWLRQRQVWULNHVLQHYHQWRI³DQDFXWHQDWLRQDOHPHUJHQF\´DQGDOORZLQJ
suspension of strikes in event of a national security or public health crisis but also
indicating that an independent, non-governmental body should have responsibility for
deciding whether to order such suspensions).
114. See OLE HASSELBALCH & PER JACOBSEN, LABOUR LAW DENMARK §§ 745, 746
(1999)
(stating
that
the Dutch resort to resolving disputes through strikes and lockouts, due to the desire to
preserve their right to frHHEDUJDLQLQJDQGWKDW³DOOWUDGHGLVSXWHVVKRXOGEHQHJRWLDWHG
E\PHGLDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQVLQYROYHG´ 
115. E.g., id. at § 741 (observing that collective agreements are limited WR ³DQ
agreement between an organization of wage earners and an organization of employers .
UHODWLQJWRWKHZDJHDQGZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQV´ 
116. See id. at § 747 (providing that if no solution can be reached through the
established rules of settlement then the matter is referred to arbitration, in instances
where local disputes of interest are common).
117. See id. DW ³,WLVWKHPDLQUXOHRIFROOHFWLYHODERXUODZLQ'HQPDUNWKDW
the conclusion of a collective agreement has the effect of making the initiation of
collective agreement has the effect of making the initiation of collective industrial
action illegal within the period of validity of the agreement, because attempts to gain
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requires the parties first attempt to resolve the conflict through negotiation
at the local level.118 Where unsuccessful, workplace mediation transpires.119
If, however, the dispute goes unresolved, most remaining cases go to either
an industrial arbitration tribunal or the Labor Court.120
Unlike Denmark, in Bulgaria, when other modes like conciliation and
mediation fail to resolve a labor dispute, the parties may voluntarily agree
to arbitration.121 Before reaching a legally binding determination, the
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators listens as both the union and employer
present their versions of the underlying events.122 Alternatively, during the
arbitration process, the parties may instead sign an agreement, which has
the same legal effect as an arbitration decision, although parties freely
choose it.123
To the contrary, in the Czech Republic, parties must try to resolve the
labor dispute first through mediation, before mutually agreeing to use
arbitration to resolve their labor dispute.124 Mutual agreement to arbitrate,
however, is unnecessary if a dispute arises in a workplace where strikes are
prohibited or if it concerns the fulfillment of commitments under a
collective agreement, either party may request the appointment of an
arbitrator. If the dispute is an interest dispute, the aUELWUDWRU¶V GHFLVLRQ
amounts to the conclusion of a collective agreement and is not subject to
appeal. In the case of a rights dispute, the parties may appeal the decision
of the arbitrator, which can be reviewed by a court at the request of one of
the parties.125
Under this arbitration scheme, neither the union nor the employer pay to
use the arbitration process. Instead, the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs pays the cost for arbitration and mediation in order to make these
options more economically advantageous compared to pursuing a strike or
lockout.126
improvements on the stipulations of the agreement and the perquisites of the
DJUHHPHQW´ 
118. See id. at § 673±74, 745±47 (defining a peace obligation and construing that
such peace obligations provide that disputes should be resolved by mediation and
negotiation by the organizations involved²the wage earners and the employers).
119. See id. at § 757 (explaining that the Conciliation Service exists to assist the
parties in resolving collective bargaining disputes).
120. See id. at § 486, 487 (discussing the procedures and jurisdiction of the Labor
Court).
121. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 17.
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 16.
125. Id. at 18.
126. Id.
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The process also differs in Lithuania. Arbitration occurs through a Third
3DUW\ &RXUW ZKLFK LV ³SUHVLGHG RYHU E\ D GLVWULFW FRXUW MXGJH DQG VL[
arbitrators appointed by the parties to the dispute´127 This Court is quite
different from most courts in that it is not permanent; rather, LW LV ³DQ ad
hoc body where the parties each appoint one or several arbitrators who
have fourteen days to resolve the dispute´128 While most members of the
E.U. have arbitration provisions, there is great variance among the nations
as to how it works.
B. Mediation
Some European Union nations fail to differentiate between mediation
and conciliation.129 7KHUHLVKRZHYHURQHELJGLIIHUHQFH³WKHFRQFLOLDWRU
does not make any suggeVWLRQVWRWKH SDUWLHV RQ D SRVVLEOHUHVROXWLRQ´130
Like arbitration and conciliation, mediation is a popular means of resolving
labor disputes.131 Unsurprisingly, how mediation is used to resolve labor
disputes continues to vary across countries.
In the Czech Republic, there is an informal, pre-mediation stage:
³SDUWLHVKROGQHJRWLDWLRQVin the presence RIDPHGLDWRU´DQGRQO\WKHQ
if the mediator is unable to resolve their dispute, are employees able to
resort to economic pressure.132 Strikes and lockouts are unlawful until this
mediation has transpired.133
Mediators can either be party-appointed through a process which the
union and employer mutually agree to employ, or the parties can select
WKHP ³IURP D OLVW NHSW E\ WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI /DERXU´134 The union and
employer can only move on to arbitration if mediation is unsuccessful,
ZKLFKLVZKHQ³QRVROXWLRQLVUHDFKHGZLWKLQ[thirty] GD\V´135
127. Id. at 18.
128. Id. (emphasis in original).
129. See id. at 14 (stating that between the E.U. nations there seems to be no
preference between the two dispute resolution methods and that certain countries do not
even differentiate between the two methods).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 16 (noting that mediation is the most widely used dispute resolution
method); see also Christian Welz & Mike Eisner, EIRO Thematic Feature on
Collective Dispute Resolutions in an Enlarged European Union, EUROPEAN FOUND.
FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING & WORKING CONDITIONS, 18 (July 26, 2006),
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2006/42/en/3/ef0642en.pdf (last visited Oct.
7, 2010) (comparing the incidence of mediation, arbitration, and conciliation
throughout the European Union and determining that mediation is the most popular
method of interest dispute resolution).
132. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 16.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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7KH PHGLDWLRQ SURFHVV LV GLIIHUHQW LQ (VWRQLD ZKHUH ³PHGLDWLRQ LV WKH
only method for industrial dispute resolution WKDWLVUHJXODWHGE\VWDWXWH´136
The statute creates the position of a Public MediatoUZKRLV³DSSRLQWHGWR
a three \HDUWHUPIROORZLQJWULSDUWLWHFRQVXOWDWLRQ´DQGLV³UHVSRQVLEOHIRU
selecting local mediators . . . and for managing mediation services between
GLVSXWLQJSDUWLHVIRUWKHHQWLUHFRXQWU\´137
The mediation process in Hungary differs from that in the Czech
Republic and Estonia. In Hungary, labor law does not regulate mediation
XQOHVV ³WKH SDUWLHV FKRRVH D PHGLDWRU IURP WKH UHJLVWHU RI WKH /DERXU
Mediation and Arbitration Service (MKDSZ) . . . [and then] the internal
rules of [the] Service apply.´138 The union and employer must jointly
decide the scope and nature of the mediation process if they choose to
appoint a non-MKDSZ mediator.139 Regardless of how parties structure
mediation, all reached agreements are legally binding.140
In Poland, the process for mediation is different still; illustrating the
wide variation across the European Union in the use of mediation.
Mediation occurs only after private negotiations between the parties have
failed to resolve a collective dispute. The union and employer, after
reaching an impasse in collective bargaining, have five days to select a
mediator, or else one may be appointed by the Labor of Ministry.141
Mediation often occurs preemptively to forestall full-fledged disputes.142
7KLV WUHQG ³LV ODUJHO\ WKH FRQVHTXHQFH RI DPHQGPHQWV WR WKH 7ULSDUWLWH
&RPPLVVLRQ $FW´ ZKLFK HQFRXUDJHV PHGLDWRUV WR DGRSW D ³UROH DV
µJRRGZLOO HPLVVDULHV¶´ and intervene to ³resolve situations that threaten
LQGXVWULDO SHDFH´143 Mediation is one popular form of labor dispute
resolution among the nations belonging to the European Union, but, as with
arbitration, there is great variance in how mediation works across countries.
C. Conciliation
As a form of alternative dispute resolution, conciliation differs from both
arbitration and mediation, though the overalOREMHFWLYHLVQRWGLVVLPLODU³to
bring the parties together and assist them in arriving at a mutually agreed
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 17.
142. Id. (citing European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line, Collective
Agreements
in
2004
Examined,
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/08/feature/pl0508106f.htm).
143. Id.
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solution.´144 Out of the three forms, conciliation is the least formally
structured and often occurs without the involvement or intrusion of
government.145 Still, this form also varies greatly across the European
Union.
,Q +XQJDU\ IRU LQVWDQFH ³interest disputes are supposed to be settled
first through conciliation, which is initiated by written submission from one
party to the other setting out the grounds of dispute.´146 Resolutions of
labor disputes through this process become legally binding. 147 This process
has shifted²before 1999 the government, through the Hungarian Labour
Code, mandated that unions and employers ³undergo pre-court conciliation
at the company level´ as a first step in resolving the labor dispute.148 The
modern trend, however, is a lack of government intervention, as union and
employer may optionally incorporate mandatory company level
conciliation in their agreements, although ³such provisions are UDUH´149
In contrast, practice in both Latvia and Lithuania often involves a form
RI FRQFLOLDWLRQ UHIHUUHG WR DV ³conciliation commissions.´150 These
commissions resolve interest and rights disputes and are often a mandatory
step in the labor dispute resolution process. The members of commissions
are union and employer representatives; the union and the employer each
select an equal number of representatives to voice their positions and
advocate on their behalf.151 Any agreement reached in conciliation
commissions is legally binding.152 Where a commission cannot reach a
resolution, however, the dispute proceeds as prescribed in the collective
bargaining agreement or, where not specified in the agreement, to other
fora, such as to arbitration or a judicial proceeding.153 Similar to arbitration
and mediation, conciliation varies greatly across the nations belonging to
the European Union.
VI. IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
While the United States relies largely on uniform labor arbitration and
labor mediation procedures employed by the states across the country, the

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nations affiliated with the European Union use a wide variety of dispute
resolution practices and approaches.154 The ILO continues to try to bring
increased uniformity to labor dispute resolution in the European Union155
Still, most of the affiliated countries operate in their own unique
fashions.156 Thus, the means by which international labor disputes are
addressed depends largely on the part of the world in which they occur and
on dispute resolution provisions in party contracts.
Allowing flexibility of choice for international labor dispute resolution
may contribute to securing and preserving industrial peace and to
preventing and resolving labor disputes.157 But it may also spark confusion,
which is likely to increase as employers and unions in different countries
enter into work relationships. These parties might not be versed in the
specific dispute procedures in place in each country. Such different
EDFNJURXQGV FRXOG FRORU HDFK SDUW\¶V H[SHFWDWLRQV LQWHQWLRQV DQG
perceptions about dispute resolution and can lead to problems in drafting,
executing, and enforcing dispute resolution provisions in collective
bargaining agreements.
Labor disputes can undermine international economic stability,
productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness, and, as such, each nation has a
stake in the development of a sustainable, effective resolution process
aimed at international labor disputes.158 Uniform standards and procedures
for addressing international labor disputes would be most beneficial. The
United States and the European Union should work with the ILO to
advocate that, at least in the case of international labor disputes, nations
adopt identical standards for handling these issues as they arise. Once
these three parties work together to design uniform standards, they should
154. See ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 2 (analyzing the
similarities and differences between resolving labor disputes among E.U. member
states).
155. Cf. id. at 19 (noting that while there is not a best way to resolve disputes, there
LV D QHHG IRU DOO FRXQWULHV WR KDYH ³ZHOO UHJXODWHG V\VWHP>V@ WKDW JXDUDQWHH> @ DFFHVV
WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQG OHJLWLPDWH RXWFRPHV´  See generally Getman, supra note 40
(explaining that labor arbitrations in the United States has increased due to the fact that
arbitrators are able to understand the common goal of uninterrupted production and
understand the particular needs of an organization or challenges in a dispute).
156. See, e.g., Manwel Debono, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective Dispute
Resolutions in an Enlarged European Union ± Case of Malta, EUROPEAN FOUND. FOR
IMPROVEMENT
OF
LIVING
&
WORKING
CONDITIONS
(2005),
THE
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/08/word/mt0508103t.doc (last visited Oct.
7, 2010) (surveying Malta, one of the newest members of the European Union, and its
unique system of dispute resolution).
157. Cf. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 19 (concluding that the
best way to maintain industrial peace is to have flexible methods of resolving
international labor disputes).
158. See id. (finding that because labor disputes can contribute to instability, it is
important for countries to have transparent and effective dispute resolution systems).
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draft legislation that codifies the process and seek to get as many
signatories as possible.159
Unfortunately, each nation may favor its own ways of handling labor
disputes and may resist adopting new standards. After all, current
SURFHGXUHV PD\ EH GHHSO\ URRWHG LQ D QDWLRQ¶V FXOWXUH DQG YDOXH VHW160
While uniform standards should be the long term goal, the ILO, at the very
least, should appoint neutral third parties that can help explain the specifics
of resolution procedures employed by certain countries and help employers
and unions take them into account when drafting labor dispute procedures
in their collective bargaining agreements.161 A special area on the ILO
website should publish these specifics where parties can easily access them.
Confusion about dispute resolution will prolong labor disputes, increase
economic instability, and undermine the operations of business enterprises
around the world.162 Uniform standards are one way to eradicate
confusion.163 Publicizing the dispute procedures applied to resolve labor
issues in each country is another step in the right direction.
VII. CONCLUSION
Work binds us together regardless of the continent on which we reside.
The global economy internationalizes many components of the
employment relationship; it simply must provide for the effective
resolution of transnational labor disputes through arbitration, mediation,
conciliation, and/or additional forms of alternative dispute resolution.
While it may be possible for arbitration, mediation, and conciliation to
resolve labor disputes, the wide variety in procedure and practice may
serve to disadvantage non-locals and make it harder for parties to arrive at a
resolution. Allowing the parties to determine where disputes will be
resolved and how they will be resolved is important, but there is still a need
159. Cf. St. Antoine, supra note 48 (finding that international commercial arbitration
has become an effective form of dispute resolution, especially as the world has become
increasingly more global).
160. See generally Debono, supra note 156 (highlighting Malta, one of the newest
members of the European Union, and its unique process of labor dispute resolution).
161. Cf. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 19 (concluding that a lack
of transparency in dispute resolution can contribute to industrial instability).
162. See generally Blanpain, supra note 22 (comparing a variety of different
FRXQWULHV¶ ODERU ODZV DQG QRWLQJ WKDW WKH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ DOO RI WKHP FDQ FDXVH
confusion for international labor transactions).
163. But cf. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra QRWHDW ´:KLOHHDFKFRXQWU\
has developed its own practices based on distinctive policy priorities, the unique labour
market and industrial relations landscape of each country is a fundamental
consideration in designing a dispute resolution framework and accounts for the variety
of approaches taken by different countries. . . . there is perhaps no one size fits all
solution´ 
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for international organizations like the ILO to make these procedures easily
understood by all the parties and more uniform in their approaches.
Resolution methods already used must respond to a new international
role. As global economic interdependence continues to progress rapidly,
such methods must become adept at addressing labor disputes on an
international scale.

* * *

PANEL
DON¶T ASK DON¶T TELL:
BEYOND THE LOG CABIN REPUBLICANS
INJUNCTION AND
THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
This Article is an annotated transcript of a panel that occurred on
November 10, 2010 at the American University Washington College of
Law. The podcast of the event can be found on the American University
/DERU

(PSOR\PHQW
/DZ
)RUXP¶V
website
at
http://aulaborlawforum.org/events/dont-ask-dont-tell/. The event was
co-sponsored by the Office of Diversity Services; Program on Law &
Government; the American University National Security Law Brief; the
American University Labor & Employment Law Forum; the American
University Legislation & Policy Brief; The Modern American, the
American University Lambda Law Society; Heath Law & Justice
Initiative; AU Queers and Allies; and AU Vets.

Panelist Biographies ..................................................................................127
Annotated Transcript .................................................................................131

PANELIST BIOGRAPHIES
Stephen I. Vladeck is a Professor of Law at American University
Washington College of Law, where his teaching and research focus on
federal jurisdiction, national security law, constitutional law (especially the
separation of powers), and international criminal law. A nationally
recognized expert on the role of the federal courts in the war on terrorism,
The AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM would like to
thank all of the panelists who contributed their expertise and insights to this panel. We
hope that this transcript provides an account of the historical, legal, political and social
implications of this policy. Special thanks to those individuals that made this event
possible, including: Clifford Clapp, Sean Shank, Jennifer Dabson, Denise HusseyRichards, Amy Tenney, Sherry Weaver, Brittany Erickson, Matthew Mulling, Richael
Faithful, Tonei Glavinic, Charlie Fowler and Dean Billie Jo Kaufman. Special thanks
to Justin Shore for his assistance with this panel.

127

128

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:1
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³6/'1´ LQ  DV WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶s Staff Attorney. Prior to joining
SLDN, Mr. McKean served as a law clerk for the Honorable Steven G.
Salant of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. He earned
his B.S. in English Literature from the University of California, Berkeley
and his J.D. from the American University, Washington College of Law.
During law school he served as Executive Editor of the American
University International Law Review, interned at Human Rights First, and
served as a research assistant to Professors Herman Schwartz and Teemu
Ruskola. While at Berkeley he interned for Senator Dianne Feinstein and
worked as an editor for the Rotary World Peace Scholarship Fund. Prior to
law school, Mr. McKean spent a year teaching English in southern China.
Ty Cobb serves as legislative counsel at the Human Rights Campaign.
His work focuses on hate crimes, the military, veterans, the judiciary,
political appointments, education, youth, immigration and international
matters. Mr. Cobb joined HRC after serving as counsel to Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy on the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee of the
U.S. Senate. As counsel to Sen. Kennedy, Cobb did extensive work in
support of the passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act. Prior to his work on the Hill, Mr. Cobb was an
associate attorney at the law firms of Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP in Dallas,
Texas, and Sidley Austin, LLP in Washington, D.C. Mr. Cobb received his
bachelor's degree in Business and American Studies from the University of
Texas at Austin and his law degree from the University of Texas School of
Law.
Anthony E. Varona teaches Contracts, Administrative Law, Media
Law, and Introduction to Public Law, and serves as Associate Dean for
Academic and Faculty Affairs at the American University Washington
College of Law. Before joining the WCL faculty, he was an associate
professor of law at Pace Law School in New York. Before that, he served
as general counsel and legal director for the Human Rights Campaign, the
QDWLRQ¶V ODUJHVW JD\ FLYLO ULJKWV RUJDQL]DWLRQ +H EXLOW +5&¶V OHJDO
department, directed its legislative and regulatory lawyering and appellate
amicus work, launched national law fellow and pro bono attorney
SURJUDPV DQG VHUYHG DV FRXQVHO WR +5&¶V ERDUG RI directors and the
orgDQL]DWLRQ¶s corporate, educational, and media initiatives. Professor
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Varona taught as an adjunct law professor for three years at Georgetown
University, and served as a Wasserstein Fellow at Harvard Law School. He
serves on the board of directors of the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against
Defamation (³GLAAD´), and is a member of the Society of American Law
Teachers and the Hispanic Bar Association of Washington. He has served
on the boards of the Human Rights Campaign and the Alliance for Justice,
was on the New York Advisory Board for the American Constitution
Society, was founding chairperson of the AIDS Action Council's Legal
Advisory Board, and served as a member of the Judicial Selection Steering
Committee of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Professor
Varona practiced communications law at the Washington offices of
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, and Mintz, Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, PC. He began his legal career as an honors
program attorney for the Federal Communications Commission. Professor
Varona's scholarship has included articles concerning media and
communications law, civil rights, employment discrimination, and hate
crimes, published in a variety of notable law journals. He has lectured
widely on these topics, and has appeared as a legal commentator on CNN,
Headline News, Fox News Network, Court TV, MSNBC, and in a variety
of major daily newspapers and legal periodicals. Professor Varona serves
on the Faculty Review Board of the Administrative Law Review, and as
faculty advisor to the Latino/a Law Students Association (³LaLSA´) and
The Modern American. He was honored with the 2009 Hugh A. Johnson,
Jr., Memorial Award by the Washington Hispanic Bar Association, was
named the 2007±08 Washington College of Law Professor of the Year, and
was profiled by the National Law Journal in May 2000.
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ANNOTATED TRANSCRIPT
STEVE VLADECK: *RRGDIWHUQRRQ,WKLQNZH¶UHJRLQJWRJHWVWDUWHG
)RUWKRVHRI\RXZKRGRQ¶WNQRZPH,¶PSteve Vladeck, Professor of Law
here at American University Washington College of Law (³:&/´) DQGLW¶V
P\ SOHDVXUH WR ZHOFRPH \RX WR WKLV DIWHUQRRQ¶V SURJUDP RQ 'RQ¶W $VN
'RQ¶W7HOOBeyond the Log Cabin Republicans Injunction and the Defense
Authorization Act.
We have a pretty jam-packHG SDQHO VFKHGXOHG IRU \RX WRGD\ VR ,¶P
JRLQJ WR EH EULHI LQ P\ RSHQLQJ UHPDUNV EXW , WKLQN LW¶V VDIH WR VD\ WKDW
'RQ¶W $VN 'RQ¶W 7HOO, (³DADT´)1 has a prominence and a significance
today, perhaps that only rivals its . . . significan[ce] when it was first
promulgated early in the Clinton Administration on two distinct fronts.2
Then, last year, [we saw] a lot of movement on DADT with regard to a
potential repeal by Congress or the [Obama] Administration.3 [In addition
1.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160,
107 Stat. 1670 (originally codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006)), repealed by Don't Ask,
Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010) (to be
codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654). Attempts to repeal the 1993 policy began in 2005 with the
Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 1059, 109th Cong. (2005) and was
continued in 2007 through the Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R.
1246, 110th Cong. (2007), and again in 2009, Military Readiness Enhancement Act of
2009, H.R. 1283, 111th Cong. (2009). Then, on May 27, 2010 Representative Patrick J.
Murphy of the 8th District of Pennsylvania, introduced H. Amdt. 672, 156 CONG. REC.
H4055±56 (daily ed. May 27, 2010) (statement of Rep. P. Murphy) to amend the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.R. 5136, 111th Cong.
(2010), in order to repeDO'RQ¶W$VN'RQ¶W7HOODIWHUVHYHUDOFRQGLWLRQVKDGEHHQPHW
including: (1) Pentagon's Comprehensive Review Working Group would submit
recommendations on how to implement a repeal of DADT by December 1, 2010, and
(2) the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and President would certify
that repealing DADT would be both consistent with military effectiveness,
cohesiveness, and preparedness; and second, that the Department of Defense would
prepare all policies and regulations necessary to institute a repeal. The Bill, including
the Murphy Amendment, passed in the House on May 27, 2010 and was introduced in
the Senate as S. 3454, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill was filibustered on September 21,
2010. 156 CONG. REC. S7246 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2010). On December 9, 2010, the Act
was filibustered during the lame duck session. 156 Cong. Rec. S8683 (daily ed. Dec. 9,
2010). After the second filibuster, a stand-alone resolution²the 'RQ¶W$VN'RQ W7HOO
Repeal Act of 2010²was introduced by Sens. Lieberman and Collins in the Senate.
'RQ¶W $VN 'RQ¶W 7HOO 5HSHDO $FW RI  6  WK &Rng. (2010). And a
simultaneous bLOO ZDV LQWURGXFHG LQ WKH +RXVH 'RQ¶W $VN 'RQ¶W 7HOO 5HSHDO $FW RI
2010, H.R. 2965, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill passed the House on December 15,
2010, with a vote of 250 to 175. 156 CONG. REC. H8410 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2010). On
December 18, 2010, in a special Saturday session, the Senate votHGWRHQG³'RQ¶W$Vk,
'RQ¶W 7HOO´ ZLWK D YRWH RI -31. 156 CONG. REC. S10666±67 (Dec. 18, 2010).
President Obama signed the Act into law on December 22, 2010. 156 Cong. Rec.
H8992±9002 (Dec. 29, 2010).
2.
See Kenneth Williams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28 U.S.F. L.
REV. 919, 921 (1994) (dHWDLOLQJKRZ3UHVLGHQW&OLQWRQ¶VFDPSDLJQSURPLVHWR³lift the
EDQRQJD\VOHVELDQVDQGELVH[XDOVVHUYLQJLQWKHPLOLWDU\E\H[HFXWLYHRUGHU´EHFDPH
'RQ¶W$VN'RQ¶W7HOO'RQ¶W3XUVXH).
3.
See Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2010, S. 3065 (2010) (introducing
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to] the lawsuit by the Log Cabin Republicans culminating [in] the
injunction of DADT by a federal district judge in California.4
That injunction of course is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.5 So one
might actually wonder if the question with regard to DADT is not so much
whether it will be repealed and/or struck down, but when. [In order] to try
and answer that question, to get at the underlying basis for the policy, to
talk a little about the history of it and where we are today, we [have]
brought together four true experts to talk about these issues and so our
format for today is going to be as follows:
,¶PJRLQJWREULHIO\LQWURGXFHWKHIRXUSDQHOLVWV7KH\¶UHHDFKJRLQJWR
give opening statementsWKHQZH¶UHJRLQJWRKDYHVRPH PRderated backand-IRUWK DPRQJ WKH SDQHO DQG WKHQ ZH¶UH JRLQJ WR WXUQ LW RYHU IRU
questions from you [all]. You may notice that at the ends of each row there
are slips of paper. The student organizers have asked that if you have
questions, please write them GRZQDQGWKH\¶OOFROOHFWWKHPDWWKHHQGRI
WKHSDQHOSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGWKHQZH¶OODVNWKHPRIWKHSDQHOLVWVGXULQJWKH4
& A. Finally, Dean [Anthony] Varona . . . will give some closing remarks.
6RWKDW¶VRXUSODQ$V,VDLG, we have a great line-up. We have people who
know of what they speak, DQG,¶PJRLQJWo get out of the way and turn it
over to David Rittgers. Thank you.
DAVID RITTGERS: Thank you for coming here. ,¶P DFWXDOO\ LQ WKH
Reserves Judge Advocate, so I served as a Reserve Military Lawyer [and
now] one weekend a month and a couple of weeks in the summer I do this
stuff for a living.
So we heard about this controversy about DADT in the courts, and if I
were to give a title to what [is going on] it would be status quo ante, the
way things were before.
You may not have that impression from the news, but just to recap what
the courts have done. On September 9, Judge Virginia Philips, a District
Judge in the Central District of California, declared the policy of DADT to
be unconstitutional, and then October 12, she granted a worldwide
immediate injunction against the enforcement of the policy by the
Department of the Defense. On October 19, the Military Recruiters were
told [they could] openly accept gay applicants, and on October 20,
Lieutenant Daniel Choi, an openly gay man who had previously been

an amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 654 WRLQRUGHUWR³HQKDQFHWKHUHDGLQHVVRIWKH$UPHG
)RUFHV´E\UHSODFLQJWKHPLOLWDU\¶VSROLF\RI'$'7ZLWKDQRQGLVFULPLQDWLRQSROLF\ 
4.
Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
5.
Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 10-56634, 2010 WL 4136210, at
*1 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2010).
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discharged under DADT, re-enlisted.6 However, that lasted for a little more
than a day²I think. Anyway, [as of] November 1 . . . there is a temporary
stay on [the injunction], so now the recruiters have to go back to the old
language. [On] November 1, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals . . . stayed
the worldwide injunction and now the service chiefs have advised service
PHPEHUVFRPLQJLQWRWKHVHUYLFH>WKDW@ZH¶UHVWLOOZRUNLQJXQder DADT²
VRZH¶UHEDFNZKHUHZHVWDUWHG
So a little bit of history: where did DADT come from? How did it come
to be? What does it mean to servicemembers who are serving right now?
So [DADT] started in the beginning of the Clinton Administration. Right
after Clinton came into office, KHVDLGZH¶UHJRLQJWRUHSHDOWKHSURKLELWLRQ
on gays serving openly in the military. There was a lot of controversy about
this and he compromised [and in] came . . . the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1994,7 which codified the exclusion policy for the
military, and it said that you can be kicked out of the service under three
conditions: statements, acts, RUPDUULDJH,W¶VDFWXDOO\DFWVVWDWHPHQWV, and
PDUULDJHLQWKHRUGHURIWKHVWDWXWHEXWLW¶VWKHPLOLWDU\VRZHKave to have
D WKUHH OHWWHU DFURQ\P WKDW ZH FDQ MXVW SURQRXQFH HDVLO\ 6R LW¶V 6$0:
statements, acts, or marriage. If you were to tell someone in your chain of
command or provide, somehow, evidence that you had engaged in
homosexual acts or you had married or attempted to marry someone [of the
same sex] while you were in the military, then you can be kicked out of the
service.
Now when I say kicked out of the service, you may not have exposure to
the military justice system. [Being kicked out of the service is] not actually
a punishment at trial; this is an administrative separation.8 Sometimes what
we call ³ad-sep,´ DQG DFWXDOO\ PRUH FRPPRQO\ LQ WKH $UP\ LW¶V FDOOHG
being ³FKDSWHUHGRXW´ 7KHUH¶VDFKDSWHUIRUHDFKNLQGRIPLVFRQGXFW[for
which] they can separate you from the service. This is Chapter 10, and this
SURFHHGLQJRQFHDJDLQLW¶VQRWDFULPLQDOWULDOLW¶VQRWDFRXUWPDUWLDOEXW
LW¶VDQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHERDUG
They conduct a hearing. IW¶VFRPSRVHGODUJHO\RIQRQ-attorneys, but will
often have a legal advisor appointed who will rule on admissibility of
evidence. However, the Military Rules of Evidence, which parallels the
Federal Rules of Evidence, that you have or will learn about do not apply.

6.
See Troops Discharged for Being Gay Line up to Reenlist, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO
(October
20,
2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130704683.
7.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 654
(1993).
8.
DEP¶T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS
(Dec. 21, 1993).
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So, [it is based on] very loose rules of evidence and the burden of proof is
RQWKHJRYHUQPHQWEXWLW¶VRQO\SURYHQWRD preponderance of the evidence.
So . . . ZH¶UHILIW\-one percent sure we should kick this person out of the
service is the bottom line.
There is an exception written in at the end of the statute and applied in
the regulations that [if] the government finds that such acts are a departure
from the soldier¶s usual behavior, [that] they are unlikely to recur, were not
accompanied by a use of force, coercion or intimidation, . . . that retention
LVLQWKHEHVWLQWHUHVWRIWKH$UP\DQGWKHVROGLHUGRHVQ¶WKDYHa propensity
to engage in any acts in the future²then they can keep you in the service. I
GRQ¶W NQRZ WKH QXPEHU RI DSSOLFDWLRQV Rf the policy where that happens.
>,W¶V@ probably very, very rare.
[T]his is a really unique situation with this policy, because this is an
LQVWDQFHZKHUHZH¶UHJRLQJWRKDYHDOOWKUHHEUDQFKHVRIJRYHUQPHQWZHLJK
in on a policy within a span of about two months. This almost never
happens on one issue. So you had a legislative action pushing to change the
SROLF\ LQ 6HSWHPEHU , NQRZ WKDW¶V JRLQJ WR JHW FRYHUHG E\ VRPH RWKHU
folks on the panel. [Then] [t]he Executive Branch, in the form of the
military, is currently conducting a review of the policy.9 The feedback from
this review of policy is due to the Secretary of Defense by December 1st.
[W]hile at the same time, Congress is going to be in a lame duck session,
WKH -XGLFLDU\¶V waiting, as I mentioned before. So this is really [a]
convergence of all three branches of government and yet the policy remains
the same.
6R WKHUH¶V EHHQ VRPH SURSRVDOV DERXW FKDQJLQJ WKH SROLF\²of course,
ZH¶ve heard about the legislative [proposals] or will hear more about them.
7KHUH¶VDOVRDSURSRVDOof using an Executive Order to change the policy.10
So how would this happen? There are two laws that [are] in the Federal
Code, Title 10, that pertains to the military; two portions of that law²one
pertaining to enlisted separations, policy for promotion, and retirement; and
then one for suspending officer personnel laws during a time of war or
national emergency²that allow the President to stop [the separation of
individuals from the service].11 This is what we know colloquially as the
9.
DEP¶T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF ³'ON¶T ASK, DON¶T TELL´ (2010) [hereinafter DOD
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_gatesdadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20
101130(secure-hires).pdf.
10. See AARON BELKIN ET AL., PALM CTR., UNIV. OF CALI., SANTA BARBARA, HOW
TO END ³'ON¶T ASK, DON¶T TELL´ A ROADMAP OF POLITICAL, LEGAL, REGULATORY,
AND ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS TO EQUAL TREATMENT 3 (2009), available at
http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/Executive%20Order%20on%20Gay%20Troo
ps%20-%20final.pdf.
11. 10 U.S.C. § 12305 (2006).
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³6WRS/RVV3ROLF\´While people are deploying to fight oveUVHDVRUWKHUH¶V
a national emergency, . . . LIZHZHUHLQYDGHGWKHQZHZRXOGQ¶WOHW\RXRXW
of the Army, because the country needs you. [A]nd the President
conceivably could use this power, and I think along with a statement of the
sort [that] retentionism in the best interest of the service²WKH SDUW WKDW¶V
written into the exception at the end of the policy²to stop administratively
separating gay service members.
And I should also note that there are criminal charges for certain sexual
acts in the Uniform Code of Military Justice ³8&0-´  the criminal law
for the Armed Forces[, that are] still on the books.12 [A]rticle 125 of the
UCMJ, continues to criminalize sodomy.13 [B]ut in light of the 2003
Supreme Court decision, Lawrence v. Texas,14 the Court of Appeals for the
$UPHG)RUFHVWKDW¶VWKHKLJKHVWFRXUWLQWKHPLOLWDU\KDVUHGXFHGWKLVWR
an as applied law.
6RWKHUH¶VDUHDOO\JRRGDUWLFOHLQWKH-DQXDU\LVVXHRIArmy Lawyer
that talks about . . . the application of the sodomy article of the UCMJ.15 It .
. . basically compares it to the statement of Miracle Max %LOO\&U\VWDO¶V
character in The Princess Bride ZKHQKHVD\V³>\@our friend here is only
mostly-GHDG$QGWKHUH¶VDELJdifference between being mostly-dead and
all-GHDG1RZPRVWO\GHDGKH¶VVWLOOVOLJKWO\-DOLYH´16
So when you conduct a survey of the prosecutions under this provision
of the [UCMJ], PRVWRIWKHPDUHEDGIDFWSDWWHUQV>7@KHUHKDVQ¶WEHHQ>D
FDVH@ZKHUHWKHUH¶VVRPHWKLQJHOVHJRLQJRQ[A]dultery is still commonly
prosecuted under the [UCMJ].17 >)@UDWHUQL]DWLRQ>ZKHWKHU@LW¶VVH[XDO
contact between a superior and a subordinate, which we view in the
military as prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the force²and
WKDW¶V D Srosecutable offense²is barred by the fraternization policy and
still prosecutable if it involves sodomy under this article of the UCMJ. Also
to note in 2005, the Joint Services Committee on Military Justice
recommended a complete revamping [of this Article].18 They
recommended not doing anything to the sexual misconduct laws in the
military, but Congress took the second option and revamped it all. And

12. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2006).
13. Id.
14. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
15. See generally, Maj. Joel P. Cummings, Is Article 125, Sodomy a Dead Letter in
Light of Lawrence v. Texas and the New Article 120?, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2009, at 1.
16. THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987).
17. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006).
18. See DEP¶T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CODE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY
JUSTICE
2
(2005),
available
at
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY05AnnualReport.pdf.
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then against the advice of the Joint Services Committee on Military Justice
kept the sodomy law intact.
6RLW¶VUHDOO\DPHVVDQGVRWKHERWWRPOLQHLVUHDOO\LI\RX¶UHJRLQJWR
IL['$'7\RXKDYHWRIL[DORWRIWKLQJV<RX¶UHJRLQJWRKDYHWRIL[
the rest of the sexual misconduct laws within the [UCMJ], and so once
again, where are we? Right where we started. Included in that story of right
ZKHUH ZH VWDUWHG ,¶G OLNH WR WDON DERXW DQ DQecdotal case²the case of
Sergeant Darren Manzella.
Darren Manzella was a combat medic at Fort Hood. After a combat tour
in Iraq he began to live as an openly gay service member. His chain of
command knew about it. With another tour in Iraq pending, his chain of
command . . . investigated the claim that he was gay. He provided them
SLFWXUHVDQGYLGHRZLWKKLPDQGKLVER\IULHQGDQGWKH\VDLG³:HOO\RX¶UH
a good sergeant; \RX¶UH D JRRG FRPEDW PHGLF DQG ZH MXVW GRQ¶W VHH DQ\
evidence of +RPRVH[XDOLW\´He had given them plenty of evidence, right.
%XWWKH\KDGDGHSOR\PHQWWR,UDTFRPLQJXSDQGVRWKH\VDLG³<HDKZH
MXVW GRQ¶W VHH LW VRUU\´ 6R KH ZDVQ¶W GLVFharged. Now his subsequent
appearance on 60 Minutes telling [his] story gave the chain of command no
choice, and he was discharged.19 But I think that [as] part of . . . where we
are and where we have been traditionally, gay service members during
times of conflict are generally allowed to serve.
$QGLWLVQ¶WXQWLOWKHFHVVDWLRQRIKRVWLOLWLHVWKDWWKHVHSHRSOHJHWNLFNHG
out of the service en masse, and I think that . . . with cases like Sergeant
Manzella and with the number of Arabic translators that have been kicked
out, I think it continues to damage our services and I knew that the
ServicemHPEHUV¶/HJDO'HIHQVH1HWZRUNhas some more current numbers.
,¶GEHLQWHUHVWHGLQKHDULQJZKDWWKRVHQXPEHUVDUH
6RLQVKRUW,¶GVD\WKDWLWLVGDPDJLQJRXUFRPEDW UHDGLQHVVDQG,¶P
persuaded by the experience of other militaries: including the British, and
the Israelis, to maintain highly effective combat forces while allowing gays
to serve openly. So I look forward to a change in the policy.
&RQVWLWXWLRQDOO\,¶P of the firm belief that it has to come from Congress.
,¶PQRWDELJIDQRIJRLQJWKH([HFXWLYH2UGHUURXWHEXW,¶OOJRDKHDGDQG
wrap it up there in case I forgot to say it earlier, my comments are mine
only, and not those of the Army or the Department of Defense. All right,
thank you.
STEVE VLADECK: Thank you, David. Michelle²

19. 60 Minutes: Is Military More Tolerant of Gay Members in Wartime? (CBS
Television
Broadcast
Dec.
16,
2007),
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/13/60minutes/main3615278.shtml.
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MICHELLE MCCLUER: Thank you. ,¶P JRLQJ WR JLYH D IHZ IDFWV
some facts that may surprise some of you based on what you see in the
media²,NQRZLW¶VVKRFNLQJ>WKDW@WKHPHGLD GRHVQ¶WDOZD\VJLYH\RXDQ
accurate view of things. [I also want to] leave you with some food for
thought as to when there is [a] repeal²and I believe there will be a repeal
of DADT.
The first thing I wanted to point out is that at least in the Air Force, I
GRQ¶WNQRZZKDWLW¶VOLNHLQWKHRWKHUVHUYLFHVDVPXFKEXWZHQHver called
LW³'$'7´Certainly not in the legal community.
,W¶V QRW DV VLPSOH DV ZH¶UH QRW JRLQJ WR DVN LI \RX¶UH KRPRVH[XDO DQG
\RX¶UH QRW VXSSRVHG WR VD\ LI \RX¶UH KRPRVH[ual. It goes much beyond
that; DQGDV\RXKHDUG'DYLGVD\LW¶VPDUUiage [or an] attempt to marry. It
is as VLPSOHDV³,DPDKRPRVH[XDO´>7@KDW¶VHQRXJKWRJHW you kicked out
of the military²and you could be fired²but we never called it DADT
because it was a much broader policy than simply if everyone stays quiet
WKHQ\RX¶UHJRLQJWREHJRRGEHFDXVHWKDW¶VQRWLQIDFWZKDWWKHLVVXHLV
How many folks can give a percentage of the numbers of females [that]
were discharged for the homosexual conduct policy from the military in the
last few years²what percentage would you say would be female? $QG,¶OO
give you a little bit of a hint to help you out. The military itself overall has
about fourteen percent female population²so [do] you think [the number
of women discharged for homosexual conduct] would be higher or lower
than [the amount of women in the military]?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Higher?
MICHELLE MCCLUER: +LJKHUKRZPXFKKLJKHU",¶PKHDULQJRYHU
fifty. I see somebody saying lower. ,¶P hearing twice. ,W¶V DFWXDOO\ PRUH
along the lines of forty-six to forty-eight percent of individual service
members who are being kicked out of the military for homosexual conduct
that KDYH EHHQ IHPDOH DQG WKDW¶V DJDLQ ZLWK WKH SRSXODWLRQ [overall] that
[consists of] a third of [the total population of the military].20
You also hear a lot about witch hunts . . . DQG,GRQ¶WGLVFRXQW that there
are some of these. We have, and the other panelists can certainly talk about
this, [heard of] some horrendous cases of harassment, and abuse, and even
death. [For example] the Winchell case,21 from a number of years ago. But
what percentage²DQG ZH¶OO KDYH, ,¶P VXUH PRUH GHILQLWLYH QXPEHUV

20. US Military Policy on Homosexuals Forces Kansas Women to be Discharged,
THE GUARDIAN, (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/19/usamilitary-policy-homosexuals.
21. See United States v. Fisher, 58 M.J. 300 (2003).
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DOWKRXJKDWWKHEHJLQQLQJWKHPLOLWDU\GLGQ¶WWUDFNVSHFLILFDOO\KRPRVH[XDl
discharges [until] after the law changed in 1993²[is] simply estimates.
, WKLQN WKH\¶YH EHHQ UHILQHG VRPHZKDW RYHU WKH \HDUV DQG WKH\¶UH
somewhat accurate, but say you have 14,000 or so who have been
discharged for homosexual conduct under the policy. The vast majority of
those individuals are actually self-identifiers. I can talk about a few specific
cases that I was involved in as the defense counsel or as the government
representative on the other side of these cases.
And often what happened was that these were individuals were
wonderful performers, [who] never had a speck of any sort of misconduct
on their record. Oftentimes they were [non-combat officers,] had been
serving for ten or more years, [and had] great careers in front of them²no
indications of any future issues. But, they simply had reached a point, and
they would write[,] a very short statement usually saying: ³,¶YH EHHQ
ZUHVWOLQJ ZLWK WKLV IRU VRPH WLPH DQG , ORYH P\ PLOLWDU\ FDUHHU EXW ,¶ve
realized that I need to, as part of being honest with myself, acknowledge
that I am homosexual. I want to be able to act on that and I realize that
WKDW¶V LQFRPSDWLEOH ZLWK PH VWD\LQJ LQ WKH PLOLWDU\´ And so rather than
continuing to try to hide their sexuality or have somebody out them later,
[they left not under] their own terms. Oftentimes and [in] the vast majority
RIFDVHVWKDW¶VZKDWKDVKDSSHQHG, these are individuals who have reached
WKDW SRLQW ZKHUH WKH\ VD\ ³, MXVW FDQ¶W OLYH WKLV GRXEOH OLIH DQ\PRUH DQG
always be in fear of what if somebody sees me?´ or ³What if somebody
finds something out?´Or, a lot of the cases that you see, that are not the
self-admissions, are the spurned lover or ex-lover. Or in the case of one
individual who is quite familiar to those of us who worked in this area,
Major Margaret Witt, [where] the husband of her love interest wrote a
scathing E-mail and sent it all the way . . . to the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force [and said:@ ³HH\ , MXVW ZDQWHG WR OHW \RX NQRZ KHUH¶V ZKDW WKH
MDMRU¶VGRLQJDQG\RXQHHGWRNLFN>:LWW@RXW´22 Those two instances²
the self-admission and the spurned individuals outing others²are probably
the vast majority of individuals.
%XW ZH DOVR KDYH HYHQ WKRXJK WKH PLOLWDU\ GRHVQ¶W SUotect as far as
being able to keep your job, homosexual conduct. There are policies that,
with varying degrees of ability, combat potential bad acts that are in place
to prevent harassment. ,¶YHVHHQVRPHWKLQJVWKDWVD\LWVKRXOGEH³'RQ¶W
$VN'RQ¶W 7HOO'RQ¶W+DUDVV´RUWKDWW\SHRIWKLQJ
And I would argue [that] there is [a] ³DRQ¶W HDUDVV´ DOUHDG\ RQ WKH
books, partly because we have so many civilians who work with the
military, oftentimes deploying with the military. And these individuals

22.

See Witt v. Dep¶t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
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GRQ¶WKDYHWKHVDPHUHVWULFWLRQVWKDWPLOLWDU\PHPEHUVGRZKHQWKH\¶UHLQ
combat zones or even [in] daily life around the base. And in order to keep a
SROLWH DWPRVSKHUH LQ RUGHU WR NHHS DQ DWPRVSKHUH WKDW LVQ¶W VH[XDOO\
KDUDVVLQJ QR PDWWHU ZKDW\RX¶UHVH[XDO RUientation is, there are ways that
[harassment] can be punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The services have individual policies on this that can be punished under
Article 92,23 which is failure . . . to obey a lawful general regulation as well
as under Article 93,24 depending on what the level of the individuDO¶V
position is. So there are some things in place already and for the most part,
,¶OOOHDYHWKHUHVt of my remarks for questions. ,ILQGWKDW¶VXVXDOO\WKHPRVW
useful thing for the audience. Thank you.
STEVE VLADECK: Thanks Michelle. 1H[W ZH¶OO KHDU IURP 'DYLG
McKean.
DAVID MCKEAN: Thank you very much. Well I have a couple of
things that I wanted to talk about. ,¶G OLNH WR VWDUW E\ MXVW UHVSRQGLQJ RU
elaborating on a couple of things that the previous speakers have said. Just
so ZHNQRZZKDWZH¶UHWDONLQJDERXWKHUHZKHQ'DYLGVDLGWKHUH¶VWKUHH
types of conduct, the SAM acronym²statements, acts, and marriage. A
statement is a statement of your sexual orientation or words to that effect.
Anytime, anywhere, to anyone, before you were in the military, after you
ZHUHLQWKHPLOLWDU\LI\RX¶UHVWLOOVHUYLQJRQFH\RXMRLQHGDQGLWLQFOXGHV
things . . . to a friend, in confidence, [such as,] ³,¶PJD\.´
If that friend turns that information over, that can constitute a statement
under the regulation. >6@R LW¶V QRW MXVW ³DRQ¶W THOO´ DV 0LFKHOOH ZDV
VD\LQJ GRQ¶W WHOO XV DQG ZH ZRQ¶W ERWKHU \RX ,W¶V UHDOO\ D ³DRQ¶W Tell
Anyone.´ [I] VSHDN WR D ORW RI SHRSOH ZKR DUHQ¶W RXW WR WKHLU IDPLOLHV RU
DUHQ¶W RXW WR DQ\RQH WKH\¶UH FORVH WR RXW RI IHDU WKDW WKLV ZLOO KDYH D
negative impact on their job. Secondly, with respect to [acts]²WKDW¶V
defined very broadly, so that investigations can be opened on the basis of
holding hands, hugging. We had two hugging cases in a couple of years so
these things are very, very broad.
One case was started²one investigation at least²when a photo of a
service member in his locker depicted him with his arm around another
guy. [T]hat other guy turned out to be his cousin²he was not gay²there
was nothing there, but nonetheless he endured a couple of months of
questioning and scrutiny of his life.
$QGVR,WKLQNLW¶VLPSRUWDQWWRUHFRJQL]HWKDWLW¶VQRW MXVWD³'RQ¶W$VN´
23.
24.

10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006).
10 U.S.C. § 893 (2006).
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provision. ,QIDFWLI\RXORRNDWWKHODZWKHUH¶VQothing in the law itself,
the Statute, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006)WKDWVD\V³'RQ¶W$VN´ At the end of
WKHODZWKHUH¶VVRPHWKLQJWKDW¶VFDOOHGD³sense of Congress´ provision that
VD\VLW¶VRXUVHQVHWKDW&RQJUHVVRUWKDWWKHPLOLWDU\VKRXOGQRWEHDVNLQJ
peopOHZKHQWKH\MRLQZKHWKHURUQRWWKH\DUHLQIDFWJD\EXWWKDWGRHVQ¶W
PHDQSHRSOHDUHQ¶WDVNHGin the course of their daily lives, between friends:
³What did you do this weekend?´, ³What are you going to do for
Thanksgiving?´²things like that. That people have to make a decision;
ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKH\¶UH JRLQJ WR MXVW QRW DQVZHU TXHVWLRQV WKDW DUH WRWDOO\
OHJLWLPDWHDQGQRWIURPDEDGSODFHDWDOORUZKHWKHUWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRPDNH
XS DQ HODERUDWH VWRU\ DERXW ZKDW LQ IDFW WKH\¶UH GRLQJ WKLV ZHHNHQG DQG
who they went and saw a movie with.
The other things I would like to mention are the statistics that Michelle
referenced, in terms of women, mirrors our numbers as well. It should also
be pointed out that of that percentage of women, women of color make up
the largesWSHUFHQWDJHRIWKDWDQGVR,WKLQNLW¶VGHILQLWHO\IDLUWRVD\WKDW
women of color are some of the most disproportionately impacted people
with respect to DADT.
Finally, I would just like to comment on the statement that Michelle
made about harassment. I think that is true. There are very stringent
KDUDVVPHQW SROLFLHV SXW LQ SODFH VR WKDW SHRSOH LQ WKH PLOLWDU\ GRQ¶W IDFH
harassment on a number of issues. Part of the issue with that, we find, is
WKDW LW¶V YHU\ GLIILFXOW WR UHSRUW WKH KDUDVVPHQW RQ Whe basis of sexual
RULHQWDWLRQZKHQ\RXFDQ¶WWHOODQ\RQHWKDW\RX¶UHJD\
So going into your supervisor²your commanding officer²and saying
³HH\OLVWHQWKHUH¶VDFRXSOHRIJX\VLQWKHXQLWZKRDUHDOZD\VJLYLQJPH
DUHDOO\KDUGWLPHEHFDXVH,¶PJay.´TKHUH¶V\RXUVWDWHPHQWXQGHU'$'7
and, more likely than not, that will result not in the reprimanding of the
people in the unit, [a]lthough it might, but it will also lead to your
discharge²or a potential discharge²under DADT.
So you have to walk people through having them go into their
FRPPDQGLQJRIILFHUDQGWRWKHLUVXSHUYLVRUDQGVD\LQJ³,EHOLHYHWKDW,¶P
being harassed on the basis of my perceived sexual orientation. I am not
making the statement one way or the other regarding my sexual
orientation.´ $QG WKDW FDQ EH D ORW EXW LI VRPHERG\¶V QHUYRXV DQG
especially iIWKH\¶UHDQ\HDU-old. [Y]ou want to . . . keep that straight in
WKHLUPLQGZKLOHWKH\¶UHVSHDNLQJWRWKHLUVXSHUYLVRUDERXWVRPHWKLQJWKDW
can lead to the end of their job.
In terms of tKHOLWLJDWLRQXSGDWH,WKLQNHYHU\ERG\¶VYHU\ZHOOIDPLOLDU
with the court cases that are happening now; Major Witt, who Michelle
touched on earlier . . . was basically the case that laid the foundation for the
Log Cabin Republicans cDVH ,¶P VXUH HYHU\one in the room is familiar
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with it.
0DMRU:LWW¶s case was in the Ninth Circuit; [i]t is [now] in the [United
States District Court of the Western District of Washington]. [O]riginally
her case was dismissed because the judge found that she was properly
dLVFKDUJHG:KHQ0DMRU:LWW¶VDWWRUQH\VDSSHDOHGWKDWGHFLVLRQLWZHQWXS
to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit articulated a standard that said,
[they] believed that the burden should be on the military to demonstrate
that Major Witt was in fact becoming a problem for unit cohesion, good
moral, good order and discipline and things like this²justifications for this
law²DQGLI\RXFDQ¶WVKRZWKDWVKHZDVLQIDFWGHVHUYLQJRIWKLVGLVFKDUJH
on the basis of your justifications for the law, th[en] DADT was
unconstitutionally applied to her.
There was a trial, after the standard was articulated. It was remanded
back to the court. There was a trial, and a number of people testified as to
[how] . . . excellent [of a] nurse that she was . . . [and] [t]he good impact
that she had on her unit, and in fact, the District Court judge, under the
standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit, really had no choice but to order
her reinstatement.
&XUUHQWO\ZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJZLWKWKDWLVWKHMXGJHLVVXHGDQRUGHUIRUKHU
reinstatement to take place as soon as practicable. The Justice Department
has sixty days from the date of that order to file a notice of appeal. 25 That
deadline is approaching on November 24th, just a couple of weeks away. If
WKH\ GR QRWKLQJ WKDW¶V WKH HQG RI Whe case and Major Witt will be
reinstated. If they do file a Notice of Appeal, they can either decide to file a
Notice of Appeal by itself, in which case Major Witt will be reinstated,
pending the appeal of the case, or they can file a Notice of Appeal and a
petition for a stay of the order . . . if they prevail on that stay, [Major Witt
will] not be reinstated pending appeal.
6RZH¶UHZDLWLQJWRVHHZKDWWKH-XVWLFH'HSDUtment decides to do with
that. ,W¶V SDUWLDOO\ RQ WKH EDVLV RI WK>H@ VWDQGDUG DUWLFXODWed by the Ninth
Circuit that the judge in the Log Cabin Republicans case, Judge Virginia
Philips, ZDV DEOH WR UXOH WKH ZD\ VKH GLG ,W¶V QRW H[DFWO\ WKDW VKH ZDV
ERXQG E\ WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ, because the Ninth Circuit
&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQZDVLQ reference to an as applied challenge.
Whereas the Log Cabin Republicans case was a successful facial
challenge, but the judge in the District Court in the Log Cabin case used the
standard that the Ninth Circuit had articulated for an as applied challenge to
rule on her facial challenge. :HWKLQNWKDW¶VSKHQRPHQDOWe hope that the
Ninth Circuit, when it hears [the] pending appeal of the Log Cabin case,
25. The Department of Justice filed an appeal on this case on November 29, 2010
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, WLWWY'HS¶WRI$LU)RUFH, No. 10-36079 (9th
Cir. filed Nov. 29, 2010).
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adopts a standard for the facial challenge as well. We think the judge was
FRUUHFWWRGRVREXWWKDW¶VDlso pending appeal.
Many of you people have been familiar with the stay WKDW¶VJRLQJRQWKH
Log Cabin [Republicans] last week filed a petition . . . to the Supreme
&RXUWWROLIWWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶VVWD\SHQGLQJDSSHDO26 Justice Kennedy has
asked the government to provide a response [and] that deadline is today.
Either way, whether or not the stay is lifted or the stay stays firm, the
merits of the case will be moving forward on appeal²I believe sometime
early this spring. ,¶PQRWVXUHWKDWWKHGDWHKDVEHen set on the calendar, so
WKDW¶VWKHOLWLJDWLRQXSGDWH
>7@KHUH¶V DOVR WKHUH¶V RWKHU OLWLJDWLRQ SHQGLQJ27 One of our clients,
Victor Fehrenbach, is a nineteen-year Air Force aviator. +H¶V EHHQ
decorated too many times to count and his performance evaluations . . . use
WKH ZRUG ³WKH EHVW DLUPDQ WKDW , KDYH HYHU VHHQ´ DQG ³WKLV SHUVRQ LV DQ
HOHYHQ RXW RI WHQ´ +H¶VMXVW DQ LQFUHGLEOH LQFUHGLEOH VHUYLFHPHPEHU DQG
we can get into the facts of this case if you ask questions. [B]ut in order to
PDLQWDLQ KH¶V DW QLQHWHHQ\HDUV LI SHRSOH GRQ¶W NQRZ²at twenty [years]
\RX¶UHHQWLWOHGWRIXOOSHQVLRQEHQHILWVDQGWKLngs like that with retirement.
We filed a suit to enjoin his discharge from moving forward, because it was
HPLQHQWDQGVRQRZKH¶VMXVWNLQG of waiting in limbo while his case moves
forward.
I would be happy to take any questions about the litigation after Ty
speaks about what we can expect from the Congress.
STEVE VLADECK: Our last panelist is Ty Cobb.
TY COBB: My name is Ty Cobb. [I] work for the Human Rights
Campaign. :H¶UH WKH ODUJHVW /%*7 FLYLO ULJKWV RUJDQL]DWLRQ in the U.S.
with over 750,000 members and supporters. We work on LGBT equality
issues at the state level and at the federal level, and, although we do not do
direct litigation, we are involved in filing amicus briefs and tracking
litigation occurring in the courts. ,¶P JRLQJ WR WDNH D ELW RI D GLIIHUHQW
direction and talk about the legislative process    ZKDW¶V JRLQJ RQ LQ
&RQJUHVVWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQDQGWKH3HQWDJRQDQGWDONDERXWZKDW¶V
happened this year . . . and leave some time for us to diVFXVVZKHUHZH¶UH
going from here.
,¶PJRLQJWRVWDUWZLWKWKH6WDWHRIWKH8QLRQZKHUHWKH3UHVLGHQWVDLGKH
26. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Log
Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F.Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV048425), 2006 WL 2314141.
27. Complaint, Fehrenbach Y 'HS¶W $LU )RUFH  :/   (No.
2010cv00402).
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was going to work with Congress to repeal DADT this year.28 6R WKDW¶V
how the year started out. We then moved into Senate hearings where both
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
PDGHVWDWHPHQWVWKDWWKH\DJUHHZLWKWKH3UHVLGHQWWKDWLW¶VWLPHWRUHSHDO
DADT.
I brought one of the quotes from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff because I liked the quote. AQG,WKLQNLW¶VVRPHWKLQJWKDWZDVJUHDWWR
have put into the record of a Senate hearing . . . from the person that chairs
the [four] branches of the military. $GPLUDO0XOOHQVVDLG³1RPDWWHUKRZ,
ORRNDWWKLVLVVXH,FDQ¶WHVFDSHEHLQJWURXEOHGE\WKHfact we have in place
a policy which forces young men and women to lie about who they are in
RUGHU WR GHIHQG WKHLU IHOORZ FLWL]HQV´29 7KHQ KH VDLG ³)RU PH it comes
GRZQWRLQWHJULW\WKHLUVDVLQGLYLGXDOVDQGRXUVDVDQLQVWLWXWLRQ´30 This is
a great quote that describes what this policy is, what it does, and what it
says about our military to have such a policy in place.
At these hearings, the Secretary [of] Defense announced that he was
going to put together a Pentagon working group to study DADT . . . and,
not [so] long after that, he announced a Pentagon working group, tasked
with looking at how to implement a repeal of DADT. The directive from
the Secretary to the working group often gets mischaracterized as a review
of whether or not to repeal DADT, but the working group was instructed to
review how to implement repeal. The directive asks the working group to
look at what needs to be changed, what policies need to be revised, how to
extend benefits to the partners of same-sex couples, and what barriers exist
that block open service. And, that study, which began in the earlier part of
WKLV\HDULVGXHRQWKH6HFUHWDU\¶VGHVNLQOHVVWKDQWZRZHHNV31 And, on
December 1st, when it lands on his desk, he will have a complete review of
how to implement a repeal of the law and what needs to be done once [the]
law is repealed.
At the same time as the Pentagon working group was formed in the
spring, there was a bill introduced in Congress called the Military
Readiness and Enhancement Act. Later in the spring, the Defense
Authorization Bill, which authorizes funds for the Defense Department,
28. President Barack Obama stated during the State of the Union Address that
³>W@KLV \HDU , ZLOO ZRUN ZLWK &RQJUHVV DQG RXU PLOLWDU\ WR ILQDOO\ UHSHDO WKH ODw that
GHQLHVJD\$PHULFDQVWKHULJKWWRVHUYHWKHFRXQWU\WKH\ORYHEHFDXVHRIZKRWKH\DUH´
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
29. Anne Flaherty, 0LNH 0XOOHQ &DOOV IRU 5HSHDOLQJ ³'RQ¶W $VN 'RQ¶W 7HOO´
POST
(Feb.
2,
2010),
³5LJKW
7KLQJ
WR
'R,´
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/02/mike-mullen-calls-for-rep_n_446067.html.
30. Id.
31. DOD REPORT, supra note 9.
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was amended in both the House and in the Senate Arms Services
Committee to include repeal legislation. So, the repeal legislation was
attached to a larger bill that was moving forward. The House passed the
Authorization Bill in May²they did their part to move forward on repeal.
The Senate, however, did not act on the Defense Authorization Bill until
September. In September, the Authorization Bill moved forward in the
Senate, but was blocked by filibuster led by Senator McCain.
Right now, we are at a point where the President has VDLG WKDW KH¶V
committed to signing repeal legislation. 7KHUH¶VQRUHDVRQWRGRXEWWKDWWKH
President will sign repeal legislation. The House has passed repeal
legislation anG ZH¶UH ZDLWLQJ RQ WKH 6HQDWH The Senate goes back in
session on Monday for the lame duck session . . . and it will be in session
for a week before they leave for Thanksgiving. Then, it will be in session
for at least two more weeks in DHFHPEHU7KDW¶VZKHUHZHDUHThis is our
window of opportunity for legislative action in the Senate.
During all this legislative action, we had, as my other colleagues on the
panel were talking about, the Witt case and the Log Cabin case moving
forward in the courts. There was a temporary time where the military was
enjoined from enforcing DADT. This created an up-and-down ride where
the policy was enjoined from enforcement one day and then back in place
another day.
,EHOLHYHWKHLVVXHVZHKDYHQ¶WDGGUHssed, but should address, is whether
it would be better for the courts to find DADT unconstitutional; or whether
it would be better for there to be a administrative action prohibiting the
enforcement of DADT. Or whether it would be better for Congress to
repeal the law. While it would be important for the courts to articulate that
DADT is unconstitutional, I think the answer to that question is to get the
law off the books now. I think the best way to do that is through
Congressional action, and our last chance to do this in 2010 is during the
lame duck session in the Senate.
STEVE VLADECK6RZH¶UHJRLQJWRWXUQWR[the] moderated Q & A
part of the program. Ty, you sort of stole my thunder there at the end,
because my first question to all of our panelists is, I suspect that we can all
agree that Congress has the Constitutional authority to repeal a statute as
enacted, right?
$QG VR LW¶V FHUWDLQO\ WUXH WKat Congress could repeal DADT. ,W¶V
certainly true that the court could strike down DADT. $W WKLV SRLQW ,¶P
curious for each of you, if you would be willing to speculate what do you
think is most likely to happen in light of the election²in light of the way
the litigation stands? [I]f you had to predict the future, what would the
Giants do at the Super Bowl? 1RWKDW¶V>QRWP\@TXHVWLRQ>L]eaving aside
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what you think should happen, where do you think things actually will go
from here?
DAVID RITTGERS: ,GRQ¶WNQRZ,¶OOEHKRQHVWDQG,WKLQNWKDWDWWKH
other end of the panel, you [all] are a lot more in tune [to] ZKDW¶VJRLng on
in the halls of Congress. I thought it was a done deal and then I started
reading the papers this morning, and . . . I guess the[re is a lot of] pressure
[on] Senator Carl Levin . . . both one way and the other . . . to repeal, [or]
not to repeal.32
[F]or forty-eight years the Congress has consistently passed the Defense
Authorization [Act]. IW¶V . . . the core task of Congress to do that, and so
WKHUH¶VDORWRISUHVVXUH from both sides to pass [it] the way each side
waQWVLW,¶YHDOUHDG\ stated what I think should happen. I think it should be
repealed, but I think that it should be Congress that does it.
&RQVWLWXWLRQDOO\LW¶VSODFHG ZLWKLQ&RQJUHVV¶SRZHUV I would like to
WKLQNWKHUH¶VDEHWWHUWKDQILIW\-fifty chance that Congress does it, and we
GRQ¶WHQGXSZLWKWKLVEHLQJIRXJKWRXWLQWKHFRXUWVad nauseam for . . . the
next year and a half or so.
MICHELLE MCCLUER: I agree with all the other panelists that it
should be Congress who does the overturning. ,¶PMXVWQRWVXUHWKDWWKDW¶V
going to happen and, to take a little step back, the National Defense
Authorization Act is the defense spending bill. It is what keeps the military
running. It [totals] trillions of dollars, or at least a triOOLRQ$QGLI\RXGRQ¶W
pass it²there is no budget and there is no money for the military except
through these things that they call continuing resolutions, which is what we
. . . find ourselves under [every year at this time of year] because the fiscal
year started about a month and a half ago and we can never pass the budget
by then.
So th[e] National Defense Authorization Act is extraordinarily important
for everyone in Congress to make sure that we can still fund our military,
HVSHFLDOO\JLYHQWKHZDUVWKDWDUHEHLQJIRXJKWULJKWQRZ%XW,GRQ¶WWKLQN
WKDW WKHUH¶s that much political will in Congress. :HOO , ZRQ¶W VD\ ³WKDW
PXFK´EHFDXVHWKHUHLVTXLWHDELWRISROLWLFDOZLOOLQ&RQJUHVVWRRYHUWXUQ
WKH SROLF\ EXW ,¶P [not] VXUH WKDW WKHUH¶V HQRXJK SDUWLFXODUO\ ZLWK WKH
procedural rules that you can use in the Senate to prevent certain things
from being passed.
Maybe this is my pessimism coming through. Unfortunately I think [that
it will probably] be this very piecemeal, interim court-GHFLGHGUHSHDOWKDW¶V
32. See Scott Wong, 6HQ &DUO /HYLQ 3UHVVXUHG RQ ³'RQ¶W $VN 'RQ¶W 7HOO´ THE
POLITICO
(Nov.
9,
2010,
8:37
am),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44913.html.
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going to ricochet back and forth for quite some time. ,KRSHWKDW¶VQRWWKH
case but[,] aside from the Constitutional reasons, it should be Congress that
does the change in the law. It was Congress that passed it in the first place,
LWZDVQ¶WWKHPLOLWDU\ So it should be Congress that does the repeal. That
would also allow an orderly [transition and] it would give a timetable.
There would be guidelines [that] would come out of Congress if it happens
that way.
If it comes from the courts and they just VD\ ³SROLF\ XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
FKDQJHLW´WKHUHLVQ¶WWKHJXLGDQFH. TKHUHLVQ¶WWKHRSSRUWXQLW\IRUPDNLQJ
incremental changes or whatever adjustments that need to be made.
TY COBB,¶PJRLQJWRJREDFNWRWKH1DWLRQDO'HIHQse Authorization
Bill as well. The bill is huge. As Michelle said, it authorizes around a
trillion dollars in funds. DADT repeal is such a small piece of it. If
Congress does not pass the National Defense Authorization Act this year, it
will be the first time in I believe forty-eight years they have not passed that.
So there is pressure on Senator Levin to get this bill through the Senate for
reasons beyond repealing DADT.
As to the original question, Congress is in the position to make the most
immediate change to DADT. They could make that change next week
when they go back into session. They could make that change in three
weeks when they get back in session after Thanksgiving. Litigation in the
courts is going to be an up-and-GRZQ EDWWOH DV ZH¶YH VHHQ SOD\ RXW WKLV
year. This kind of pattern could continue all the way up to the Supreme
Court. I certainly would welcome a favorable verdict from the Supreme
Court, a decision from the Supreme Court on the unconstitutionality of
DADT, but I think right now, the Senate is poised in the position to make
the most immediate change to the law.
And, as a caveat to this conversation, the legislative repeal language in
the Defense Authorization Act does not immediately strip DADT off the
books. The way the legislation works is that three things must happen
before DADT is stripped off the books. First, the Pentagon working group
report I talked about, which is due on December 1st, must be received and
considered by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Second, the President, Secretary of Defense, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must provide the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee with a
certified letter saying that repealing DADT will not hurt military
effectiveness and the policies and regulations to implement repeal are
prepared. Sixty days after certification, the law is repealed.
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STEVE VLADECK: I would echo [and] agree with everything Ty just
said. The group that can most readily and most quickly repeal DADT is the
people who put it in place in the beginning [in] [19]93, which is the Senate
and the Congress in general. 7KH\¶UHEDVLFDOO\DOPRVWWKHUH the Senate
should vote in this [l]ame [d]uck [session] WRUHSHDO%DUULQJWKDWLW¶VJRLQJ
to be out in the courts; WKHFRXUWVGRQ¶WJRRQD&RQJUHVVLRQDORUDSROLWLFDO
WLPH WDEOH DQG WKH\¶OO FRQWLQXH WR DFW LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK ZKDWHYHU WKH\
MXGJH WKH ODZ WR EH DQG WKDW¶V QRW QHFHVVDULO\ ZKHUH SROLWLFDO EUDQFKHV,
especially the military, like to find themselves subject to the whim of a
MXGJH¶VGHFLVLRQ
$QG LW¶V QRW    D GHFLVLRQ WKDW WKH\¶OO EH PDNLQJ OLJKWO\ 7KH\¶OO EH
reviewing it in the context of the Constitution, but that level of uncertainty
for the military is not where they want to find themselves and we saw that
when the injunction was put in place. The military is excellent at figuring
out how to implement something and doing it. [T]KHUH¶VDUHDVRQZHKDYH
the best military in the world, but doing things that quickly and pushing it
down the bureaucracy that fast poses some challenges.
6R,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKH\ZDQWWRVHHWKDWKappen again on a bigger scale. So
that begs a related question, DQG PD\EH WKDW¶V WKH DQVZHU, which is²
[where] is the Obama administration, in all of this? President Obama, in his
first State of the Union sa[id] [that] repeal [of] DADT is a priority. At least
it indicates [that] the administration has been proactive on that front. At the
same time, LW¶V WKH VDPH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ [that the] Justice Department is
aggressively [litigating the appeals.]
Judge [Phillips] ruled on the Log Cabin Republicans case [and the
Justice Department] is aggressively appealing the Witt case. [O]ne way to
slice that is the [that] Attorney General has a constitutional obligation to
defend the constitutionality of [a] [f]ederal [l]aw, EXW WKHUH¶V GHIHQGLQJ LW
and [then] WKHUH¶V GHIHQGLQJ LW ,¶P FXULRXVLI \RX [all] WKLQN WKHUH¶V DQ\
inconsistency in what we see in different parts of the administration dealing
[with] this issue.
DAVID RITTGERS: [I] think that the Attorney General does have the
obligation to defend the constitutionality of laws, and I think that if the
President wants to speak in that matter then he needs to go the Executive
Order route. ,I KH¶V JRLQJ WR VSHDN then speak but otherwise I think . . .
defending the law . . . is part of the role of the Attorney General and
something they have to do. SR,¶PJRLQJWRKDQGLWRIIWRWKHQH[WVSHDNHU
MICHELLE MCCLUER: I actually heard . . . Neil Cattell, the acting
Solicitor General, speak about his office and the role of his office on a day
where he had to jet out of the room, because the injunction had just come
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down, and he needed to go chat with the White House. And it was
interesting. TKH WKLQJV WKDW ZH¶YH KHDUG EHIRUH²³,W¶V WKHLU MRE DV WKH
6ROLFLWRU¶V 2IILFH WR GHIHQG ZKDWHYHU    KDV QRW EHHQ GHHPHG
unconstitutional up to that point´²ZKHWKHULW¶VSRSXODU>D@QGZKDWHYHU
. . . political whims are brewing including that of the current
administration. I thought this was really interesting because my view of the
6ROLFLWRU¶V 2IILFH KDG EHHQ PRUH    RI ³+H\, \RX¶UH ZRUNLQJ IRU WKH
3UHVLGHQWVR\RXIROORZZKDWKHKDVWRVD\´
And so that was an interesting insight to me, a very timely one, but I
KDYH KHDUG WKRXJK WKDW WKH 6ROLFLWRU *HQHUDO¶V 2IILFH GRHVQ¶W DOZD\V   
knee-jerk defend every provisioQ RI WKH 86 &RGH VR WKHUH¶V VRPH
GLVFUHWLRQEXWLW¶VGHILQLWHO\DPXGGOHGPHVVDJH
TY COBB: I would say the administration has been very consistent at
being inconsistent. They continuously rely on their duty to defend all laws
whether RU QRW WKH\ DJUHHZLWKWKHP 7KH\¶UHFRQVLVWHQWLQWKHVHQVHWKDW
they continue to defend the constitutionality of DADT and the Defense of
Marriage Act while opposing the laws.33 In 2009 the President explained
that DADT weakens national security, which is the basis for which
Congress actually enacted the law, and one of the basis that Justice
Department continues to use as a defense to challenges against the
constitutionality of DADT. There was no rational basis for enacting
DADT, the President has spoken to this point, but the Justice Department
continues to defend the law. 7KHUH¶VSUHFHGHQWWKDWWKH-XVWLFH'HSDUWPHQW
does not have to defend an unconstitutional law, but the Administration has
been very consistent in defending laws that the Administration opposes.
DAVID RITTGERS: I would just add a couple of points, not to confuse
7\¶VDUJXPHQWEXWWKH-XVWLFH'HSDUWPHQWGLGQRWDSSHDOWKHWitt decision
from the Ninth Circuit, which is . . . I think, directly on point here. When
the Ninth Circuit artiFXODWHG LWV VWDQGDUG DQG EDVLFDOO\ VDLG WKDW WKHUH¶V
going to be a burden shift in DADT cases in the Ninth Circuit, at least with
respect to as applied challenges. That case was not appealed to the Supreme
&RXUWDQGWKDW¶VZK\WKDWUXOH, I think, still stands today.
7KDW¶V ZK\    SHRSOH DUH WKLQNLQJ DERXW EULQJLQJ FDVHV LQ WKH 1LQWK
Circuit, because the law there is just simply better. And with respect to the
Executive Order issue WKDWZDVEURXJKWXS,WKLQNWKHUH¶VVRPH²it would
be great if it can be done in an Executive Order and done tomorrow²
legitimate constitutional questions as to whether or not the President has

33. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
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authority under ³Stop Loss´ to issue an Executive Order. I think it would
also raise a host of other potentially unexpected consequences with respect
to divisions of government.
STEVE VLADECK: I have one more question for the panel before we
turn it over to questions. I come at this from a different perspective, I think,
than the four of you, which is sort of the top down perspective. This is sort
of a piece of a larger puzzle and the larger puzzle that I see in teaching
Constitutional Law is lots of different areas where laws that discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation are at the forefront of policy and legal
debates²[such as] the Prop 8 lawsuits in California and the challenges for
the constitutionality of DOMA.
[S]ome of you may know [that] on Tuesday, Iowa voted out three of
WKHLU VWDWH¶V 6XSUHPH &RXUW -XVWLFHV DOPRVW HQWLUHO\ LQ UHVSRQVH Wo a
unanimous decision by their Supreme Court that same sex marriage is
protected by the Iowa Constitution.34 [S]R,¶PFXULRXV>WRknow] if you all
see DADT as a unique variation on this theme or as part of a much larger
growing national conversation and whether there are ways in which DADT
is either a poorer or better vehicle for those who are interested in moving
ahead on questions of sexual equality in the 21st century.
DAVID RITTGERS ,¶OO JR DKHDG DQG VD\ , WKLQN WKDW LW¶V D WHUULEOH
vehicle for moving this discussion forward. In 2003, the Supreme Court in
Lawrence v. Texas declared unconstitutional all of these [state] laws . . .
[criminalizing] consensual sodomy between two adults in the comfort of
their bedroom. That was once again applied by the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces to . . . knock out some of the prosecutions this conduct.
But the same article that I was talking about²that it was mostly dead,
but still partly-alive said that WKHORRSKROHWKDW¶VEHHQOHIWE\WKH&RXUWRI
$SSHDOV LQ WKH $UPHG )RUFHV PDNHV WKH PLOLWDU\ H[FHSWLRQ WKDW¶V FUHDWHG
by that case means that the sodomy article of the UCMJ is still mostlyalive, not totally dead. I think that the strong policy considerations in favor
of discipline of the force just make this a tougher aUHD LI \RX¶UH JRLQJ WR
litigate. This is a tougher area than other areas.
I think it was the same week, actually, Judge Philips came down, you
had a defense of marriage statute partially overruled in Massachusetts. I
think there was a federal employee who wanted to get benefits for their

34. See Krissah Thompson, Gay Marriage Fight Targeted Iowa Judges,
Politicizing Rule on Issue, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2010, 6:39 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/03/AR2010110307058.html.
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partner, is that correct?35
STEVE VLADECK: Yeah.
DAVID RITTGERS: So, you see the difference. When you have those
federal agencies but one military, one non-military, this is clearly
swimming upstream to get things done on DADT.
MICHELE MCCLUER: Maybe because I came from a military
background², ZRXOG VD\ LQ PDQ\ ZD\V LW¶V D WRXJKHU VHOO ZLWK WKH
military²but there may be a silver lining that makes it a little bit better,
DQG VR ,¶OO WDON DERXW ERWK >)@ROORZLQJ DORQJ ZLWK ZKDW 'DYLG VDLG KH¶V
referring to the United States v. Marcum case, which if you want to look it
XSDQGUHDGLWLW¶VDW0-²LW¶VD04 case.
My boss argued it. I was there when it was argued; [it was] very, very
LQWHUHVWLQJ 0RVW RI XV , WKLQN WKRXJKW ³+PP Lawrence v. Texas, that
pretty much means the end of Article 125 unless you can be quite clever
ZLWKWKHDUJXPHQW´DQG,JXHVV she was or . . . they bought it regardless of
the argument, EHFDXVH \RX DOZD\V KHDU WKDW DUJXPHQW GRHVQ¶W matter as
much as the briefs. But . . . the military has always gotten traditionally very
high deference from the courts in particular, which is another reason that
the courts in my opinion are not the best branch of government to be
deciding the issue.
We keep talking about the Ninth Circuit case, the Ninth Circuit case
gives a little less deference to the military than what you traditionally see²
and you see some of that with the cases involving the detainees. <RX¶UH
seeing less deference to the military in the Supreme Court. That sort of
swimming upstream, traditional ³+H\ LV WKH 'efense of Marriage Act
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO´ RU ³Should partners geW EHQHILWV´ WKDW VRUW RI [argument].
YRX GRQ¶W KDYH WKH LVVXHV WKDW \RX KDYH LQ WKH PLOLWDU\ ZKHUH PLOLWDU\
members have always given up some of their rights.
I mean, military members are not allowed to say thinJVOLNH³,KDWHWKH
3UHVLGHQW´DQG³7KH3UHVLGHQW¶VWKHVWXSLGHVWSHUVRQRQWKHSODQHW´³>+@H¶V
JRW WKH GXPEHVW GHFLVLRQV DQG PDNHV WKH VWXSLGHVW DUJXPHQWV´    DQG
writing a letter to the editor and sign your name: ³*HQHUDOSo-and-SR´7KH
same as a lot of other things that we give up the right [to do]. [W]e give up
the right to refuse immunizations. So that makes it a tougher sell.
On the other side, you have the history of the military. Because the
military is used to following orders, if and when policies change, people²
whether they agree with the policy or not²have been taught and [we] saw
35.

Gill v. Office Pers. Mgmt., 688 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass 2010).
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this with integration [of] the races as well as the sexes. If individuals are
WROG ³>+@HUH¶V WKH QHZ SROLF\ KHUH¶V ZKDW \RX QHHG WR GR´ SHRSOH DUH
JRLQJWRVDOXWHVPDUWO\DQGWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRJR [to it].
TY COBB: Not to belabor the point, but the courts deal with the military
as a different type of animal than society-at-large. The way the courts apply
WKH ODZ DQG FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SULQFLSOHV WR WKH PLOLWDU\ DUHQ¶W QHFHVVDULO\
DSSOLFDEOH RXWVLGH RI WKDW VPDOO VSDFH 6R , GRQ¶W NQRZ WKDW D IDYRUDEOH
court decision on DADT would necessarily be a vehicle to advance LGBT
equality generally in the courts. But like I said, I would certainly welcome
a favorable decision.
DAVID MCKEAN: LLNH,VDLG,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWDQ\UXOLQJIDYRUDEOH
to DADT would necessarily be translatable to a broader LGBT agenda
because like Ty said, those things are dealt with by the courts separately.
The one thing I would like to point out though is that they do seem to be
dealt with by the public at large somewhat differently in that approval for
repealing DADT is upwards of seventy-five perFHQW DQG WKDW¶V DFURVV
parties²that¶V DFURVV ZHHNO\ FKXUFK-goers. [I]t is very high²LW¶V QRW
seventy-five percent of all those groups²but on average.36
TY COBB: Yeah, it is a very, very high number of people. ,GRQ¶WWKLQN
the same thing can be said for other aspects of the LGBT agenda,
unfortunately.
STEVE VLADECK: [A] question?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Regarding the filibuster, one of the main
questions was²were there any other express reasons for the filibuster?
And we say this in terms of it seemed like the main talking point for the
ILOLEXVWHU ZDV WKDW WKH PLOLWDU\¶V UHSRUW KDG QRW FRPH RXW \HW DQG \HW LW
seems that as Ty and David stated, that [it] in fact did not necessarily have
anything to do with eventual passage of the Authorization Bill.
So I guess [this is] a multi-part question. Were there any express reasons
for the filibuster? Do we expect those reasons to come up again, and if and
when we see the report, do we feel that the filibuster is still the biggest
structural obstacle to the repeal of DADT?

36. Aubrey Sarvis, 'RQ¶W $VN 'RQ¶W 7HOO: Getting Repeal Right this Time,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23, 2008, 07:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aubreysarvis/dadt-getting-repeal-right_b_145874.html.
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TY COBB: Definitely. Looking back at September . . . when the
National Defense Authorization Act did not survive a filibuster, people like
to think it was because of DADT repeal, but like Michelle said, DADT
repeal is only [a] small, little piece of the National Defense Authorization
Act. The failed cloture vote had to do with a lot of things going on in
Congress at the time, including the upcoming mid-term elections and other
amendments, including the [Development, Relief and Education for Alien
0LQRUV ³'5($0´ @Act.37
DAVID MCKEAN: And jet engines as well.
TY COBB: Yes, jet engines.
DAVID MCKEAN: I mean, The [DREAM] Act happened, if I recall
correctly, at least publicly right. Senator Reid²DQG KH¶V VWLOO 6HQDWRU
Reid²had attached the [DREAM] Act. The [DREAM] Act is an
immigration reform measure and he attached it rather late, which is not to
VD\WKDW5HSXEOLFDQVKDGQ¶WDWWDFKHGWKLQJVODWHEXWthat there was sort of a
process objection in applying the filibuster.
TY COBB: Right, he wanted to vote on the DREAM Act and other
senators had opposing views. There were many issues being debated when
the Defense Authorization Bill failed to move forward. ,W ZDVQ¶W MXVW
DADT repeal.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you feel that a filibuster could come up
again after December 1st?
TY COBB 7KHUH¶V D UHWLFHQFH WR PRYLQJ IRUZDUG ZLWK '$'7 UHSHDO
until the December 1st report comes out. As I said earlier, the report does
not talk about whether we should repeal DADT. It looks at what policy
changes need to be made to implement a repeal. There were several people
that opposed the moving forward on the Defense Bill, in some part,
because they did not want to move until this December 1st report comes
out.
So obviously once the December 1st report comes out, that talking point
is gone. I am sure there will be a new talking point, as there always is, but
that talking point does disappear December 1st, and, going forward, I
would expect a filibuster, because the Senate has probably filibustered
37. Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010, S. 3827,
111th Cong. (2010).
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DOPRVW HYHU\ ELOO WKDW KDG JRQH WKURXJK WKLV \HDU <RX GRQ¶W VHH PXFK
movement in the Senate without a filibuster.
STEVE VLADECK: Ty²and this is just thinking out loud²EXWGRQ¶W
yRX DOVR VXVSHFW WKDW LI LW ORRNV FORVH WKHUH¶V JRLQJ WR EH D SURFHVV
objection that Senators should not be moving ahead with legislation that
their replacements probably would not be in support of?
TY COBB,GRQ¶WWKLQNVR7KHUHLVWKLVH[SHFWDWLRQWKDt the National
'HIHQVH $XWKRUL]DWLRQ $FW LV SDVVHG HYHU\ \HDU DQG , GRQ¶W WKLQN WKDW D
process issue is what is going to stop the National Defense Authorization
Act from going forward.
DAVID MCKEAN: So it might affect other legislation but not this?
TY COBB: I think so. Passage of the National Defense Authorization
Act is something that we expect every year. It is something that has
happened for almost fifty years at this point. And so it would be strange if
it was not passed after the midterm elections.
STEVE VLADECK: Which has been done before?
TY COBB: Yes, yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Moving more toward the report itself. It was
mentioned earlier that the United Kingdom and Israel do allow openly gay
servicemembers. One: is the DOD in this report trying to study these
[countries] and other international examples? Then two: along those same
lines, could you speak about how the military will have to change its
internal policies, if and when, servicemembers are allowed to serve as
openly gay service members? And specifically, how will this deal with
issues such as incentivizing marriage? Will they be allowed the same
marriage benefits as current heterosexual couples?
DAVID RITTGERS: ,¶OO WDNH WKDW EHFDXVH , PHQtioned the other
militaries. So let me just tease it out, there were like three questions, like
how will this affect combat readiness. How are we going to . . . implement
this and I think the second one was the broader legal scope of family law or
whatever you want to call it. $QG WKH WKLUG RQH ZKLFK ,¶P MXVW JRLQJ WR
disregard right now, is the homophobic nature of the military.
Of the folks that are listening right now, I think Colin Powell was right,
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seventeen years ago this was a tougher sell. But I think times have changed
and kids coming into the military now do not have the hang-ups that were
in place seventeen years ago.38 >7KHUH¶V@D generational change in the folks
that are . . . coming in and enlisting right now. So back to the first
[question], the British and Israelis have done it.
,¶P FHUWDLQ WKDW WKH\¶UH ORRNLQJ DW WKLV ,W¶V DFWXDOO\ EHHQ GRQH EHIRUH;
this has been studied before by the Rand Corporation,39 and other folks
have already looked at this, and have looked at the personnel policies of
WKHVHRWKHUPLOLWDULHV,¶PFHUWDLQWKDWZKDWHYHUWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRSURGXFH
is going to, in large part, mirror whatever the Brits and Israelis do.
The reason I focus on the British and Israelis is because they have real
militaries that really fight. , GRQ¶W FDUH ZKDW /X[embourg does. Great, if
they let people serve gay openly, good for them. But we should focus on . .
. what the question says: ³>:@KDW [are] the folks who have top notch
FRPEDWXQLWVGRLQJ"´And then I think iW¶VDFWXDOO\the second part of . . .
³>+@RZ GRHV WKLV ILW LQ WKH EURDGHU OHJDO VFKHPH´ WKDW JHWV EDFN WR ZKDW
Steve ZDVVD\LQJDERXW³>:@KHUHGRHVWKLVILWLQWRVRUWRIWKHEURDGHU
GLVFXVVLRQ´DQG,WKLQNWKDWWKHPDUULDJHSLHFHRILW²,GRQ¶WWKLQN\RX
cDQDGGUHVVDOORI³>'@RVHUYLFHPHPEHUVJHWWR marry, have same sex
PDUULDJHVDQGKDYHWKHPKRQRUHG´XQWLO&RQJUHVVUHYLVLWV'20$.
DAVID MCKEAN: To pick it up on the back of that, first I do want to
reemphasize that the first point you made which is the lack of homophobia
in the military especially with regards to the younger recruit. The Military
Times²where its readership is widely considered to be kind of an older,
more conservative readership²for the first time this year found that . . .
just over fifty percent of [its] readers . . . were in favor of, RUGLGQ¶WFDUH
whether or not DADT was repealed.40
And those numbers just climb as you get down to people who are
\RXQJHU DQG , PHDQ LW¶V UHDOly a generational issue. The people who are
VHUYLQJZKRDUHVLJQLQJXSQRZKDYHQ¶W lived in a world without DADT.
This is a seventeen year-old law and the kids signing up right before they
graduate from high school are often that age, believe it or not, which gives
38. See Karen DeYoung, Colin Powell Now Says Gays Should be able to Serve
Openly in the Military, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2010, at A4, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/03/AR2010020302292.html.
39. BERNARD D. ROSTKER ET AL., RAND CORP., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S.
MILITARY
POLICY
(1993),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/RAND_MR323.pdf.
40. See Lisa Leff, Appeals Court: Gay Ban can Stay, for Now, MILITARY TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2010, 5:55pm), http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2010/10/ap-militarydont-ask-dont-tell-case-moves-to-appellate-court-102010/.
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them a birthday of like [19]92. 6RLW¶V just not as much of an issue. 7KDW¶V
QRWWRVD\WKDWKRPRSKRELDGRHVQ¶WH[LVWLQWKHPLOLWDU\, as it does lots of
places, but the military is a very, very capable and disciplined organization
DQGWKDWGRHVQ¶WFKDQJHLQWKLVFDVH
With respect to the laws or regulations that may QHHGWREHFKDQJHG,¶OO
be brief here. For a lot of the benefits issues, there may be a DOMA issue
there as much as anything else. 7KDW¶V QRW WR VD\ WKDW WKHUe aUHQ¶W VRPH
potential work-arounds, EXWWKDW¶VH[DFWO\ZKDWWKHFRPSUHKHQVLYHZRUNLQJ
group is doing right now, which is figuring out exactly what regulations
would need to be changed.
The one thing that would not need to be changed, or very little of it
would need to be changed, is a regulation based on conduct. Most of the
regulations based on conduct, whether sexual misconduct or other
misconduct, are sexual-orientation neutral. 7KH\GRQ¶WGHDOZLWKZKHWKHURU
not a man assaults a woman or a straight man assaults a straight woman,
LW¶VQRWKRZWKH\DUHZULWWHQDQGQRUZRXOGLWSUREDEO\RFFXUWRDQ\ERG\WR
write them that way.
,I WKHUH¶V DQ DVVDXOW LW¶V GHDOW ZLWK ZKHWKHU RU QRW RQH SHUVRQ VH[XDOO\
DVVDXOWV DQRWKHU SHUVRQ DQG LQ IDFW , EHOLHYH WKHUH¶V VRPH historical
research to find that when some of the sexual assault provisions were
written, it was before . . . women were widely serving in the military²it
was in order to prevent same-sex male-on-male sexual assaults. I think
these are totally applicable and capable of providing any sort of discipline
that the military needs to enforce and the rest will have to be visited after
repeal.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Will there be support at all levels?
TY COBB,WKLQNWKDWLW¶VNLQGRISUHPDWXUHWRPDNHWKDWdetermination
now, EHFDXVH ZH¶UH JRLQJ WR ILQG RXW ZKDW WKH 3HQWDJRQ ZRUNLQJ JURXS
discovers in about nine days. 2Q'HFHPEHUVWZH¶OOJHWDQLGea of where
service members and their families²where the military²stands on this
issue. But something to think about, strong leadership will be required to
implement a change like this.
You also talked about looking at foreign armies. The working group is
looking at foreign armies, WKH\¶re updating the old RAND report, which
was made back in the 1990¶s that evaluated how other militaries made a
change to open service. And one of the key ways this was done was by
making the change quickly and exhibiting leadership from the top. ,W¶V D
FOHDUTXLFNFKDQJHZKHUHWKHOHDGHUVKLSVD\VWKLVLVKRZLW¶VJRLQJWREH,
assume that the report coming out December 1st will find that the military
is ready for this, and I expect that the leadership within the military will be
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assertive in implementing these new policies, because the RAND report
will likely show that this is how other countries have dealt with such a
change.
DAVID MCKEAN: I think the leadership component cannot be
understated. Maybe David or Michelle would like to speak on how much of
a difference leadership, especially within the context of a chain of
command, really does influence the way people behave in the service.
DAVID RITTGERS,ZRXOGMXVWVD\WKDWWKHUH¶VEHHQVRPHGLIIHUHQW
views coming from the Service Chiefs and I think just as late as last week
or maybe this week, [the] Chief of the Marine CorSVZDVVD\LQJWKHUH¶VDQ
exception policy for the Marines where the Navy would have . . . a certain
amount of space that each person is supposed to have, and the Marine
Corps has an expressed exemption to that and they live in austere
conditions, and so he opposes the change of the policy based on that
service.
Requirements with the bottom line, that once the military is told do
something, and the leadership gets involved[,] makes an order effective,
WKHQWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRH[HFXWHWKHRUGHU
DAVID MCKEAN: It should also just be noted very quickly that there
are currently²LW¶V QRW WKDW WKHUH DUH QR JD\ DQG lesbian service people
today EHFDXVH REYLRXVO\ ZH FDQ¶W DVN WKHP WR WHOO XV ZKR WKH\ DUH²an
estimated 66,000 [LGBT] servicemembers, which is not the vast majority
of the services by any stretch, but there are people. You rarely speak to
somebody who served any length of time who can credibly say that they
have never served with [or] known somebody in the military who was gay.
STEVE VLADECK: So I guess this leads to my next question which is:
so what is life after DADT? >3@UHVXPDEO\WKHUH¶VVWLOOJRLQJWREHFRQFHUQV
about, as you mentioned in your remarks, the . . . anti-harassment policies.
And I guess the question is . . . how to adequately balance respect for
equality with the particular needs of the military? Would you counsel
leaders in the Pentagon and in the Congress to construct a sort of viable,
non-discriminatory policy that accounts for . . . the parts of DADT [that
are] actually . . . sensible²the parts of DADT have come from a place that
. . . are justified?
MICHELLE MCCLUER: >7@KHUH    DUH D ORW RI WKLQJV WKDW ZH¶OO
have to deal with under new policies. What do you do about [the
/LHXWHQDQW &KRL¶V@ DQG WKH 0DUJDUHW :LWW¶V ZKR have been discharged
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already? How do you reintegrate them and get them back to where they
ZRXOGKDYHEHHQRUZKHUHWKH\KDYHQ¶WORVWDOOWKLVWLPHDQGVWDWXUH
and all that?
Post-homosexual conduct [and what it] means for discharge in the
military is going to be mainly depend on the leadership. My dad used to
UHSHDW WKH SKUDVH ³%HDW RQ the bosses, beat on WKH JDQJ´ [I] know from
just thinking about my last duty station, even when we had a case where
there was an allegation of homosexual assault, we dealt very gingerly with
the individual who was accused, because it is a very sensitive area.
And this is under the policy where homosexual conduct is not
compatible ZLWK PLOLWDU\ VHUYLFH EXW RQFH WKH SROLF\ LV FKDQJHG \RX¶UH
going to see even more of an emphasis. [W]e already, on a yearly basis, in
some services²in others twice yearly²do things like . . . antifraternization briefings, and EULHILQJVRQ³>+@HUH¶VZKDWsexual harassment
LV´EHFDXVHOLNHWKHRWKHUVKDYHVDLG\RXDOUHDG\KDYHKRPRVH[XDOVLQ
WKH PLOLWDU\ ZKHWKHU WKH\¶UH FLYLOLDQV ZKHWKHU WKH\¶UH FRQWUDFWRUV or
ZKHWKHUWKH\¶UHRWKHUVHUYLFHPHPEHUV
Disrespect for your fellow service members detracts from the mission if
\RX¶YH JRW LQGLYLGuals who are harassing others. ,¶P QRW VXUH WKDW WKHUH
would be other new policies. TKHUHMXVWPLJKWEHQHZHPSKDVLVRQ³>7@KLV
LQFOXGHVKRPRVH[XDOEDVKLQJ´But I really think that for a large number of
individuals, DWOHDVWDWWKHEHJLQQLQJHYHQXQGHUDQHZSROLF\WKH\¶UHVWLOO
JRLQJWRWKLQN³>2@ND\ :HOOLI,GRFRPHRXWDP , JRLQJWRKDYHVRPH
VRUWRIUDPLILFDWLRQVDJDLQVWPHZKHWKHULW¶VVXEFRQVFLRXVO\ZKHWKHULW¶V
in my performance report, or the assignments that I get.´I think the policy
. . . change may be rapid but it may not be as rapid as we think it will be.
DAVID MCKEAN: If I can just add a couple of things to that. I think
WKHUH¶VWZREURDGissues after DADT that I think are worth thinking about.
The first is an easy one and much easier than the second one. The first is
what to do inter-military with personnel policies and things like that. That
can be dealt with. 7KHUH¶V D mechanism for dealing with it. 7KHUH¶V D
working group . . . considering it, there are groups like ours who are
GHGLFDWLQJDQHQRUPRXVDPRXQWRIWLPHWRLW>7@KDW¶VDVROYDEOHSUREOHP
in a fairly straight forward manner.
The second is what to do with people who are discharged and who have
been out of the service for some time now, or even just a little bit of time,
who want to go back in? 7KHUH¶VDIHZLVVXHVthat are very important there.
Do you give credit to the people who were discharged for all the time that
they would have had? Do they go in at the rank that they were or the rank
that they would have been?
Do you, if there are no spots open for . . . radar technicians in a certain
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unit where the person was discharged, . . . create one for them? [I]t will be
a potentially complicated issue to deal with. 7KDWGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWLW¶VQRW
ZRUWKGRLQJDQGLWGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWIDLUQHVVDQGMXVWLFHGRQ¶WUHTXLUHWKDW
of us. It just means that it might take a little longer. The other thing I
wanted to point out is that a ORW RI SHRSOH ZKHQ ZH¶UH GLVFXVVLQJ WKHVH
things, have the assumption . . . that when DADT is repealed, gay and
lesbian service members will be known to their counterparts, which may be
true but it may not be.
Nobody has to come out on [the] day after DADT is repealed, and if you
think about the way life works, PRVWSHRSOHSUREDEO\ZRQ¶W3HRSOHGRQ¶W
FRPHRXWXQWLOWKH\DUHVDIHDQGFRPIRUWDEOHDQGWKLQNWKDWWKH\ZRQ¶WEH
subject to any sort of reprimand or harassment. It might be the case that the
policy changes and that [the] actual practical matter of the policy is not
EHLQJLPSOHPHQWHGDVTXLFNO\EXWWKDWZRQ¶WLPSDFWVRPHERG\QHFHVVDULO\
XQOHVVWKH\PDGHWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWWKH\¶UHJRLQJWREHFRPLQJRXW²
WKDWWKH\WKLQNWKDWWKH\¶UHLQDVDIe environment.
STEVE VLADECK: Great. Well thank you to our panelists. We have
one last closing . . . treat before we leave today. He[re] to give us some
closing remarks is TRQ\ 9DURQD ZKR¶V >D@ 3URIHVVRU RI /DZ DQG WKH
Associate Dean for Faculty and Academic Affairs here at WCL.
TONY VARONA: Thank you so much Steve. I will be very brief
because I was not able to attend the panel and hear your presentations and
so ,ZRXOGQ¶WZDQWWRUHWUHDGground that you have already covered. I will
share with you that I had the privilege of working on [the] DADT repeal
efforts some years back and I can tell you that my experience has been over
the last few years that nothing much has changed.
This is a policy problem, a political problem, a legal problem that is of a
very interesting sort. It seems to us DQG E\ ³XV´ , PHDQ WKH /*%7 FLYLO
rights movement, that trusted polls indicate that the American public is on
the side of repeal. The Congress by and large is on the side of repeal. The
President has told us that he is in favor of repeal, and the courts are telling
us that they are in favor of appeal.
6RZKHUH¶VWKHUHSHDO"7he question, really, becomes one of tactics and
strategy and repealing in the right way according to the right sequencing,
whatever that might be. And so the theoretical question of whether repeal is
the right way to go becomes how to repeal and when. I am certain that
WKDW¶VWKHFRPSOLFDWHGTXHVWLRQWKDW\RXVWUXJJOHGZLth the most during this
panel. So I bring you greetings and thanks from Dean Grossman who is
very happy that this panel took place and would have been here had the
Committee Against Torture at the UN had . . . scheduled their proceedings
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for another time. He offers you his thanks and his greetings.
I thank my colleague, Professor Vladeck for doing what I am sure was a
fantastic job as he always does moderating and I thank Michelle McClure,
David McKean, Ty Cobb. >+@H¶VVWLOODWWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV&Dmpaign. ,¶P
a former General Counsel Legal Director there and I GRQ¶WWKLQNRXUSDWKV
have crossed. [A]nd David Rittgers, thank you very much. . . . I also thank
everybody who put the program together from the [Office of Diversity
Services], [the] Program on Law and Government, the National Security
Law Brief, the Labor and Employment Law Forum, [the LAMBDA] Law
Society, the Legislation Policy Brief, the Modern American, [the] Veterans
of American University, the Health Law and Justice Initiative and AU
Queers and Allies.
Thank you all very much, thank you for a job well done and have a great
rest of the week.
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